Report Contrasting CRESSI’s Approach of Social Innovation with that of Neoclassical Economics by Houghton Budd,, C et al.
 CRESSI Working papers 
 
 
The CRESSI project explores the economic 
underpinnings of social innovation with 
a particular focus on how policy and 
practice can enhance the lives of the most 
marginalized and disempowered citizens 
in society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
CRESSI Working Papers 
No. 12/2015  
 
Report Contrasting CRESSI’s Approach of Social Innovation 
with that of Neoclassical Economics 
 
By C. Houghton Budd, C.W.M. Naastepad, and C. P. van Beers (Eds.) 
 
Deliverable 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRESSI Working Papers are published by the 
CRESSI Project and may be downloaded free of 
charge from the CRESSI website: 
www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cressi 
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 1 | 133 
 
Report Contrasting CRESSI’s Approach of Social Innovation 
with that of Neoclassical Economics 
Deliverable 1.31  
By C. Houghton Budd, C.W.M. Naastepad, and C. P. van Beers (Eds.) 
     
Contents 
 
PART 1 − To guide the reader ......................................................................... 4 
 
1. Introduction (C. Houghton Budd, C.W.M. Naastepad, and C. P. van Beers) 
1.1. Theoretical framework .......................................................................................... 5 
1.2. Working terminology ............................................................................................ 6 
1.3. Structure of the report ........................................................................................... 7 
1.4. The brief for this report ......................................................................................... 8 
1.5. Synopses of the papers .......................................................................................... 9 
 
 
PART 2 − Task 1.4: How does an economic sociology of social 
innovation challenge conventional economic assumptions concerning 
the role and development of innovation in general? ..................................... 15 
 
2. Institutions from a Capability Approach perspective (N. von Jacobi) ......................... 16 
2.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 16 
2.2. Defining institutions ............................................................................................ 16 
2.3. Relative position and collective capabilities ....................................................... 21 
2.4. Conclusion........................................................................................................... 22 
 
3. Innovation – a genealogy from the standard approach in economics to an 
economic-sociological model for human development (R. Ziegler) ............................ 25 
3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 25 
3.2. Standard economics and innovation.................................................................... 26 
3.3. The Schumpeterian critique of the standard approach ........................................ 29 
3.4. Ecology and destruction ...................................................................................... 31 
3.5. Towards an extended grid model for better understanding the economic 
underpinnings of (social) innovation for human development ........................... 33 
 
4. How does social innovation challenge neo-classical assumptions regarding 
technological innovation? (A. Havas) .......................................................................... 40 
4.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 40 
4.2. Technical, organisational and institutional changes: a subject in classical 
economics ............................................................................................................ 41 
                                                          
1 This report forms CRESSI project Deliverable 1.3, which was submitted to the EC on 28th February 
2015. The editors for this report are: C. Houghton Budd, C.W.M. Naastepad, and C. P. van Beers. The 
report layout was completed by E. Arkesteijn-van Schaik. The lead partner for this deliverable is: Delft 
University of Technology. Other participating partners are: Austrian Institute of Technology; Institute of 
Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; University of 
Greifswald; University of Pavia. This report is available online at: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-
impact/cressi/publications-0 
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 2 | 133 
 
4.3. Technical, organisational and institutional changes: exogenous factors in 
neo-classical economics ...................................................................................... 43 
4.4. Social innovation and the assumptions of neo-classical economics ................... 45 
 
5. Neoclassical economics and innovation – An EU policy making perspective on 
legitimising R&I policy  (K. Kubeczko) ...................................................................... 47 
 
PART 3 − Task 1.5: What incentive structures or types of motivation 
best suit social innovation addressing the marginalised? ............................. 50 
 
6. Aristotelian economics and modern finance. A consideration of the true 
counterpart to today’s financial markets (C.W.M. Naastepad and C. Houghton 
Budd) 51 
6.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 51 
6.2. Background ......................................................................................................... 52 
6.3. A first attempt at quantification .......................................................................... 53 
6.4. ‘Too much capital’ and ‘the real values of life’ .................................................. 55 
6.5. Humanity’s ‘permanent problem’ ....................................................................... 56 
6.6. Rethinking growth ............................................................................................... 57 
6.7. In search of the ‘invisible hand’ .......................................................................... 60 
6.8. Freedom, responsibility, character and capital .................................................... 62 
6.9. A twin theory for capital ..................................................................................... 63 
6.10. Freed capital ........................................................................................................ 64 
6.11. The ‘unfinished symphony’ of Marshall, Keynes, Mill, Smith and Marx .......... 65 
6.12. Telos and ethos .................................................................................................... 70 
6.13. Two kinds of capital; two concepts of liberty ..................................................... 70 
6.14. Capital = capacities ............................................................................................. 72 
6.15. Capital and the emancipation of the human being .............................................. 73 
6.16. Conclusion........................................................................................................... 75 
 
7. Commitment to social and ecological objectives: Crucial in generating social 
innovations for the marginalised? (J. Lodemann) ........................................................ 87 
7.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 87 
7.2. Definition of commitment ................................................................................... 88 
7.3. Commitment and social innovation .................................................................... 92 
7.4. Summary ............................................................................................................. 94 
 
8. From rational agents to human diversity (M. Sebastianelli, E. Chiappero and N. 
von Jacobi) .................................................................................................................... 97 
8.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 97 
8.2. Comparing the two approaches ........................................................................... 98 
8.3. Economic agents ............................................................................................... 100 
8.4. The nature of rationality .................................................................................... 101 
8.5. Evaluative space and metric .............................................................................. 108 
8.6. Conceptual space for social innovation ............................................................. 109 
 
9. The role of incentives versus intrinsic motivation in relation to micro-
credit activities  (G. Molnár) ...................................................................................... 115 
9.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 115 
9.2. Motivations in setting up microlending institutions.......................................... 116 
9.3. The marginalised on the Hungarian labour market: incentives versus inner 
motivations ........................................................................................................ 119 
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 3 | 133 
 
PART 4 − Task 1.6: Synthesis and sharing ......................................................... 119 
 
10. CRESSI’s Common Framework (C. Houghton Budd, C.W.M. Naastepad, and C. 
P. van Beers)  .............................................................................................................. 119 
10.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 119 
10.2. A succinct-as-possible explanation of neoclassical economics (NCE) in 
relation to social innovation addressing marginalisation .................................. 119 
10.3. ‘Externalities’ in social innovation ................................................................... 124 
10.4. Towards theoretical foundations for social innovation: CRESSI’s Common 
Framework ........................................................................................................ 128 
10.5. Conclusion......................................................................................................... 132 
 
 
  
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 4 | 133 
 
 
 
PART 1 
 
To guide the reader 
  
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 5 | 133 
 
1. Introduction 
 
By Christopher Houghton Budd, C.W.M. (Ro) Naastepad and Cees van Beers  
 
This report is part of CRESSI project Work Package 1 (WP1)2. It follows the previous 
deliverable (D1.1), entitled Report on Institutions, Social Innovation & System 
Dynamics from the Perspective of the Marginalised3. That report provided initial 
contextualising of the CRESSI concept and project, with its aim of Creating Economic 
Space for Social Innovation with a view to contributing to the overcoming of 
marginalisation4. This theme takes its cue from the statement in the EU (2013) FP7 
programme call that  
“…we lack systematic research about how markets, public sector and 
institutions (including incentives, norms and legal provisions) work for 
those groups of society which are marginalised….”5  
 
1.1. Theoretical framework 
Devised from the work of three main scholars – Jens Beckert, Amartya Sen, and 
Michael Mann – the over-arching research objective of WP1 is to develop a novel 
theoretical framework to improve understanding of the economic underpinnings of 
marginalisation and social innovation in the European Union.6 Other approaches, such 
as Resilience Theory7, Schumpeterian economics,8 and novel perspectives on capital 
(especially its link to capacities or capabilities)9 will also play a role. 
The primary framework is the social grid of Beckert, the essence of which is that no 
single social field has a primary role ex ante. On the contrary, different social structures 
are likely to be at play contemporaneously, which means that their interconnections and 
co-evolution need to be taken seriously. For Beckert there are three main and irreducible 
social forces: cognitive frames, social networks and institutions (see Deliverable 1.1, 
Chapters 2 and 4). 
The value and validity of such a grid is being explored by way of Sen’s ‘capabilities 
approach’, whereby individuals alone and/or collectively transform their ‘endowments 
into ‘achieved functionings’ (see Deliverable 1.1, Chapters 3 and 510).  
Such a process, along with its success vis-à-vis the real world, is also being conceived 
                                                          
2 Further details about the CRESSI project, including its work packages and deliverables, can be found at: 
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-impact/cressi 
3 Chapters from this deliverable are available online at: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-
impact/cressi/publications-0 
4 Marginalisation is a key word which, however, people interpret in various ways. Coming to an agreed, 
shared and clear meaning that the world can also use is one of the project’s main challenges. 
5 European Commission (2012) Activity 8.1, SSH.2013.1.1-1 ‘Economic underpinnings of social 
innovation’ of FP7 Cooperation Work Programme 2013 Theme 8: Socio-economic sciences and 
humanities. 
6 For a definition of these terms, see Section 1.2: Working terminology. 
7 Grant Agreement, Annex 1, WP1 description.  
8 Grant Agreement, Annex 1, WP1 description.  
9 Grant Agreement, Annex 1, WP5 description.  
10 Both chapters are downloadable at: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-impact/cressi/publications-0 
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and evaluated in terms of Mann’s account of four (which were expanded by Risto 
Heiskala, one of the partners in D1.1, into six) social powers (see Deliverable 1.1, 
Chapters 9 to 1111).  
These perspectives have been combined into a Common Framework, set out in D1.1 
Chapter 11. 
1.2. Working terminology 
The work in the project relates to an important set of concepts – in particular, 
marginalisation, social innovation, and economic underpinnings. These are being used 
in the sense of initial and provisional, even loose, formulations, so that their deeper or 
agreed meanings can be explored as the project unfolds. Such a working terminology 
serves to give all partners a shared focus, while avoiding the stifling or standardising of 
researchers’ intellectual creativity and freedom. The hope is to arrive at convergence of 
meaning out of diverse perspectives. 
 
1.2.1. Marginalisation 
The EU has no fixed meaning for ‘marginalisation’ or for ‘vulnerable people’. The 
connotation is often of poverty and people on the edge of society, but such things as 
poverty are complex matters, while one also has to distinguish between those who need 
help extended to them and those who, were it not for lack of resources, could develop 
and drive their own overcoming of marginalisation. What marginalisation actually 
comes to mean in the CRESSI context will therefore depend on the terms of reference 
and empirical findings of the cases studied. 
 
1.2.2. Social innovation 
The EU descriptor for social innovation is more concrete, namely, “the development 
and delivery of new ideas and solutions (products, services, models, markets, processes) 
at different socio-structural levels that intentionally seek to change power relations and 
improve human capabilities, as well as the processes via which these solutions are 
carried out.”  
 
1.2.3. Economic underpinnings 
Conventionally, both theoretically and empirically the economic underpinnings of social 
innovation are understood in terms of “how different actors gain access to the resources 
needed to innovate in a general context of scarcity”.12 These resources include “not only 
financial capital, but also manufactured, social, and cultural capital, and natural 
resources, depending on the context of the innovation. Access to resources raises 
questions of efficient and effective allocation, as well as of fair distribution and 
sustainable use.”13 
This echoes but is not quite the same as ‘the economic problem’ when understood as 
efficient allocation of scarce resources, leading to the question: to what extent does 
                                                          
11 Chapters 9-11 are downloadable at: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-impact/cressi/publications-0 
12 Grant Agreement, Annex 1, Part B, p. 8. 
13 Ibid. 
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social innovation require a widening of today’s prevailing concepts and theories, 
including ‘the micro-foundations of economic theory’14 beyond the current paradigm? 
Put more succinctly, can space, and economic space in particular, be created for social 
innovation if all social life is reduced to markets? 
1.2.4. Capabilities, capacities, and related concepts 
In the context of the CRESSI project, with its emphasis on Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach15 there is a need for precision as to the use of the word ‘capability’, as well as 
of related words which are also central to the project, such as ‘capacities’. There is also 
the fact that, in English, both words have general meanings, which would tend to 
override, as it were, any specific meaning unless that qualified use is made clear. 
In general (and dictionary) usage, ‘capability’ can mean the power or ability to do 
something, the extent of someone's or something's ability, and the facility to perform a 
specified task. ‘Capacity’ means, variously, the amount that something can contain or 
produce, the ability or power to do or understand something, and a role, as in ‘his 
capacity as director’. If one discounts the meanings linked to physical life, such as an 
army’s capability on the battlefield or a cup’s capacity to hold water, focusing instead 
on the social meanings, then it is evident that these terms are also somewhat 
overlapping if not interchangeable. 
In writing this report, we have sought to let the context make this clear where the 
meanings of these words have been made specific. For example, Sen’s ‘Capability 
Approach’ uses ‘capability’ in the sense of being capable of, or ability, hence ‘beings’ 
or ‘doings’, which it further translates as ‘functionings’ – states and activities that 
constitute a person's being. Examples of functionings vary from being healthy, having a 
good job, and being safe, to being happy, having self-respect, and being calm. In other 
words, capability is conceptualised as a reflection of the freedom to achieve valuable 
(often non-economic) ‘functionings’, achieved through the agency of one’s ability to 
pursue one’s goals on a basis of self-determination, self-empowerment and autonomy.  
The term ‘capacities’ as used in CRESSI, refers to such human qualities as intelligence, 
consciousness, thinking, ideation, intuition, creativity and initiative, non-material 
dimensions to human existence (and indeed wealth or value creation) without which 
economic and social life, and capital in particular, would make little sense. Arguably, 
creating economic space for social innovation depends crucially on such ‘capacities’, 
and a main problem we face is narrow or simplified thinking that does not capture such 
ephemeral phenomena. Such thinking, therefore, often fails to embrace the full meaning 
of socio-economic events, at the same time that it too readily marginalises or ‘outlies’ 
those people, events and ideas that challenge the viability of its assumptions. 
 
1.3. Structure of the report 
In the previous CRESSI report (D1.1) we focused on research tasks conducted under 
three sub-headings: 
                                                          
14 Grant Agreement, Annex 1, Part B, p. 9. 
15 Through his academic work over decades, Sen had come to remark the importance of an ethical and philosophical 
analysis as the basis for a new concept of development, distinct from other current economic perspectives within 
international development theories: “values are not then just instruments, but also views of what should be or should 
not be promoted” (Sen, 1988). 
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• Task 1.1: What are the common institutional factors at play in defining and 
facilitating the enactment of effective social innovation focused on the marginalised 
in different contexts? 
• Task 1.2: What are the systemic dynamics that delineate the lifecycles and resilience 
of social innovation? 
• Task 1.3: How is power enacted in the key contexts for social innovation? 
 
This report (D1.3) comprises two further topic areas: 
• Task 1.4: How does an economic sociology of social innovation challenge 
conventional economic assumptions concerning the role and development of 
innovation in general? 
• Task 1.5: What incentive structures or types of motivation best suit social 
innovation addressing the marginalised? 
 
The report at hand has four parts. Part 1 is this Introduction. The remaining sections 
explain Task 1.4 and Task 1.5 in more detail (Section 1.4), and provide synopses of the 
papers in this report (Section 1.5). 
Parts 2 and 3 comprise the various papers under the headings of Task 1.4 and 1.5 
respectively. Part 4, comprising Task 1.6, presents the findings of this stage of the work, 
and provides a (tentative) common framework as it emerges from the eight papers in 
this report, which is to guide the case studies, measurement and analysis to be 
undertaken later in the project. Conversely, the work done in the remainder of this 
project will feed back into the common framework. 
 
1.4. The brief for this report 
The ‘bottom line’ of the brief suggested for the papers covered by this report16 was: 
How does the project’s suggested approach to social innovation differ from established 
neoclassical microeconomic analyses? And what departure from, or further evolution of, 
neoclassical economics is required for social innovation?  
As regards Task 1.4 (How does an economic sociology of social innovation challenge 
conventional economic assumptions concerning the role and development of innovation 
in general?), the idea was to integrate the conceptual tools elaborated in the previous 
three tasks by referring to more standard economic analysis. In particular, to compare 
the notions of vulnerability, institutions, power and social innovation17 previously 
developed in this Work Package with today’s predominant neoclassical microeconomic 
analysis, and to highlight the utility of each of these different approaches in terms of an 
analysis of social innovation and its (potential) impact on the most marginalised and 
vulnerable populations particularly in terms of institutional and systems level structures 
and dynamics. 
Task 1.5 (What incentive structures best suit social innovation addressing the 
marginalised?) focuses on a concern that the scale and viability of innovation that takes 
                                                          
16 See Grant Agreement, Annex 1, Part B. 
17 Per OED, to innovate is ‘to change into something new, to bring something new into being, or to 
change something already established.’ 
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 9 | 133 
 
social and ecological goals into account often appears to be limited because of 
incompatibilities with the normative theoretical foundations on which our economic 
order rests. Neoclassical economic theory suggests that the rational, utility-maximising 
individual will allocate resources to maximise his own returns rather than returns to 
others or to society generally. This view of the allocation of resources rests on narrow 
assumptions about human motivation. Human beings are depicted as ‘rational fools’ 
(Sen, 1990), whose main motivation is myopic, microeconomic self-interest. This is not 
just a positive (objective) characteristic, but a utilitarian moral prescription; according to 
this paradigm human behaviour should be guided by self-interest in order to achieve 
maximum common welfare.  
This theory is, however, increasingly questioned by philosophers and economists who 
argue that, in reality, human actors balance two opposing sets of propensities, the self-
oriented and the other-oriented. It is this balance, rather than self-interest alone, which 
qualifies human beings for social existence. Moreover, a one-sided emphasis on self-
interest may erode our social qualities (Sen 1997; Grant 2011). If the only factor that 
can possibly motivate people towards ethical behaviour is financial gain, sustainable 
and inclusive growth may prove prohibitively costly, if attainable at all in any 
effectively social way.  
There is a need, therefore, to study how commitment to social and ecological objectives, 
or ‘intrinsic motivation’, is critical to generating business and employment opportunities 
for the marginalised in ways that exhaust neither nature nor the human actors. This 
entails reviewing the literature on and investigating empirically the role of ‘ethics 
incentives’ versus ‘intrinsic motivation’ in social innovation in finance in various 
sectors. 
The findings of the enquiries under Task 1.4 and 1.5 are presented in Part 4 of this 
report (1.6: Synthesis and sharing), which also frames the implications of its findings in 
terms of CRESSI’s Common Framework,18 comprising the perspectives of Beckert, Sen 
and Mann. 
 
1.5. Synopses of the papers 
The papers in this report come under two headings, defined by Tasks 1.4 and 1.5 of 
Work Package 1. This section provides synopses of the papers showing how the papers 
address these tasks, and how they relate to the three main scholars Beckert, Sen and 
Mann. 
 
1.5.1. TASK 1.4 − How does an economic sociology of social innovation challenge 
conventional economic assumptions concerning the role and development of 
innovation in general? 
 
Nadia von Jacobi’s paper Institutions from a Capability Approach perspective 
(Chapter 2) aims at a reconceptualisation of the nature and scope of institutions from the 
vantage point of Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach. From the point of view of 
neoclassical economics, institutions [such as property rights, contracts, intellectual 
                                                          
18 Summarised at the end of D1.1 and also at the end of this chapter. 
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 10 | 133 
 
property rights, in short, laws and formal and informal rules and regulation (eds.)] exist 
to improve the functioning of markets, or to enhance efficiency. From the perspective of 
economic sociology (à la Beckert 2010) as well as the Capability Approach, on the 
other hand, institutions are ‘socially defined structures which enable and shape human 
interaction.’ Institutions serve collective aims and in order to serve these aims, 
institutions consist of constraints which shape human behaviour, as well as of space 
which is constantly renegotiated and modified.  
 
Von Jacobi then goes on to ask who creates institutions: the individual (à la Douglas 
North 1990) or society (à la Pranab Bardhan 2005)? For North, however, the individual 
is constrained by structures, whereas von Jacobi argues that “apart from a delimiting 
power, institutions have wider instrumental value in providing opportunities for human 
action.” Within a Senian view, “the institutional setting should ideally be evaluated in 
terms of the degree to which it enables its society to achieve greater capabilities.” This 
is in line with Idealist Institutionalists such as Johnson (1989) who state that 
“institutions express ideas and embody a continuing approach to resolving the issues 
which arise”. “Once realised that institutions embed an idea or particular will,” 
continues von Jacobi, “we should ask ourselves whose idea and will it is.” Institutions 
can serve the interests of a restricted group or create opportunities that recast the 
distribution of capabilities within a society.  
 
Social innovation depends on the balance between institutions’ two elements: 
constraints and space, or structure and ideas or aims. By not mentioning explicitly space 
for ideas and agency, theories concentrating only on limits (such as constraints and 
rules) can have important social effects by shifting the focus of attention to adherence to 
rules. This has the effect of forcing “places and people with diverse history, values and 
culture to adhere to resolutions of human issues that have evolved outside of their own 
values and collective choices.” Besides being ethically questionable, this tends to lead to 
institutions that do not work; “it is far from empirically proven that a one-size-fits-all 
approach to institutions is efficient in terms of human development, or even in terms of 
growth.” 
 
Returning to the question who creates institutions (the individual or society), this is 
taken up also by researchers within the Capability Approach. Are capabilities created at 
the individual level or at the collective level? For the author, acknowledging the 
position of the individual within society does not require renouncing ethical 
individualism.  
 
Rafael Ziegler observes, in his paper Innovation – a genealogy from the standard 
approach in economics to an economic-sociological model for human development 
(Chapter 3), that today, entrepreneurship and innovation are strongly associated with a 
focus on profits, and with social and ecological problems resulting from profit 
maximisation. The legitimisation of this behaviour appears to be given by neoclassical 
theory, which doesn’t leave (let alone create) space for entrepreneurs to behave 
otherwise but which paradoxically also does not offer an account of entrepreneurial 
action as a distinct type of economic rationality. The neoclassical (equilibrium) 
approach contrasts to some extent with, for example, the emphasis of the Austrian 
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school on entrepreneurship as a discovery process (although also there, the only 
envisaged outcome is profit maximisation). At the macroeconomic level, the only goal 
considered is economic growth, which is regarded as the “single most important 
determinant of the economic well-being of a nation’s citizens” (Mankiw 2000). But 
what creates economic growth is not analysed. In neoclassical models, it depends on so-
called ‘exogenous factors’ (typically population growth and technological progress) 
whose causes are not researched (“the determinants of technological progress are not 
understood”, says Mankiw 2000: 115). 
 
Schumpeter has criticised the standard approach for leaving out from the analysis the 
entrepreneur and his entrepreneurial and innovative activities in their concrete historical 
context; but he stays within the same normative frame of increases in the standard of 
living as the goal of economic activity. Schumpeter’s focus on disruptive change and 
out-of-equilibrium processes is also adapted by the resilience approach, which – 
inspired by systems ecology – focuses on transition processes, or “the capacity to 
change and yet still maintain the integrity of the original” (Westley, Zimmerman and 
Patton 2007). “This ecology-inspired perspective on innovation finally breaks with the 
cognitive frame of economic development and a rising standard of living,” writes 
Ziegler. However, the focus on maintaining the health and integrity of the system that 
the resilience approach offers remains problematic, if this focus is also posited as a 
“given frame” or metaphor that is not further analysed for its normative aspects.  
 
Ziegler concludes that − in the light of a) the failure of neoclassical economics to 
provide an account of entrepreneurship and innovation while insisting on the 
importance of entrepreneurship and innovation for its guiding frame of economic 
growth, b) the Schumpeterian insight, adopted by contemporary innovation studies, that 
the study of innovation has to be sensitive to its historical context, and c) finally the 
observation that all these approaches include societal ideas that frame the analysis and 
give it an evaluative dimension − there is space for a creative inference to an improved 
model of innovation that takes history and social context as well as ethics seriously. The 
Capabilities Approach and its account of human development and emphasis on ethical 
individualism offer a language and cognitive framework that could help create space for 
normative discussions, while Michael Mann’s framework of social powers will help in 
analysing the dynamic social reality that will be involved. In this view, economics is – 
paraphrasing Mann – the study of the central human capability to extract, transform, 
distribute and consume the produce of nature. Thus, the brief genealogy of innovation 
and entrepreneurship in economics suggests the prima facie legitimacy of the extended 
social grid proposed by CRESSI, which takes ethics and history seriously. However, 
clearly there is space for alternative approaches in this direction, and CRESSI needs to 
compare its own approach with these alternatives as it enters the case studies and refines 
its approach. 
 
Attila Havas’s paper How does social innovation challenge neo-classical economic 
assumptions regarding technological innovation? (Chapter 4) traces the loss of realism 
in the evolution from classical to neoclassical economics. While classical economics 
paid attention to dynamics (including learning processes), uncertainty, and historical 
path-dependence (including irreversibilities) within a context of political and social 
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structures, all of which are crucial to a realistic analysis of innovation, neoclassical 
economics, with its focus on optimisation and (static) equilibrium, is a-historical and 
abstract, and ignores technological, institutional and behavioural change. Although 
some economists, such as Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), have taken up analysing 
innovation within a neoclassical framework, this research has tended to remain confined 
to a particular class of innovations (based on intramural R&D results), and to disregard 
other, equally important types of innovation, including innovations based non-R&D 
knowledge and non-technological innovations, as well as the impact of co-evolving 
social, political and economic structures. 
 
In Neoclassical economics and innovation – An EU policy making perspective on 
legitimising R&I policy (Chapter 5), Klaus Kubeczko discusses the impact of 
neoclassical economic thinking on EU research and innovation (R&I) policy making. 
Political action addressing R&I is frequently legitimised with reference to concepts such 
as market failure and regulatory failure, which are derived from a neoclassical 
perspective on the economy and society. Such concepts need to be thought through, 
however. For instance, regarding market failure, are ‘markets for knowledge’ to be 
treated in the same way as ‘markets for products and services’? Are ‘market solutions’ 
the answer in all cases, despite differences in terms of, for instance, uncertainty, 
divisibility, externalities, and private appropriability?            
 
1.5.2. TASK 1.5 − What incentive structures or types of motivation best suit social 
innovation addressing the marginalised? 
In Aristotelian Economics and Modern Finance. A consideration of the true 
counterpart to today’s financial markets (Chapter 6), C.W.M. (Ro) Naastepad and 
Christopher Houghton Budd argue that marginalisation and social exclusion are 
related to the motivating forces that belong to what have come to be accepted as the 
foundation of modern economic theory, policy and institutions. Solving these problems 
requires rethinking the microeconomic foundations of economic theory. The root of the 
problem, according to the authors, is an incomplete analysis of capital, itself the result 
of an incomplete understanding of the human being. Unless we understand the wider 
nature of the human being and the purpose of human life, we shall not be able to define 
the boundaries of the economy or assign to capital its proper role in society. This paper 
is an invitation to review – and hopefully remedy – our theoretical understanding of 
capital in the light of Aristotle’s concepts of τέλος (telos, purpose) and ἦθος (ethos, 
character), or the inner sense of what is right and worthy in human life. It explores how 
these concepts can help in defining the boundaries of the economy, and, more 
specifically, in finding a true counterpart to today’s ‘superabundant liquidity’ – a 
phenomenon that can also be described as “too much capital”. Unless this counterpart 
can be identified, marginalisation and social exclusion are inevitable. 
 
Justus Lodemann’s paper Commitment to social and ecological objectives: Crucial in 
generating social innovations for the marginalized? (Chapter 7), places commitment 
centre-stage as the sine-qua-non of innovation.  Lodemann then looks at various aspects 
of commitment, including (a) how it shapes relationships between social innovator, 
target group and other stakeholders; (2) how, vice versa, relationships between social 
innovator, target group and stakeholders influence commitment; and (3) what factors 
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initiate, foster or decrease commitment. It is important, however, to distinguish 
commitment and motivation. Although commitment has a voluntary component (it is 
not initiated by merely recognising responsibilities, obligations, or to avoid 
punishment), during the course of action a degree of obligation might develop for the 
committing social entity.   
 
Key features of neoclassical economics identified by Marco Sebastianelli, Enrica 
Chiappero and Nadia von Jacobi in From rational agents to human diversity 
(Chapter 7) are (a) methodological individualism, which ignores the impact of 
individual’s actions on others (the whole is nothing but the sum of individual actions); 
(b) methodological instrumentalism − that is, only the end counts (in fact just one single 
end, namely maximisation of individual utility), and rationality is subjected to this end; 
the particular way in which ends are achieved does not matter; (c) the assumption of 
perfect information; (d) the assumption of an inherent tendency towards equilibrium; (e) 
confusion of objective and normative stances;19 and (f) circularity in reasoning.20  
 
The Capability Approach, on the other hand, recognises (a) a diversity of ends or values 
(‘ethical individualism’); (b) multiple dimensions of wellbeing; (c) intrinsic motivation 
in addition to instrumental motivation; or commitment in addition to self-interest;21 (d) 
an emphasis on the necessity to understand the nature of economic phenomena with the 
purpose of producing knowledge-driven suggestions on how to improve people’s lives 
(rather than assuming automatic tendencies towards equilibrium states); and (e) freedom 
of choice in the sense of freedom of thought; that is, of being free to choose the values 
guiding one’s behaviour (rather than being constrained by alternatives determined by 
axiomatically given preferences, and denied by axiomatic forms of rationality or 
“machine-like responses to inputs such as prices and other monetary incentives”).  
 
Coming to the implications for social innovation, the authors emphasise the importance 
of conceptual space. A comparison between neoclassical theory and the Capability 
Approach points to the importance of ideas and (shared) intentions rather than self-
interested responses to incentives as movers of people and drivers of choices and 
actions including innovation. These ideas are then transmitted through social interaction 
(with ‘social networks’ functioning as connectors) and implemented through collective 
as well as individual agency.  
 
György Molnár investigates The role of incentives versus intrinsic motivation in 
relation to microcredit activities (Chapter 8). Neoclassical economics treats 
                                                          
19 For instance, besides being an over-simplification of the object of analysis (i.c. the human being), 
neoclassical economics’ definition of the ‘representative agent’ as a ‘rational being’ (complying with the 
assumption of perfect rationality) also includes normative elements.  
20 In contrast to recommendations by methodologists (in particular Karl Popper) for scientific research to 
aim at falsification rather than verification, the neoclassical paradigm clings to inferring predictions from 
unproven (axiomatic) theory, subjecting these to empirical testing, and then using neoclassical theory to 
explain the outcomes (rather than using the outcomes to test the theory), thus preferring deduction over 
induction, and ignoring the fact that the test result could be an outcome of many different underlying 
models. Another example of circular reasoning is the explanation of behaviour in terms of preferences, 
whose existence is ‘proved’ by the behaviour, thereby excluding other explanations of behaviour 
(including lack of freedom to choose). 
21 Including commitment to choices “that are not best in one’s personal interest but are considered more 
appropriate or rightful”, i.e. to “the act in itself, not because of the consequences it generates.” 
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marginalisation (which can occur as part of free-market equilibrium) as a consequence 
of the absence of incentives and work ethic. Its ignorance of intrinsic motivation is the 
cause of a number of market and government failures. Taking the example of micro-
lending, Molnár shows that at the start of his experiment, Muhammed Yunus had in 
mind a concept of entrepreneurship and investment based on intrinsic motivation 
(‘psychological, emotional, and spiritual satisfaction’). Simultaneously, he was aware 
that businesses owned by the poor or disadvantaged must run a profit in order to be 
sustainable in the long run. However, in practice, (previously) socially excluded people 
often experience difficulty in maintaining profitability, and their capital soon starts to 
shrink. In policy circles as well as in academia, the compatibility or otherwise of 
intrinsic motivation and ‘market-based solutions’ is an issue creating confusion in many 
minds. On the one hand, we find those who do not expect self-sustainability of 
microfinance institutions; on the other, there are those who believe the poor can be 
helped in profit-maximising ways (e.g. by providing them with loans and hence a strong 
financial incentive to profit-maximise). A main problem, however, is extremely poor 
initial conditions in terms of not just financial capital, but also knowledge and social 
relationships, which in turn erode trust and motivation. In such circumstances, can 
incentives work as a ‘jump-start’?           
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PART 2 
 
Task 1.4: How does an economic 
sociology of social innovation challenge 
conventional economic assumptions 
concerning the role and development of 
innovation in general?  
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2. Institutions from a Capability Approach Perspective 
By Nadia von Jacobi22 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Within the CRESSI project, institutions play an important role in shaping the context 
within which social innovation processes emerge, evolve and - eventually - exert 
pressure to change the social forces cognitive frames, networks and institutions 
themselves. If institutions are to be understood as providers of reasons and resources for 
human development and social progress in general, the point of view adopted for their 
conceptual framing matters: how we understand and conceive institutions affects which 
role for society we attribute to them and how we think about changing them, including 
through social innovation processes.  
Within neoclassical economics, institutions are broadly conceived as equilibrium-
outcomes that lead to a more efficient functioning of markets.23 Such an interpretation 
of institutions is reductionist mainly because it implies that different contextual realities 
will eventually converge towards the most efficient institutional set-up. Consequently, 
neoclassical economics-inspired interpretations of institutions − also known as Rational 
Choice Institutionalism − are unable to explain on one hand the coexistence of very 
diverse institutional realities, on the other hand the persistence of highly inefficient 
institutional set-ups. The institutional literature can of course not be reduced to Rational 
Choice Institutionalism, as many other scholars have already highlighted the role of 
complementarities (Aoki, 2001; Pagano, 2011) and of complex interactions between 
formal and informal rules (e.g. North, 1990). 
This study departs from Amartya Sen's Capability Approach in order to conceptually 
reframe the nature and scope of institutions within society. It proposes an alternative 
definition for institutions and tries to highlight conceptual commonalities and 
differences with other, broadly used definitions. 
 
2.2. Defining institutions 
Institutions can be considered a subset of contextual characteristics - or as in Beckert 
(2010), as one of the social forces that cannot be missed out in analyzing social 
processes. Within the Capability Approach, contextual characteristics can have an 
external effect on individuals by providing reasons and resources for action (von 
Jacobi, 2014; Longshore Smith and Seward, 2009; Robeyns, 2005). In what follows, I 
                                                          
22 University of Pavia. 
23 In Neoclassical Economics, equilibrium is conceived as the clearance between demand and supply, 
meaning that any amount of good or service exchanged on the market encounter an interested consumer 
on one hand and a producer willing to offer it on the other. Efficiency, in Neoclassical Economics, is a 
synonym for this market clearance, as it requires for the maximum amount of goods and services to be 
exchanged on the market, reducing therefore any potential loss in 'surplus' which stands for a proxy of 
well-being or satisfaction of individuals that participate in the market. Applying this logic to institutions 
implies envisaging rules as a good that - as any other product - results from the interaction of people 
demanding for it and people producing it. If institutions are equilibrium-outcomes this means that they 
take on the precise form according to which demand and supply meet, neither under-regulating nor over-
regulating any topic. 
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provide a definition of institution that is functional for an analysis in which institutions 
are meant to provide both, reasons and resources to their citizens: 
Institutions are socially defined structures which enable and shape human interaction. 
These structures are defined by constraints and by spaces withheld by the same 
constraints. The spaces (i) reflect a collective aim that resulted from a bargaining 
process and (ii) become themselves the arena of action for those who want to modify 
the constraints. The structure itself is therefore dynamic and continuously reshaping. 
 
2.2.1. Common elements 
In choosing this definition as my preferred one, I pool between the work of Douglass 
North and others that mainly belong to different branches of the New Institutionalism on 
one side, and Pranab Bardhan which adopts the view of a development economist. 
Among the most famous definitions of institutions are “the rules of the game in a 
society or the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”, (North, 
1990:3) and the “formal and informal rules a society decides to give itself”, (Bardhan, 
2005). In what follows, I outline to which extent my definition is different. 
Some elements are common to both (North’s and Bardhan’s) and to my preferred 
definition such as the inclusion of formal and informal elements - where Bardhan states 
this explicitly, North also specifies his constraints as being informal or formal (North, 
1990:35). The definition I propose does not refer explicitly to the nature of the 
structures, but implicitly includes formal — intended as state-guaranteed — and 
informal arrangements.24 
A second common element is the understanding that institutions originate with a precise 
goal, namely to shape human interaction, usually in the attempt of reducing uncertainty 
and of simplifying a smooth coexistence of diverse strategic behaviors. This notion is 
commonly accepted among institutionalists, for example by March and Olsen: 
“institutions create elements of order and predictability” (March and Olsen, 2006:4). 
A third and directly deducible ground of agreement among scholars is that order and 
predictability, or the shaping of human interaction requires a structuring process. For the 
rational choice institutionalists it is North’s constraints or scripts, behavioural 
repertoires, sequences... who can be either exogenous (as in Shepsle, 1979; North, 1990) 
or endogenous (as in Riker, 1980; Schotter, 1981; Calvert, 1995).25 Historical 
institutionalists also focus on “rule structures that are human creations” (Sanders, 
2006:40), although they are more interested in the processes that shape these structures 
in time, often referring to the concept of path dependence (Pierson, 2004). The “logic of 
appropriateness” that belongs to sociological institutionalism also refers to conventions, 
norms and cognitive frames (Hay, 2006:58) which enable a structuring process, just as 
                                                          
24 I do not distinguish between formal and informal institutions to imply different degrees of enforcement, 
or credibility, or differences in functioning. I simply distinguish in terms of their ”form”, namely among 
those that belong to the terrain of state-action, and can therefore be the direct object of policy-
intervention, and those that evolve and act outside of the state-terrain. For a theoretic appraisal of the 
usefulness of distinguishing between formal and informal institutions and an introduction of the concepts 
of form and content when analyzing institutions, see Sindzingre (2006, 2003). 
25 For rational choice literature reviews that distinguish between exogenous or endogenous constraints see 
for example Shepsle (1986, 2006) or Weingast (2002). 
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the “stable and recurrent patterns” that are dear to the network institutionalists give 
structure to repeated interaction or exchange (Ansell, 2006:75). 
 
2.2.2. Conceptual differences: agents  
Beyond these commonalities, there are some conceptual differences, which have 
implications for the empirical and practical application of the definition. A first relevant 
difference between North’s and Bardhan’s definition derives from the authors’ choice of 
who ultimately creates institutions. Where North refers to “humanly devised” 
constraints, Bardhan explicitly identifies the “society” as the creator. Of course we 
could argue that human action does not exclude collectivities, such as a society, but 
North explicitly states that his theory is individual-centered (North, 1990:27). 
The location of the individual within a society is dealt within a theory of transaction 
costs, which however implicitly constrains the analysis to a one-to-one game, whereas 
in society multiple players and multiple interactions occur contemporaneously.26 My 
definition follows Bardhan’s intuition that institutions can only be created by a 
collectivity, and implicitly refuses to regard collective behavior as the simple sum or 
aggregation of individuals, as isomorphism in individual and collective behavior can not 
explicitly be assumed.27 
In my definition, the institution reflects a collective aim, which results from the 
convergence of interests. The institution therefore works as a cumulative collective 
choice and is therefore better defined at the society level. 
 
2.2.3.  Conceptual differences: underlying elements  
While the notion of structure is accepted and shared, there are differences to which 
ought to be their elementary components. My definition slightly detaches from North’s 
and Bardhan’s conception of institutions by introducing the other side of the coin to 
their delimiting concepts of constraints and rules: I stress that institutions create spaces 
that are delimited by the constraints. 28 
Why is it relevant to go beyond the mere notion of constraints or rules? North himself 
states that “Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing stable structure to everyday 
life” (North, 1990:3), and therefore implicitly states that the ultimate outcome of 
constraints are structures. While it is hard to counter that structures are made of 
constraints, I argue that a focus on them only is limiting. Apart from a delimiting power, 
institutions have wider instrumental value in providing opportunities or space for human 
action: be it agency, interaction or evolution and change. This is particularly true within 
                                                          
26 While North brilliantly understands the logic of societal interaction of human beings, his need to insert 
his theory into the theoretical framework of neoclassical microeconomics is stronger and leads him to 
prefer the adoption of behavioral hypotheses of a representative individual. 
27 Isomorphism is the assumption that two phenomena are linked with a monotonic function, which 
implies that the meaning of a concept is identical at the individual and the context/collective/societal 
level. 
28 The importance of considering agency within institutions has been acknowledged and investigated by 
the literature on Institutional Entrepreneurship, see for example: DiMaggio, 1988; Dacin et al., 2002; 
Hoffman and Ventresca, 2002; Seo and Creed, 2002; Maguire et al., 2004; Lawrence and Phillips, 2004; 
Garud et al., 2007; Lounsbury et al. 2007; Battilana et al. 2009. 
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a Senian view in which the context is considered a conversion factor, meaning that the 
institutional setting should ideally be evaluated in terms of the degree to which it 
enables its society to achieve greater capabilities. 
A structure implicitly withholds shapes and paths which lead to and consist of meaning. 
This intuition is partially in line with the argument of the Idealist Institutionalists (for 
example Johnson, 1989; Nicholson, 1990) who state that “institutions express ideas and 
embody a continuing approach to resolving the issues which arise” (Johnson, 1989:131) 
in human interaction. This passage is very much in line with the part of my definition 
where “spaces reflect a collective aim that resulted from a bargaining process”. 
Ideas are a fuzzy concept, which might comprise visions and goals, both achievable and 
non-achievable. They are likely to be highly influenced by existing cognitive frames, 
but might also represent some groundbreaking thought that works against them. By 
becoming 'shared ideas' they may actually represent a kick-off for the development of 
innovative cognitive frames. For the scope of the definition provided, the concept of 
ideas is relevant as it might represent some sort of fuel for collective aims: the horizon 
that people look to when they motivate their own paths, their motion. Cognitive frames - 
which may be different among different groups of society - act as filters in translating 
ideas into an own understanding. Therefore they play a crucial part in selecting who in 
society will eventually engage into the collective aim and who will not. 
Embedded ideas and practices are crucial to a theory of institutions that maintains a 
pluralistic and context-specific approach. It is further highly useful for analyses that are 
interested in investigating how and in which cases institutions contribute to perpetuating 
inequality and poverty, as common in macro institutionalist research. A focus on spaces 
is further helpful for conceptualizing institutional change, as the spaces are the arena 
within which the institution itself can be changed. 
Once realized that institutions embed an idea or particular will, we should ask ourselves 
whose idea and will it is. Institutions reflect the struggle and temporary resolution for 
the distribution of power and resources: “institutions are defended by insiders and 
validated by outsiders” (March and Olsen, 2006). They do not automatically imply an 
equitable resolution. Often, they incorporate and reflect distributional inequalities. 
When the ideas and wills that are incorporated into an institution come from a leading 
minority that withholds most power and resources, this will typically reflect in the type 
of mechanism with which the institution works. By designing the mechanism of the 
institution in a way that only a restricted group of individuals can occupy an 
advantageous position within it, the institution becomes an instrument for the 
perpetuation of existing social inequalities. Differently, institutions that guarantee 
opportunities with broad access can recast the distribution of capabilities within a 
society.  
'Bargaining' therefore is directly linked to power issues and their analysis. The sources 
of social power that may provide greater 'bargaining power' can be different, as 
analyzed by Thomas Mann. Correspondingly, the institutional (re-)production process 
may very easily not include marginalized groups and therefore reinforce their relative 
disadvantage. What the notion of 'bargaining' indeed implies is some sort of 
participatory and deliberative process. The more inclusive the discussion is about 
'collective aims', the more broad and accessible shall be the space provided by the 
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institution. Where participation and deliberation systematically excludes certain groups, 
institutions and their evolution are not providing arenas of action for the excluded, 
firstly by not considering their ideas, visions and cognitive frames. Secondly by 
triggering functioning mechanisms that will systematically reduce their access to 
opportunities. 
While I can place ideas into the notion of structure as previously defined, these seem to 
be slightly out of place in those theories that concentrate only on limits, such as 
constraints and rules. Let’s consider this argument on hand of the easiest example of 
structure we can think about: a rack. Clearly, the rack has a known shape that is made of 
constraints, namely its edges and its boundaries. We could focus our attention on the 
fact that the rack does not permit to place anything beyond its boundaries, which would 
follow the conceptualization of a structure as merely being made of constraints. We 
could also adopt a slightly different perspective and appreciate the useful space that the 
rack provides to give our life more predictability. It helps with putting some of our 
material belongings into order and facilitates the moment in which we will desire to find 
them. This view focusses on the space notion. We will further realize that some objects 
will fit well into the rack, while others will not — maybe due to their size or weight or 
shape. 
The structuring process so dear to Institutional Analysis starts with the structure and the 
subsequent choice and convention to use the structure in a certain way, namely to place 
objects into its space. Clearly a rack can serve as example for a structure, but not for an 
institution, which I described as socially defined.29 
 
2.2.4. Conceptual differences: implementation  
We could argue that the existing definitions that focus on constraints and rules 
implicitly comprise spaces and ideas and that it is not necessary to mention them 
separately. While this might be true in theory, my point is that differences in 
perspective, as the one just outlined, can have important effects in the phases of 
implementation: by explicitly mentioning spaces for agency and ideas, institutions can 
assume a different role within the analysis of social progress. 
For example, the focus on constraints leads to an implementation logic where 
developing countries adhere or do not adhere to certain types of rules — for example to 
the so-called Global Standard Institutions: these are supposedly ’better institutions’ that 
improve governance in developing countries. Defended by mainstream economic theory 
and promoted by e.g. the World Bank, IMF, OECD, G7 and the World Economic 
Forum. They typically derive from neoclassical economic theory and are seen as 
maximizing market freedom and as protecting private property rights most strongly 
(Chang, 2010:2).30  
This logic however has a number of flaws: it is ethically questionable as it forces places 
and people with very diverse history, values and culture to adhere to resolutions of 
human issues that have evolved outside of their own values and collective choices. 
                                                          
29 Beyond it being a structure, a rack does not necessarily shape human interaction, as it could be built 
and used by a single individual. 
30 For a critical review see for example Chang, 2005. 
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Secondly, profound ownership of the social solution is required in order for it to be 
accepted by the society, which in turn is a necessary element for the credibility of any 
institution. As Pritchett (2012) puts it: “The only way to get to the rule, is having to get 
to the rule through struggle”. He emphasizes that it is the struggle, the resolutionary 
process that is based on the consolidation of successful experiments that leads to 
institutions that work.31  
Despite of extensive cross sectional analyses, it is far from being empirically proven 
that a one-size-fits-all approach to institutions is efficient in terms of human 
development, or even in terms of growth. In a world where a multitude of capitalisms 
have arisen, and within a discipline in which the neat connection between institutions 
and economic performance has not been found so far, a more cautious approach is 
needed. Pluralism of views and exploration might do a better job than top-down 
solutions, which tend to simplify the complex connections between formal and informal 
institutions, economic structure and people. 
Beyond developing contexts, the comprehension that institutions need to result from a 
process and that this process needs to be 'owned' by citizens, is of great relevance 
everywhere where top-down technocracies shall be avoided. Social innovation 
processes represent a fertile ground of experimentation on the basis of which new 
solutions can be found and shared − and subsequently chosen as those most functional 
for the collective aim embedded in the institution. 
 
2.3. Relative position and collective capabilities 
As my definition of institutions tries to fill a gap in the capabilities literature, I would 
like to quickly review how this study differentiates from other studies on collective 
capabilities whose research questions partially overlap with mine. My study distances 
itself from both, those authors who claim that capabilities cannot merely be defined at 
the individual level, but that they should instead be considered as “collective“ (Ibrahim, 
2006; Ballet et al, 2007) and those that interpret contextual causality as strictly of the 
relational type (Smith and Seward, 2009). While the notion of “collective capability” is 
not irrelevant, I argue that it should not to be mixed up with the methodological unit of 
analysis, which in the Capability Approach ideally is the individual.32 
A number of authors stress that the life of an individual only occurs in relation to others 
and that an important aspect to consider is the relative position an individual occupies 
within the social structure.33 The relative position of a person within society could 
however also be considered an individual endowment, as it can be interpreted as a 
relational resource. For example, a person borne from higher-class parents that have 
strong connections to a variety of actors in the local economy, is endowed with greater 
“connections” when setting out to find a job. The endowment is individual. Contrarily, 
the particular shape of the network linking actors within the local economy – which can 
                                                          
31 See Pritchett’s speech at the annual lecture of the UNU-WIDER institute, September 2012 (Pritchett, 
2012) and other work of his. 
32 When considering groups as a unit of analysis, we always risk neglecting inequalities and differences 
within that group. In line with Robeyns (2005), I adhere to the view that the individual should be the 
relevant unit of analysis, not only in methodological terms, but also (and most importantly) ethically. 
33 This is an argument particularly common in the Sociological literature. 
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be more or less conducive to the repetition of inequalities – is a contextual or societal 
characteristic.34 
My point is that the relevance of the relative position of an individual can perfectly be 
analyzed without renouncing on ethical individualism. By identifying social structures 
such as institutions and their mechanisms that advantage certain people over others at 
the social/contextual level, the relative position of an individual can still be taken into 
account.  
The milestone for my reasoning is therefore the attribution of the proper level of 
analysis to different phenomena: collective capabilities, and collective agency, can be 
attributed to collectivities, which are not the simple sum of individuals. Compare this 
argument with a quote reported in Smith and Seward, (2009:222[119]): 
Social structures (. . . ) have an ontological existence that is both autonomous and 
independent from individuals. Like natural entities, social structures emerge from 
relations: the relations between humans, and between these human relations and nature 
(Bhaskar, 1998; emphasis added) 
Within the framework previously proposed, collective capabilities and collective agency 
can broadly be included into the analysis as institutions themselves. Let us consider the 
conceptual analogy between collective capabilities and institutions: although the single 
individual/event cannot actively modify the collectivity/institution, at a certain tipping 
point one additional or incremental action/event will provoke or realize a collective 
capability/institutional change.35 
This reasoning recognizes the relevance of each single’s agency in realizing a collective 
achievement. It also reminds that the certain realization of this achievement is out of the 
immediate control of the single individual. 
 
2.4. Conclusion  
This paper has outlined that a different interpretation of institutions might be important 
for the understanding of their role in society. In particular, the definition proposed 
allows to pay greater attention to which collective aims are currently being protected, 
whose will has been embedded most strongly into the working mechanism of the 
institution during the bargaining process and which social innovation possibilities are de 
facto provided by the institutional set-up. The interpretation of institutions proposed 
could serve as complement to the analysis of social innovation processes, in particular 
with a view to changes in power structures. 
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3. Innovation – A Genealogy From the Standard Approach 
in Economics to an Economic-Sociological Model for 
Human Development 
By Rafael Ziegler 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship and innovation are predominantly associated with new products and 
services for markets. Paradigmatic is the new, technological product and the tech 
entrepreneur, who makes a private fortune and changes the social world in numerous 
intended and unintended ways. Attempts to extend the language use – social 
entrepreneurship and social innovation – remain strongly attracted by the prevailing 
use: the most famous social entrepreneur/innovator is Muhamad Yunus: he is a banker, 
and his entrepreneurial and innovative achievement is widely recognized. His example 
confirms our linguistic expectations regarding entrepreneurship and innovation: it is 
about money and markets. Suppose somebody with good knowledge of the Indian 
subcontinent asks: so why is Gandhi not heralded as a social entrepreneur and social 
innovator? Was he not truly creative and had massive social impact? A likely answer:  
he did not have a business; he was a social activist/politician.  
With a view to everyday use of the term, the reply is unsurprising: entrepreneurship and 
innovation are closely associated with markets and earned income from selling products 
and services to customers. It therefore can appear appear also logical to identify 
entrepreneurship and innovation as a cause of social and ecological problems. They 
exemplify a primary focus on the economy, a quest for maximum profit and a 
permanent stream of new products and services that reproduce societal unsustainability. 
A scientific approach that seeks to analyse the causes of this unsustainability 
predicament, and contribute to the discussion of ways out of unsustainability, therefore 
has to scrutinize this language use and its associations very carefully36. However, even 
on a purely disciplinary perspective, the coherent use of concepts needs to be tested 
where the exclusions and inclusions of everyday use suggest a puzzle or possibly 
confusion.  
With a view to both the social challenge and the intellectual curiosity, this paper 
embarks on the following type of genealogy: If the prevailing use of entrepreneurship 
and innovation refers to entrepreneurship and innovation in the economy, then 
economics should be a good starting point for critical reflection of the terms. 
Accordingly, the paper starts with the standard economic approach that emerged in the 
second half of the 19th century. What perspective on entrepreneurship and innovation 
does it propose? And given the issues that as we will see arise with the standard 
approach, what alternatives to this approach have emerged in economics? Accordingly, 
the paper turns to the Schumpeterian critique of, and alternative to the standard 
approach. How are entrepreneurship and innovation focused on here? Finally, with a 
                                                          
36 In the literature on sustainability as well as on social innovation such an approach is labeled 
transdisciplinary (Mittelstrass 1992, Moulaert et al. 2013) because it seeks to respond to the societal 
problem (as opposed to the disciplinary puzzle) and for this reason also may have to work across different 
disciplines. 
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view to the social challenge, I will contrast the Schumpeterian approach with an 
approach emerging from systems ecology that shares the Schumpeterian focus on out of 
equilibrium dynamics but breaks with the focus on economic development/growth as 
the orienting societal idea37. In a final step, I will draw conclusions from this brief 
genealogy for the analysis of innovation and entrepreneurship: what elements does a 
critical and coherent approach to entrepreneurship and innovation require? How does it 
create space for the varieties of entrepreneurship and innovation, in particular the social 
innovation introduced above? Thus, the genealogical proposition is simple: we better 
understand a term, if we look at the history of its use. Such a history can serve a critical 
purpose, if it helps us better understand the presuppositions and (alleged) foundations of 
the present use, and it can have a constructive liberating effect, if it allows us to see 
conceptual alternatives more clearly.  
 
3.2. Standard economics and innovation  
Standard economics here refers to neo-classical economics as the prevailing conceptual 
approach for research and teaching in economics departments. A central concern of this 
approach is to model and explain the economic process as the “study of human behavior 
as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins 
1932). It is impossible to comprehensively introduce such as vast and mathematically 
brilliant body of thought. The sketch of a few central ideas must be sufficient to prepare 
the discussion of standard economics in relation to entrepreneurship and innovation38.  
Neo-classical economic focuses on the efficient employment of means with given ends. 
It takes these ends – as the preferences of customers, or the goals of firms – as given, in 
the sense that the analysis of ends is not part of the economic analysis. It assumes, 
however, that these ends are pursued rationally. “Rationality” here refers to the idea that 
economic agents are utility maximizers; they know their preferences, they are able to 
rank them and act according to what best suits their interests. This idea of rationality is 
typically introduced as a simplifying, modelling assumption (homo oeconomicus): not 
how people are or ought to be, but as a useful approximation for the analysis of markets.  
The assumption is consistent with the methodological individualism of the standard 
approach, which seeks to explain economic phenomena in terms of individual actors. 
The approach combines this individualism with a subjective theory of value: the value 
of a good is dependent on the preference of the actor, and especially the marginal utility 
                                                          
37 Societal idea here is inspired by the economic sociology discussion of cognitive frames (Beckert 2010). 
The inspiration is philosophical: rule application leaves space for interpretation – a point familiar to 
anyone who has visited a public administration. The judgment required for rule application tends to be 
informed by shared meanings: the cultural codes, narratives, norms and how-tos of socialization. 
Cognitive frames therefore are usually taken for granted, and in this way, they are very influential: they 
help us deal with uncertainty and they legitimize action, including of our language use and the 
“appropriate” ways to use a term. There are many cognitive frames. Cognitive frames sometimes change, 
and actors sometimes explicitly argue for one cognitive frame rather than another one. Here I focus on 
cognitive frames that orient our thinking about society, economy and its environment. Therefore, I use the 
term “societal idea”.    
38 The origin and meaning of neoclassical economics are far from clear (Aspromourgos 1986). I therefore 
here follow a Kuhnian device and rely on textbooks used to initiate students into the paradigm. For 
microeconomics, I rely on Varian 1996, for Macroeconomics on Mankiw 2000. To be sure, as Attila 
Havas remarks in his contribution to this report, some of the neoclassical assumptions have been relaxed 
and modified in different ways. The discussion should be read with this caveat in mind.  
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a further unit of the good has for the actor. Due to this subjective theory of value, neo-
classical welfare economist focus on the Pareto criterion, according to which an 
allocation of goods is efficient, if it is impossible to make somebody better off without 
making somebody else worse off. The criterion takes preferences as given along with 
the social positions that these preferences are related to.      
Neo-classical economics combines this instrumental rationality with a focus on markets 
and their equilibria. It shows that – assuming the rationality of actors stated above – the 
combined action of utility-maximizing actors (consumers, firms) will result in market 
equilibrium. Whenever demands is in excess, suppliers will increase prices, and they 
will undercut each other when supply is in excess. Strictly speaking, however, the 
equilibrating process just described is purely hypothetical. For the standard approach 
defines a competitive market as a market where goods and prices are given; they are 
outside the control of each participant39.    
This focus on market equilibria partly explains the relative absence of innovation 
analysis in neo-classical economics. With prices and goods assumed as given, there just 
does not seem to be any space for entrepreneurial action. For example, the market 
equilibrium (and even the hypothetical process of mutual adjustments just described) 
presupposes comparable products. This does not leave analytical space for innovations, 
which are distinguished by novelty and in this sense by incomparability with the older 
product. “Invention is the ultimate heterogeneous product. This impedes the optimality 
analysis underlying most microeconomic theory. Explicitly or implicitly, an optimality 
calculation entails a comparison among possible substitute choices, while the innovating 
entrepreneur deals with no well-defined substitutes with quantifiable attributes” 
(Baumol and Schilling 2008, 876). Due to this focus on market equilibrium, neo-
classical economics conceptually marginalizes the study of transitions and out-of-
equilibrium dynamics.   
 
3.2.1. Entrepreneurship as a discovery process 
There is, however, even with a focus on market equilibria, one exception. Entrepreneurs 
can discover profit-opportunities that create a tendency toward market equilibrium. If 
for example a population trend with market implications can be anticipated – an 
increase in students at universities that yields an increase demand for student housing – 
then there is a profit possibility that the entrepreneur can exploit, and which in turn will 
strengthen the tendency towards market equilibrium.  
Entrepreneurship as a force that strengthens the tendency towards market equilibrium is 
associated especially with the work of Israel Kirzner (Kirzner 197340). Kirzner stresses 
the relation between entrepreneurship and equilibrium but analyzes the relation in terms 
of the Austrian school of economics (Kirzner 1997). In other words, it is by no means a 
standard economic account in terms of neo-classical economics. His approach offers a 
distinct perspective on the entrepreneurial process as a discovery process. Rather than 
                                                          
39 For a standard textbook exposition of the neo-classical approach to equilibrium see Varian 1996, 284 
40 Along with Schumpeter, Kirzner’s work is often present as the classic foundation of entrepreneurship 
research with Schumpeter suggesting a focus on the role of innovation for large-scale change processes, 
Kirzner complementing a focus on continuous, incremental change processes. Shockley and Frank 
proposes that the two account also can serve as a foundation for social entrepreneurship (Shockley and 
Frank 2011). 
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positing known prices and products as the default assumptions, the focus here is on 
uncertainty and discovery leading to changes of prices and in products. “Where 
shortages have existed, we understand the resulting price increases as driven by 
entrepreneurs recognizing, in the face of the uncertainty of the real world, the profit 
opportunity available through the expansion of supply through production, or through 
arbitrage” (Kirzner 1997, 70). On this view, the entrepreneurial process via the profit-
motive nudges the market in “equilibrative direction” (Kirzner 1997, 70). It stresses 
error, and learning from error as central elements that routine-resisting entrepreneurs 
rely on to exploit up to then unknown opportunities for their profit. “The lure of pure 
profit in this way sets up the process through which pure profit tends to be competed 
away. Enhanced mutual awareness, via the entrepreneurial discovery process, is the 
source of the market’s equilibrative properties” (Kirzner 1997, 71).  
 
3.2.2. The macro level 
While the central focus of neo-classical economics is on the micro-level due to the 
above stated methodological individualism, neo-classical economists also analyze and 
explain macro-economic phenomena such as inflation, unemployment, balance of trade 
etc. on this foundation. The central macro-economic focus has been economic growth. 
A widely-used textbook tells its students: “Long-run economic growth is the single 
most important determinant of the economic well-being of a nation’s citizens. 
Everything else that macroeconomists study pales in comparison” (Mankiw 2000, 122).  
According to the Solow model (Solow 1956), economic output can be studied as a 
production function based on the capital stock and the labor force, with demand of 
economic output depending on consumption and saving. In the model, savings equal 
investment. Economic growth depends on the initial capital stock and the investment 
rate (minus capital depreciation). On this basis, it is possible to calculate a steady state, 
which represent the equilibrium of the economy (investment equals depreciation). 
Based on the neo-classical assumption that individuals seek to maximize their 
preferences, here identified with maximum amount of goods and services, neo-classical 
economist seek to identify the optimum steady state that maximizes consumption 
possibilities41.     
As a result of the pull towards steady-state equilibrium, the model cannot explain 
sustained economic growth. Therefore, the model has been expanded with two further 
sources of growth: population growth and technical progress. Technological progress – 
and via it innovation – is modelled as increasing the efficiency of labor. In the steady 
state, only technological progress can explain the long-run possibility of an increase of 
goods per worker, and thus on the neoclassical view, a rising standard of living42. 
Therefore, on this model stimulating private and public investments in technological 
innovation is very important. Yet the approach encounters difficulties with the analysis 
of this source of growth. “Unfortunately, the determinants of technical progress are not 
well understood” (Mankiw 2000, 115).   
                                                          
41 Solow (1974) has modified this in terms of a weak sustainability approach. On the expanded model, the 
natural environment as “natural capital” is a further input into the production function that should be 
optimally exploited to total net investment being higher than zero (Neumayer 2010, 22).   
42 Population growth can explain sustained economic growth but not sustained increase in well-being as 
the total product has to be shared by a larger population. 
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3.2.3. The standard approach, entrepreneurship and innovation 
On the standard approach, the actor focus is on individual actors, which for modelling 
purposes are represented as rational, utility maximizing actors. Both on the micro- and 
macro-level, the explanatory focus is on market equilibrium and on market exchange 
relationships primarily informed by price signals. Both on the micro- and on the macro-
level, the approach encounters difficulties modelling innovation processes.  
On the micro-level, entrepreneurship as a discovery process effectively draws on a 
research tradition (Austrian economics) that rejects the neo-classical focus on 
equilibrium as well as the modelling assumptions about the knowledge of individual 
actors (assumed to know and to be able to rank their preferences in the light of given 
prices and goods on the standard approach). On the macro-level, innovation in terms of 
technical progress is drawn on to explain sustained economic growth, but the standard 
neo-classical approach encounters difficulties in further analyzing this source of growth. 
The axiological foundation of the standard economic approach in subjective value 
theory offers the possibility to analyze the normativity of market dynamics in terms of 
the Pareto criterion. On the macro level, the axiological foundation in association with 
the modelling assumption of homo oeconomicus yields a focus on a raising standard of 
living that is somehow tracked by a growth in economic activity (economic growth). 
Due to subjective value theory, “somehow” in the last point means that strictly speaking 
intersubjective well-being comparisons and collective well-being estimates are not 
possible.  
The standard approach combines the societal idea of progress (in the guise of economic 
growth for increased standard of living) with a mathematical, ahistorical analysis of 
equilibrium processes explained in terms of individual actors, who are modelled as 
rational and as identical for modelling purposes. Differences in actors only emerge if, as 
in the Kirznerian approach, the process of innovation receives closer attention. But as 
noted, these differences require a break with the neoclassical model of rationality.  
 
3.3. The Schumpeterian critique of the standard approach 
The standard approach pursues a one-dimensional model of rationality, in the sense that 
some version of homo oeconomics is drawn on to explain all economic processes. As 
we have seen, this model struggles to account for innovative and entrepreneurial action. 
An influential critique of this approach was early on launched by Joseph Schumpeter, 
who remarked that the absence of an analysis of disruptive innovative action in the 
standard approach decisively limits its capacity to analyze they dynamics of capitalism: 
“it is like Hamlet without the Danish Prince” (Schumpeter 1942, 86). As William 
Baumol remarked, the “theoretical firm [in neoclassical economics] is entrepreneurless” 
(Baumol 1968, 66). The entrepreneur has disappeared and continuous to play a marginal 
role in the initiation of students into standard economics (Gunther 2012).  
Entrepreneurial activity for Schumpeter is not the invention of something new 
(Schumpeter 1911, 111) but the active carrying out of the invention. This activity has 
complex motivations that are not reducible to income only (136). Schumpeter speaks of 
the dream to found a private kingdom, of the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to 
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prove oneself superior to others and to raise socially, to succeed for the sake, not of the 
fruits but success itself, and finally he mentions the joy of creating: of getting things 
done and exercising one’s energy and ingenuity (Schumpeter 1911, 138f). In short, 
innovative action calls for psychological and sociological analysis beyond the one-
dimensional meta-frame of the rational utility-maximizer. Overcoming resistance and 
changing habits is therefore a key to entrepreneurial activity; even though this 
sociological dimension is frequently overlooked by economists (Swedberg 2009, 80). 
Thus, sociology is important for the study of entrepreneurship and innovation.    
In Theory of Economic Development Schumpeter primarily focuses on the individual 
entrepreneur. He argues that the change in habit and routines, and the overcoming of 
fear and anxiety regarding the novel required leadership (Schumpeter 1911, 118-129): 
to act without established rules and certain data, against the habits of others, and to 
influence others in such a way that they will follow, imitate and adapt. In the later 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter 1942) Schumpeter acknowledges 
that organizations can include as part of their capabilities the research and development 
of new products and services. Innovation can become a “routine” task of organizations. 
The secondary literature speaks of Schumpeter Mark 1 and Mark 2, and seeks to 
accommodate the seeming contradiction in terms of different stages of development 
(Peneder 2007, 526): The “entrepreneurial function” with its focus on the individual and 
his or her leadership dominates in the early phase of the development of an economy, 
whereas innovation as a routine of organizations and entire systems dominates at a later 
stage. Large firms organize research and development laboratories, accumulate 
knowledge and create high barriers for the entry of entrepreneurs and small firms. 
Monopolies and oligopolies dominate the market for a product and service. This 
dynamic famously provoked Schumpeter’s hypothesis that the “success” of capitalism 
would ultimately undermine capitalism itself and lead to socialism, as it blocks and 
dries out the entrepreneurial function (Schumpeter 1942). However, subsequent 
research rather suggested that in the presence of major technological and market 
disruptions, the research and development within established organizations can be 
replaced again by entrepreneurs and small firms (Malerba 2007). Thus, from this this 
Schumpeterian tradition, we can see the continued importance of better understanding 
the psychological and sociological specifics of entrepreneurial activity, in contrast to a 
one-dimensional rational actor model.         
Schumpeter here leaves a demanding legacy: on the one hand, akin to the standard 
approach, he suggests the possibility of a context-independent account of action, as 
something that is always there throughout history; on the other hand, he emphasize the 
importance to focus on the guises of entrepreneurial action in the concrete historical 
context. For example, in his analysis, he focuses on the “industry captains” of late 19th 
century capitalism (Schumpeter 1911). This contextual study of innovation process has 
been further developed in the study of systems of innovation (Edquist 2005, Hanusch 
and Pyka 2007, Perez 2013). 
This sensitivity to the historical context is also important for a second reason. In 
contrast to the standard economic approach, Schumpeter’s account of economic 
innovation in capitalism co-depends on political structure. Political institutions do not 
only provide “fetters”, they also “shelter” (Schumpeter 1942, 135). For early capitalism, 
they provided the space and the security to unfold within states governed by aristocratic 
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ruling class with a different socialization and different values from the economic actors. 
“The steel frame of that structure still consisted of the human material of feudal society 
and this material still behaved according to pre-capitalist patterns” (Schumpeter 1942, 
136). This case rests on the proposition that there are political values and virtues 
required for a nation state or empire to survive that the “calculative”, “narrowly selfish” 
motivations promoted by capitalism undermine and respectively cannot reproduce. 
Generalizing from this: history, and historical sources of power matter, and they are 
neither reducible to nor reproducible by the economy and its analysis.  
Having stressed these differences to the standard economic approach – i.e. the focus on 
specifically entrepreneurial action, and the focus on this action in its historical guise in a 
specific institutional environment – let me also emphasize what the approaches have in 
common. First, while the Schumpeterian account leaves open the possibility of other 
types of innovation (in arts, politics etc.), this possibility remains a footnote in 
Schumpeter’s works. The primary focus is on innovations in capitalist markets, and the 
primary object of analysis is the capitalist economy. Second, while Schumpeter and 
followers attack the focus on market equilibria, and point to the non-equilibrium 
transition processes of the “gale of creative destruction”, the frame of this “gale” is the 
economic version of the idea of progress: “economic development”. The entrepreneurial 
process keeps the economy dynamics, increases in the long-run the total economic 
output, and this raises the standard of living. Like the standard account, the 
Schumpeterian analysis does not analyze the normative aspects of a “standard of 
living”. Here too it remains a vague indicator for the subjective preference satisfaction – 
only that the elitist Schumpeter makes clear that the preferences of “the masses” are not 
his own, and that by implication the value of consumer sovereignty and Pareto 
optimality only has limited, ethical value by his own lights.         
 
3.4. Ecology and destruction  
For the study of entrepreneurship and innovation, the Schumpeterian focus on disruptive 
change and out of-equilibrium transition processes can be complemented by a focus 
congenial to it from systems ecology. For reasons that would deserve a study of its own, 
this ecological perspective has provided a soil for the study of innovation not primarily 
focused on technical-economic innovation.  
According to ecologist C.W. Holling’s, resilience determines the persistence of 
relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb 
change of state variable, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist” (Holling 
1973, 17). In contrast to a focus on the one “perfect equilibrium”, this approach is based 
on the observation of multiple equilibria in ecology, and therefore also the possibility of 
change from one equilibrium to another. Resilience as the study of multiple equilibria 
and the related transition processes has been adopted as a conceptual lense by many 
disciplines and for various topics, including for the study of social innovation43.  
According to social innovation scholars Frances Westley, Brenda Zimmermann and 
Michael Patton, resilience is “the capacity to experience massive change and yet still 
maintain the integrity of the original. Resilience isn’t about balancing change and 
                                                          
43 See Lodemann and Ziegler (2014). 
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stability. It isn’t about an equilibrium state. Rather it is about how massive change and 
stability paradoxically work together” (Westley, Zimmermann and Patton 2007, 65). On 
this perspective on social and social-ecological systems, resilience is an important 
property on the systems level for the health of the system on various levels: the person, 
the organization, a country or social-ecological system.   
Social innovation plays a functional role for maintaining the health of society: “The 
capacity of any society to create a steady flow of social innovations, particularly those 
which re-engage vulnerable populations, is an important contributor to the overall social 
and ecological resilience” (Westley and Antadze 2009, 4). Social innovations are a 
“complex process of introducing products, processes or programs that profoundly 
change the basic routines, resource and authority flows or beliefs of the social system in 
which they arise. Such successful social innovations have durability and broad impact” 
(Westley and Antadze 2009, 2).  
This emphasis on the “profound change” mirrors the Schumpeterian focus on the 
disruptive innovation. It draw on the model of an adaptive cycle that is presented as the 
ecological version of the idea of creative destruction (Westley, Zimmermann and Patton 
2007, 67; Westley 2013, 7). A four-stage adaptive cycle of release, reorganization, 
exploitation and conservation, so the proposal, can be drawn on to analyze social 
innovations. The work of Muhamad Yunus and the Grameen Bank on this view can be 
studied in terms of an adaptive cycle starting with a rigidity trap in Bangladesh that 
prevented many people from having access to credit (ibid. 68). In a post-independence 
poverty-crisis – Bangladesh became independent in 1972 – resources are released, yet 
there are quite different ideas what to do with them and there is therefore a competition 
for resources. This can create a poverty trap, if no single idea can win sufficient 
resources and space to thrive. However, if some ideas succeed, the idea can move from 
the stage of local experimentation and prototyping to large-scale diffusion, up to the 
moment when the idea has matured and institutionalized. The Grameen Bank is state-
regulated and state-supported bank, and the idea of micro-credit has been adopted in 
many other countries. In a similar vein, the authors tell the development of PLAN 
(Planned Lifetime Advocacy Network), an organization that supports families to create 
a good life for people with disabilities, and that has spread throughout Canada. The 
shared  features of these social innovation examples is the focus on a social problem – 
poverty, the exclusion of people with disabilities –  and the development of an idea for 
dealing with it that has spread widely, even though it frames the problem/solution in a 
way that is disruptive.  
This ecology-inspired perspective on innovation finally breaks with the unquestioned 
societal idea of economic development and a raising standard of living. Indeed, this 
might partly explain its popularity: in a time of anthropogenic climate change, a focus 
on the long-term health of social-ecological systems is perceived by many as more 
problem-oriented than the further pursuit of the elusive quest for economic variants of 
the idea of progress. The resilience approach (at least in the version presented here) 
instead proposes “health” and “integrity” of the system as orienting ideas. It emphasizes 
the multi-level and multi-sectoral aspect of change processes.  
All the approaches presented here, both standard and non-standard, included societal 
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ideas with direct or indirect44 normative implications. The resilience approach in the 
story told here has a liberating effect in that it proposes a different framing. But for this 
liberating effect to have critical value, health (or economic development for that matter) 
cannot be simply stated as given “social preferences”, rather, they must themselves be 
analyzed for their presuppositions and implications for a study of innovations that can 
reflectively deal with its normative dimension. I will return to this point in the next 
section45.   
But let me first conclude with two further points regarding the resilience approach to 
innovation. Like the Schumpeterian search for long-run business cycles according to the 
structure the gale of destructive destruction, users of the adaptive cycle model must 
show the empirical validity of this model with a view to innovation processes. However, 
so far this appears to be as difficult for “social” innovations (in the sense introduced in 
this section) as it is for “economic” innovations (in the sense introduced in section 2). 
Second, the resilience approach presented here replaces the standard economic focus on 
markets by a focus on “the social system” (compare the definition above). This can be 
understood in a complementary sense: the social system next to the economic system. 
The resilience authors intend, however, a general sense: the social system as “any 
organized assembly of human resources, beliefs, and procedures united and regulated by 
interaction or interdependence so as so to accomplish a set of specific functions” 
(Westley and Antadze 2009, 5f).  
 
3.5. Towards an extended social grid model for better understanding 
the economic underpinnings of (social) innovation for human 
development    
It is time to revisit our genealogy and draw some conclusions. An epistemic argument 
for the standard approach draws on the value of simplicity as a virtue of theories. On 
this view, the rational choice approach of neo-classical economic provides a research 
program to explain a large variety of economic phenomena based on a parsimonious set 
of assumptions about rationality and knowledge of individual actors. 
For our topic – innovation and entrepreneurship – this simplicity proved to have the 
following consequences. First, the focus on rational agents and equilibrium in fact 
radically marginalizes the entrepreneur and innovation along with non-equilibrium 
dynamics. The entrepreneur disappears. Paraphrasing Schumpeter: Hamlet isn’t 
“simpler” without the Prince of Denmark, it just isn’t Hamlet. The first result of our 
brief genealogy is therefore disconcerting: rather than offering a foundation for 
entrepreneurship and innovation, standard economics removes the grounds. The effect is 
at first sight similar to a Nietzschean genealogy of morals: just as there is no god as a 
source of absolute values, so there is no heroic entrepreneur as the source creating an 
always increasing standard of living. The standard approach fills this void with homo 
                                                          
44 Proponents of the standard approach of course emphasis that homo oeconomicus and economic growth 
theory are not to understood as normative ideas that somehow follow from the theory. However, even 
proponents of the standard approach will not deny that the indirect effect of such “modelling 
assumptions” and “research foci” is normative, and has occupied a central place in economic policy 
throughout the last hundred years.  
45 In Lodemann and Ziegler 2014, we propose to interpret the “key functions” of the resilience approach 
in terms of human rights and central capabilities.  
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oeconomicus and is committed to the idea of an increasing standard of living that 
requires technological progress (or population growth) to avoid a steady state. As a 
result, entrepreneurship and innovation remain in a conceptual void while at the same 
time their importance is acknowledged. The conceptual void – the “ghost of Hamlet” – 
is “placed” in the context of markets and their equilibrium, and it acquires importance 
due the quest of an ever-increasing standard of living, the societal equivalent to the 
individual utility maximization of homo oeconomicus. Thus, it is hardly surprising that 
within economics a different approach emerged that studies the historic emergence of 
economic entrepreneurship in capitalism rather than founding entrepreneurship and 
innovation analysis in rational choice and equilibrium analysis. This leads us to 
Schumpeterian innovation studies: the study of innovation in historical context. The 
temporal marker is important on both the individual and on the societal level. At the 
individual level, the focus is on what is distinctive about entrepreneurial action: the 
carrying out of new combinations even if this meets resistance of the old (habit, customs 
and related interests). At the societal level, the focus is on the gale of creative 
destruction as opposed to the equilibrium dynamics. While the search for distinct 
patterns of large-scale business cycles has remained an elusive task, contemporary 
innovation studies follow the Schumpeterian lead via the study of national and regional 
systems of innovation in their specific context (Edquist 2005, Lundvall 2013)46. 
Economics therefore requires sociology and history for the study of entrepreneurship 
and innovation.    
Second, a model of rationality that treats preferences as given, and as not themselves 
part of the analysis, does not distinguish between simple preferences for goods and 
services and higher order preference about preferences based on rules and norms, 
culture and history. This omission is particularly problematic if we wish to analyze 
innovation in an unbiased way and not a priori with a view to private goods and 
services. Preferences for public goods depend on rules and customs as well as political 
commitments as the controversial discussion of the privatization of public goods in the 
late 20th and early 21st century amply demonstrates. These commitments can hardly be 
explained in terms of individual utility maximization, and even the idea of always self-
interested action becomes near vacuous when applied to people putting considerable 
effort and assuming risk for what they take to be the “right thing to do”, i.e. their 
commitments. Thus, the analysis of action in the standard approach would posit 
“rational fools”, in the sense of actors incapable of drawing the diction between first 
order and higher order preferences (Sen 1977, 336). It also produces foolish researchers: 
they lack a language to describe what motivates both innovators as well as those 
benefited or otherwise involved in the innovation process. This is a descriptive, 
sociological point, and does not imply that second-order preferences or commitments 
are “good” or “better”. Rather, these commitments are a part pf the analysis of action, 
no matter whether they are democratic, nationalistic, religious etc. They are the 
ingredients of the ideas that move people. Thus, this second point also points to the 
importance of historical and of sociology for the study of entrepreneurship and 
                                                          
46 And this approach needs to include the Kirznerian insight that next to the disruptive innovation of 
Schumpeter and the resilience approach, there is also the incremental innovation of the “process of 
discovery”. Disruptive and incremental innovations are orienting poles for a much more messy continuum 
in between. 
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innovation47. 
The importance of societal frames, thirdly, does not only pertain to the economic actors 
and their preferences but also to science. All approaches to innovation presented in the 
prior sections are associated with ideas of society and their trajectory: economic 
development and a raising standard of living, economic growth and national 
competitiveness, health and the integrity of systems etc. Many innovation researchers 
point out that (social) innovations are neither good nor bad as such, even if many actors 
from practice will say otherwise. But there is also a need to be aware of the societal 
ideas transported by research. They have direct and indirect normative implications. 
They pertain to central societal issues about what “ought to be done” and that directly 
touch on the well-being and living-together of people. They cannot be taken as “given” 
either; as good, bad or neutral. Rather, they too call for analysis and reflection. A 
scientific approach that seeks to play an active role in practice – as much of innovation 
research does via copious amount of policy recommendations – and also a self-
reflective science must acknowledge that its frames have societal consequences (with a 
view to innovation studies see Lundvall  1992, 6-8). They help orient policy-making 
and what kind of issues are selected as relevant for discussion, what counts as an 
innovation to be studied, and potentially supported etc..  The relative popularity of the 
resilience approach to social innovation can be explained partly by its switch of societal 
idea. It takes seriously a widely perceived societal challenge, i.e. the overall health and 
sustainability of society, whereas the old societal ideas of limitless economic 
development and economic growth are widely perceived as ideological, and insufficient 
for dealing with central challenges of our age. However, if the old frames can no longer 
be taken for granted, then their discussion is called for, they cannot be taken as “given”. 
This point also pertains to the alternative societal ideas!  
An approach to entrepreneurship and innovation that takes seriously these points 
emerging from our brief genealogy requires a richer interdisciplinary and ethical 
toolbox than the standard account has to offer. Yet, a brief genealogy does not yield 
deductively an alternative. It creates a space of orientation regarding issues that have to 
be addressed. With a view to the questions and purposes of specific research projects, it 
provides the soil and materials for creative inferences to a better explanation and for an 
improved reflective framework.  In the remaining paragraphs, I therefore sketch the 
contours of such an alternative approach to the standard approach for a research project 
that actively seeks to respond to societal challenges and to entrepreneurship and 
innovation as proposed solutions to these challenges.  
With a view to the ethical challenge, the genealogy suggests that approaches are 
required that can reflect on and make explicit the ethical dimension of societal ideas 
associated with innovation. In a first step, this suggest the need for ethics, i.e. ethical 
theories of justice and development to provide concepts and justifications for a value-
reflexive innovation studies. In a second step, it can be proposed – and this proposal 
relies on a long discussion within ethics – that the capabilities approach may offer a 
particularly suitable approach as it has emerged via a critical discussion both of the idea 
                                                          
47 However, it should be added that also in innovation studies the societal ideas frequently also taken as 
given (in terms of growth and national competitiveness), implausibly suggesting that these frames, and 
their normative elements, cannot themselves be analysed and discussed. But see Lundvall 1992 for a clear 
statement of the problem.   
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of economic growth and development as well as of the major theories of justice (Sen 
1999, Nussbaum 2000). The capabilities approach and its account of human 
development offer a language and an explicitly normative idea that creates space for the 
discussion of justice and sustainability challenges rather than subsuming them under a 
given frame that takes ethics out of the analysis48. The capabilities approach shares 
ethical individualism with the standard economic approach. It proposes the inclusion 
and impact on individuals as the focal point of ethical reflection on innovation. It differs 
from the standard approach in that it does not interpret this individualism in terms of 
themselves unanalyzed preferences but in terms of capabilities defined as the 
heterogeneous doings and beings that people have reason to value. It also differs from 
the standard approach in that it is not committed to explanatory individualism, i.e. 
approaches that seek to explain all economic and social phenomena in terms of 
individuals and their properties (Robbyens 2005, 107f). This leads to a second element 
of a conceptual alternative to the standard approach.  
It is a lesson of innovation studies from Schumpeter to the study of innovation systems 
that we cannot explain social change in terms of individual action only. Already 
Schumpeter seeks to explain the dynamic of capitalism via reference to a central social 
relation: that between the capitalist and the entrepreneur. It is this relation that fuels the 
“gale of creative destruction”. Subsequently, innovation systems studies have done 
much further work to uncover the social relations between both public and private 
organizations in innovations processes. Describing, and ultimately explaining 
innovation processes, therefore calls for a focus on social relations. It calls for a focus 
on the actor networks - in traditional innovation systems research for example 
universities and firms - as well as on the institutions that provide the rules that enable 
and constrain organizations and individuals49. The point is already anticipated in 
Schumpeter’s discussion of the “protective political stratum” in the emergence of 
capitalism (Schumpeter 1942). However, as noted, Schumpeter’s account – for our 
purposes – suffers from a reductive focus on the economy oriented by the idea of 
economic development and national competitiveness. This limits his explanatory 
account of innovation. Again, however, the genealogy provides space for attempts at 
improved explanatory frameworks. Prima facie innovation is possible everywhere in the 
social world, and its “spheres” and “systems”. Therefore, comprehensive explanatory 
accounts of social forces in history are called for. In parallel to the theory choice in 
ethics, there is at this point a moment of choice as various sociological and historical 
theories can be drawn on. For example, a general model of social forces is provided by 
Michal Mann and his account of the political, military, ideological, and economic 
sources of power in world history. “Ideological power derives from the human need to 
find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic 
and ritual practices with others . . . economic power derives from the human need to 
extract, transform, distribute, and consume the produce of nature . . . I define military 
power as the social organization of concentrated and lethal violence . . . political power 
is the centralized and territorial regulation of social live” (Mann 2013). Drawing on, and 
further developing50 this account of social forces in the light of a dynamic social reality, 
                                                          
48 See also the contributions by von Jacobi, and by Sebastianelli, Chiappero and von Jacobi in this report.  
49 The distinction between networks and institutions as further elements (in addition to cognitive frames) 
for the analysis of social change is due to Beckert (2010).  
50 Michal Mann rejects explanatory individualism but his own account comes close to methodological 
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prima facie promises a more adequate model of social explanation for an epistemically 
less biased study of innovation and entrepreneurship.  
In conclusion, we need general models that include ethics as well as sociology and 
history for the study of entrepreneurship and innovation51. Specifically I have referred 
to the possibility of an economic-sociological model for human development as a 
creative inference to a better explanation and societal idea in the light of the 
shortcomings of the standard approach. This specific approach draws on ethical theory 
to create space for the explicit discussion of the normative presuppositions and 
implications of the framing of innovation discussion, and it draws on an 
interdisciplinary sociological-economic model for the analysis of social change 
processes that seek to account for the relations between innovators, their supporters and 
opponents in a institutional setting and oriented by societal ideas (Nicholls and Ziegler 
2014 and papers in CRESSI Deliverable D1.1). It is important to stress the creative 
element in this inference to the alternative model. As we have seen, there are both with 
a view to the ethics, as well as to the explanatory frameworks moments of theory 
choice, and hence of conceptual alternatives. The value of an alternative approach 
therefore cannot derive only from a critique of the standard approach but will depend on 
its effective capacity to explain innovation processes, and to do so in a way that is 
reflective of the normative dimension of this task.  
I conclude with two last points on economy and innovation. If we replace the 
neoclassical assumption of given preferences that are to be maximized, and replace it 
with a focus on heterogeneous doings and beings that people have reason to value, then 
the definition of economy also changes. In neo-classical economics, the assumption of 
subjective, unlimited preferences in a world of given goods and services leads to a focus 
on scarce means. The primary task of economics is the analysis of allocation efficiency. 
In the present account, the assumption is that we can assume a central category of 
human ends in terms of capabilities but that we cannot assume maximization, because 
capabilities are internally heterogeneous and because they require choice52.  With choice 
rather than maximization, reflection and discussion become part of what economics is 
about. The means – goods and services – also are not given: the available means 
constantly change in the process of innovation, and what ought be used as means is 
subject to ethical reflection. Therefore economics is – paraphrasing Mann – the study of 
the central human capability to extract, transform, distribute and consume the produce 
of nature53.    
Innovation, in the abstract and classic formulation of Schumpeter, is the carrying out of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
nationalism, a serious limitation for the analysis of supranational political entities such as the European 
Union. Also – as Mann hints at in his later work (Mann 2013) – his sources of power do not deal 
sufficiently with natural and artefactual power (Heiskala 2014).  
51 This conclusion reached here via a genealogy is reached via an analysis of social innovation projects 
carried out in the past in the EU: Jenson and Harrison (2013) draw from their analysis of these projects 
the recommendation to better include ethics as well as history in social innovation research. More 
problematically, they also recommend not to focus on the societal macro-level, yet it is at this level that 
societal ideas no doubt play an important role!  
52 Capability does not refer to the functioning (for example being in good health) but to the opportunity to 
enjoy the functioning. Sen therefore also speaks of real freedoms (Sen 1999).  
53 “Central” here refers to the idea that this capability is constitutive of the human condition; capability 
refers to the moment of active choice that is in principle, if not necessarily in practice, there and that 
includes our reflection on nature as part of the exercise of this choice.    
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new combinations. Such innovative action is not limited to the economy but also 
possible with a view to other spheres of life such as the arts, politics, science or civil 
society. The product focus of much economic innovation studies is just a specific 
possibility of a more general human action potential. It is this action possibility that 
provides a shared yet abstract ground for innovation studies. In any specific historical 
context, this possibility requires detailed filling out in terms of societal ideas, 
institutions and actors relations.  
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4. How Does Social Innovation Challenge Neo-Classical 
Economic Assumptions Regarding Technological 
Innovation? 
 
By Attila Havas54 
4.1. Introduction 
Various economics paradigms treat innovation in fundamentally different ways. This 
paper focuses on neo-classical economics, in comparison with classical economics 
along their major assumptions, notions, research questions, and methods from the point 
of innovation in general, and social innovation, in particular. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 recalls briefly that innovation had been a 
major theme in classical economics. Then Section 4.3 shows that neo-classical 
economics essentially abandoned all research questions concerned with dynamics, and 
instead focused on optimisation. In this framework only certain types of innovations can 
be analysed. 
Given abundant empirical findings and theoretical work on firm behaviour and the 
operation of markets, mainstream industrial economics and organisational theory has 
relaxed the most unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical economics, especially perfect 
information, deterministic environments, perfect competition, and constant or 
diminishing returns. Yet, several major shortcomings have remained: (i) institutional 
issues are not addressed satisfactorily in these branches of economics, either; (ii) a very 
narrow concept of uncertainty is used; (iii) no adequate theory is offered on the creation 
of knowledge used in innovation activities and technological interdependence amongst 
firms; and (iv) the role of government is not analysed in a way that would provide a 
sound and constructive guidance to policy-makers. (Fagerberg et al. eds., 2005; Foray 
ed., 2009; Lazonick, 2013; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; Smith, 2000) Evolutionary 
economics of innovation – drawing also on institutional economics – rests on radically 
different postulates compared to mainstream economics. These latter schools, however, 
are not discussed in this contribution. 
The main question of this paper, that is, how social innovation challenges neo-classical 
economic assumptions regarding technological innovation is addressed in the 
concluding section. 
Innovation is a modern term – first applied extensively in economics by Schumpeter –, 
and thus authors belonging to classical and neo-classical economics have not used it. 
For the sake of simplicity, however, this notion is ‘retrospectively’ introduced in certain 
parts of this paper. 
 
                                                          
54 Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
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4.2. Technical, organisational and institutional changes: a subject in 
classical economics 
Although classical economics cannot be regarded as a paradigm – in terms of having 
shared axioms, basic notions, research questions, methods, postulates or main theses – it 
can be safely generalised that major classical economists had put a strong emphasis on 
technical, organisational and institutional changes when analysing “the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, the “Principles of Political Economy”, or “the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation”. More generally, these authors had paid 
attention to historical developments (long-term issues) and thus to the dynamic nature of 
the economy and considered it embedded in political and social structures. 
A fundamental notion in Adam Smith’s theory is the division of labour, that is, an 
organisational innovation, using modern terminology. In developing his arguments, 
further aspects of innovations are also explained – such as learning, introduction of 
machinery, better organisation of production processes – and various sources of 
innovations are mentioned. 
“This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of labour, 
the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different 
circumstances; first to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the 
saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; 
and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge 
labour, and enable one man to do the work of many. (…) 
(…) the invention of all those machines by which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, 
seems to have been originally owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to 
discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their 
minds is directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety 
of things. But in consequence of the division of labour, the whole of every man's attention 
comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object. (…) A great part of the 
machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most subdivided, were 
originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some 
very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier 
methods of performing it. Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures, 
must frequently have been shewn very pretty machines, which were the inventions of such 
workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work. (…) 
All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of those 
who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been made by the 
ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a 
peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, 
whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that account, 
are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar 
objects.” (Smith, 1776/1904; sections 1.1.5; 1.1.8; 1.1.9) 
Just to mention another ‘modern’ issue, Smith (1776) also devoted a chapter to describe 
the co-evolution of transport technologies, markets, and division of labour, leading to 
economic development. His examples stretch from the case of ancient Egypt to his 
contemporary Holland in time and cover Africa, Asia and Europe in space. (Book I, Ch. 
III) 
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John Stuart Mill also identifies various types of innovations – technical, managerial and 
organisational, and financial –, and distinguishes invention from innovation (practical 
use) and incremental innovations during diffusion. Using modern terms, he also speaks 
of product and process innovations. Finally, he stresses the importance of diffusing new 
knowledge. 
“§4. The third element which determines the productiveness of the labour of a community, is 
the skill and knowledge therein existing; whether it be the skill and knowledge of the 
labourers themselves, or of those who direct their labour. No illustration is requisite to show 
how the efficacy of industry is promoted by the manual dexterity of those who perform mere 
routine processes; by the intelligence of those engaged in operations in which the mind has a 
considerable part; and by the amount of knowledge of natural powers and of the properties of 
objects, which is turned to the purposes of industry. That the productiveness of the labour of 
a people is limited by their knowledge of the arts of life, is self-evident; and that any 
progress in those arts, any improved application of the objects or powers of nature to 
industrial uses, enables the same quantity and intensity of labour to raise a greater produce. 
One principal department of these improvements consists in the invention and use of tools 
and machinery. (…) 
The use of machinery is far from being the only mode in which the effects of knowledge in 
aiding production are exemplified. In agriculture and horticulture, machinery is only now 
[1852] beginning to show that it can do anything of importance, beyond the invention and 
progressive improvement of the plough and a few other simple instruments. The greatest 
agricultural inventions have consisted in the direct application of more judicious processes to 
the land itself, and to the plants growing on it (…). In manufactures and commerce, some of 
the most important improvements consist in economizing time; in making the return follow 
more speedily upon the labour and outlay. There are others of which the advantage consists 
in economy of material. 
§5. But the effects of the increased knowledge of a community in increasing its wealth, need 
the less illustration as they have become familiar to the most uneducated, from such 
conspicuous instances as railways and steam-ships. A thing not yet so well understood and 
recognised, is the economical value of the general diffusion of intelligence among the 
people.” (Mill, 1848/1909, Book I, paragraphs 1.7.9-1.7.12) 
In his major book, Ricardo has also analysed major marketing and technological 
changes, for example “Sudden Changes in the Channels of Trade”, “the influence of 
machinery on the interests of the different classes of society”, on output, trade, profit, 
and employment. (Ricardo, 1817/1821, chapters 19 and 31) 
The way, in which Karl Marx has addressed technological changes and economic 
development is analysed in detail by many authors, most notably by Schumpeter (1942) 
[cf. Rosenberg, 2011], as well as by contemporary scholars of economics of innovation 
(e.g. Clark and Juma, 1988; Mazzolini and Nelson, 2013), and thus there is no need to 
stress here that Marx had paid attention to innovation. 
To conclude this brief overview, it is worth stressing that classical economists had not 
paid a particular attention to the allocation of scarce resources. Following Kaldor 
(1972), two functions of decentralised markets are identified by Dosi and Orsenigo 
(1988, p.14): allocation of resources and transmission of impulses to change. To 
generalise, classical economists had inclined to focus on the latter one. 
“Fundamental dynamic properties such as the relationship between expansion of markets, 
division of labour, and productivity growth in Smith, or the ‘increasing organic composition 
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of capital’ in Marx, are examples of a class of propositions argued on the grounds of the 
irreversible transformations originated by processes of what we could call ‘dynamic 
competition’. Moreover, their neglect of explicit microfoundations was justified on the 
grounds of what we may term a ‘holistic’ or ‘macroinstitutional’ assumption about 
behaviour: it seemed obvious to them that, for example, given an opportunity, capitalists 
were ready to seize it, or that their ‘institutional’ function was to invest and accumulate the 
surplus.” (ibid., emphasis in the original) 
 
4.3. Technical, organisational and institutional changes: exogenous 
factors in neo-classical economics 
Neo-classical economists abandoned the classical tradition at least in two crucial 
aspects: (i) they put allocative efficiency into the centre of their analysis, that is, a short-
term issue; and closely related to this rupture, (ii) neglected technological, institutional, 
behavioural and organisational changes. Their main new objective was to develop 
sophisticated models of general equilibrium and by doing so to turn economics into a 
‘hard science’, exemplified by Newtonian physics in the 19th century. Walras 
(1874/1954, p.71), for example, perceived “the pure theory of economics or the theory 
of exchange and value in exchange” as a “physico-mathematical science like mechanics 
or hydrodynamics”. (cited in Clark and Juma, 1988, p.206)55 In other words, a rich set 
of historical analyses offered by classical economics was replaced by an ahistorical, 
highly abstract theory. 
Since the late 19th century, however, economists – representatives of various schools 
who criticise each other, on the one hand, and methodologists and historians of 
economic thought, on the other – use the label of neo-classical in various ways. Two 
different approaches can be distinguished. (Lawson, 2013) First, this school is defined 
in relation to classical economics, assuming both continuity (in some aspects) and 
discontinuity (in others). Many of the authors following this approach establish that 
hardly any continuity can be found, and thus counter-classical or anti-classical would be 
more appropriate designations.56 Second, other authors seek to define common 
analytical features of writings labelled as neo-classical, that is, continuity with classical 
economics is not an issue in this (classification) approach. There is a non-negligible 
                                                          
55 For a more detailed account on this ‘zeal’ and its repercussions, see, e.g. Allen (1988, pp.96-97), as 
well as Clark and Juma (1988, pp.204-207). In his Nobel memorial lecture, Herbert Simon (1978, p.367) 
also touched upon this issue: “The social sciences have been accustomed to look for models in the most 
spectacular successes of the natural sciences. There is no harm in that, provided that it is not done in a 
spirit of slavish imitation. In economics, it has been common enough to admire Newtonian mechanics (or, 
as we have seen, the Law of Falling Bodies), and to search for the economic equivalent of the laws of 
motion. But this is not the only model for a science, and it seems, indeed, not to be the right one for our 
purposes.” It is also worth stressing that the “role model” for neo-classical economists already changed its 
“course”: “By the time Jevons and Walras began laying the cornerstones of modern economics, a 
spectacular revolution in physics had already brought down the mechanistic dogma both in the natural 
sciences and philosophy. And the curious fact is that none of the architects of ‘the mechanics of utility 
and self interest’ and none even of the latter-day model-builders seem to have been aware at any time of 
this downfall.” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, pp.2-3, cited in Clark and Juma, 1988, p.207) 
56 Lawson (2013, p.948) offers an overview of these claims, including a particularly vivid one by 
Schumpeter: “there is no more sense in calling the Jevons-Menger-Walras theory neoclassic than there 
would be calling the Einstein theory neo-Newtonian”. One could add, though, that Einstein’s theory 
seems to be much more relevant in explaining phenomena in physics than neo-classical economics in 
analysing economic developments. 
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diversity even inside this ’camp’, however.57 For instance, the equilibrium states are 
quintessential for some authors, while for others are not. Moreover, there is some 
disagreement whether equilibria are supposed to always prevail axiomatically, or only 
their possible existence is among the main research questions. Just to mention a few 
attempts, the neo-classical school has been defined in the following ways (all cited by 
Lawson, 2013, p. 949): 
“(1) an individualistic perspective, a requirement that explanations be couched solely in 
terms of individuals; (2) an acceptance of some rationality axiom; and (3) a commitment to 
the study of equilibrium states.” (Hahn, 1984)  
“1. People have rational preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize utility and 
firms maximize profits. 3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant 
information. Theories based on, or guided by, these assumptions are neoclassical theories 
(Weintraub, 2002).” 
Neo-classical economics “1) assumes rational, maximizing behaviour by agents with given 
and stable preference functions, (2) focuses on attained, or movements towards, equilibrium 
states, and (3) is marked by an absence of chronic information problems (Hodgson, 1999, p. 
29).” 
From the point of analysing innovations, the following neo-classical assumptions are 
essential: homogenous products, diminishing returns to scale, technologies accessible to 
all producers at zero cost, perfectly informed economic agents, perfect competition, and 
thus zero profit. In this framework, technological changes were treated as exogenous to 
the economic system. Thus, uncertainties were not considered, either; the underlying 
notion related to innovation was risk, assuming that the probability distribution of all 
possible events can be known a priori. The major actor in these models is the 
‘representative agent’, that is, a single person who – regardless of his or her field of 
activity – has no specific characteristics. In brief, innovation became a non-issue in neo-
classical economics. 
Building upon the neo-classical framework, Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) started a 
systematic analysis of firms’ in-house R&D activities. In this way, a certain type of 
technological innovations, that is, the ones based on intramural R&D results could be 
considered.58 It is an important ‘class’ of innovations, no doubt, but at least equally 
important ones were disregarded. These include: (a) innovations based on the results of 
extramural R&D projects conducted in the same or other sectors, at public or private 
research establishments, home or abroad; (b) all other technological innovations based 
on non-R&D type of knowledge, e.g. stemming from various other sources, such as 
design, scaling up, testing, tooling-up, trouble-shooting, and other engineering 
activities, ideas from suppliers and users, inventors’ concepts and practical experiments, 
as well as collaboration among engineers, designers, artists, and other creative ‘geeks’;59 
and (c) non-technological innovations, such as organisational, managerial, marketing, or 
                                                          
57 A further issue, namely the confusion between neo-classical and mainstream economics is not 
discussed here. 
58 The first models of innovation, developed by practitioners – policy-makers or managers of in-house 
R&D units of large firms – and natural scientists also regarded R&D as the principal information source 
of innovations. These are the so-called science-push models of innovations. To describe their origin and 
features in detail, as well as subsequent linear and non-linear models of innovations is beyond the scope 
of this contribution. 
59 Further, innovative firms also utilise knowledge embodied in advanced materials, other inputs, 
equipment, and software. 
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financial ones, as well as new business models.60 Non-technological innovations are all 
the more important; as innovation studies have shown technological innovations can 
hardly be introduced without organisational and managerial innovations.61 Moreover, to 
latter ones – together with marketing innovations – are vital for the success of the 
former ones. 
The pioneering work by Nelson and Arrow first looked as a promising extension of neo-
classical economics, e.g. leading to economics of information, but in light of Nelson’s 
later major contributions, can also be seen as the first step opening up fundamentally 
new avenues, namely evolutionary and institutional economics of innovation. 
 
4.4. Social innovation and the assumptions of neo-classical 
economics 
Social innovation is defined by the CRESSI project as follows: The development and 
delivery of new ideas (products, services, models, markets, processes) at different socio-
structural levels that intentionally seek to improve human capabilities, social relations, 
and the processes in which these solutions are carried out. 
Clearly, the theoretical framework of neo-classical economics cannot accommodate 
social innovations for several reasons. Just to highlight some of the most important 
ones, for social innovators the major goal is not optimisation in a strict economic sense. 
Second, social innovators do face uncertainty, too, not only calculable risks. Third, 
dynamic aspects are crucial, e.g. changes in the environment, in which social 
innovations take place; moreover, to induce this change is indeed among the major 
goals of social innovation. Fourth, various types of changes – economic, technological, 
organisational, social (e.g. structural, behavioural) and political – are endogenous from 
the point of view of social innovations, and co-evolve. Policy governance sub-systems 
and the level of governance need to be considered, too. In other words, these changes 
and co-evolutionary processes cannot be treated as exogenous. Fifth, social innovators 
are neither ‘representative agents’, nor do they act on their own. They have their own 
specific features, partly shaped by the context, in which they operate, and they need to 
interact with several other actors, and often form formal or informal networks to do so. 
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5. Neoclassical Economics and Innovation – An EU Policy 
Making Perspective on Legitimising R&I Policy 
By Klaus Kubeczko62 
 
No doubt neo-classical economics has been strongly influencing policy making 
regarding research, technological development and innovation over the last decades and 
even up to now. This part will therefore focus on some implications of neo-classical 
economics on the way policies are supposed to be legitimised in democratic processes. 
The question, how social innovation challenges neo-classical economic assumptions 
regarding innovation, is addressed from this perspective. 
Nearly all initiatives in the European Union require a formal Impact Assessment63 in 
which the executive bodies have to provide arguments showing the legitimacy of the 
proposed initiative, before political decisions are made. Impact Assessments have to 
address three categories of rationales: (a) the existence of market failure, (b) regulatory 
failure, as well as (c) discrepancies between fundamental goals of the EU Treaty and the 
status quo. 
This holds true for any kind of research and innovation oriented (R&I) policy measures 
supporting technological development and it is also a fact for Horizon 2020 and hence 
for social innovation related parts of it. Although increasingly other (sustainability) 
criterial for supporting R&I-policy instruments are becoming more prominent, up to 
now the main criteria in defining the problem is market failure.  
Based on neo-classical economic theory, three fundamental problems are pointed out: 
uncertainty, inappropriability, and indivisibility (Hauknes and Nordgren 1999; Arrow 
1962; Nelson 1959). As those characteristics make it irrational for a homo-oeconomicus 
to produce any kind of good or service, public intervention is justified. 
It is frequently argued that market failure provides sufficient legitimation for political 
action addressing R&I. We must, however, ask first which “market” is referred to. Are 
we talking about markets for products and services (including artefacts, technologies 
and solutions for societal challenges) or markets for knowledge? Arrow (1962) and 
Nelson (1959) originally considered failure of “scientific knowledge markets” as a 
sufficient legitimation for science policy intervention (meaning basic research) 
(Kubeczko and Weber 2009). Many authors since have followed suit, as such failure is 
also frequently cited in the wider R&I policy context. Although the understanding of 
markets is not made explicit by most authors, markets for knowledge and innovation, 
will probably describe best what they are referring to. Neo-classical economist will 
understand marketable knowledge as equal to codified generic information and data 
which can be commercialized by economic actors (Chaminade et al. 2009). This can be 
traded in the form of licenses for patents or other intellectual property rights and play a 
key role in the case of the endogenous neo-classical growth model Paul Romer (1990). 
However, as research and innovation involve uncertainty since, (a) research activities do 
                                                          
62 Innovation Systems Department, Austrian Institute of Technology. 
63 “Impact assessment will be applied to the major initiatives presented by the Commission in its Annual 
Policy Strategy or its Work Programme, be they either regulatory proposals or other proposals having an 
economic, social and environmental impact.” COM(2002) 276 final 
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not inevitably lead to new knowledge or innovations, and (b) markets are not always 
responsive to innovations. In both cases, the main problem is incalculable risk and thus 
the absence of investments in the light of uncertainty. Inappropriability of knowledge 
involved in innovation is a problem related to the public good nature of knowledge 
production and the externalities it entails. State intervention, for instance, is justified on 
grounds of expected knowledge spillovers from basic research. Finally, the indivisibility 
of knowledge makes it difficult to find a formula for sharing the expected profits, which 
substantially reduces the willing individual companies to invest in knowledge 
production.    
As can be seen from the Impact Assessment Guidelines provided by the European 
Commission (EC 2009), neo-classical economic arguments are key for reasoning the 
existence of market failure. The following problems are described as market failure:  
1. Market prices do not reflect the real costs and benefits to society ('externalities') 
2. Insufficient supply of public goods 
3. Missing or weak competition (including abuse of market power) 
4. Missing or incomplete markets 
5. Information failures, such as imperfect information or lack of access to information 
for decision takers (including consumers and public authorities), unless caused by a 
regulatory failure 
This shows that there is a strong focus on market solutions when defining the problem 
and a perfect market is seen as the ideal state. Clearly these market-failure arguments 
are mainly related to product and service markets including public goods but only to a 
lesser extent to knowledge. It is particularly the case with respect to how the problem 
has to be defined in the Impact Assessment. But, it would be misleading to reverse the 
market failure argument and claim that any policy initiative has to be solved by proper 
“market-solutions”. On the opposite, Arrows (1962) and North (1959) - who showed 
that the preconditions for a market solution are not met in the case of knowledge 
provision - recommended substantial public investment and support of scientific 
institutions. They understood basic research as an area where market solutions do not 
work. Also later neoclassical economists with an endogenous model of technological 
change like Romer (1992) are critical of constructing models showing markets 
providing optimal level of research. 
Once the problem has been defined and the corresponding objectives are set in the 
Impact Assessment the neo-classical arguments put forward are mainly focusing on 
ideal markets or on why a market is not established. They are rarely specific enough or 
appropriate to guide policy maker in developing policy options at an operational level 
apart from direct financial interventions. Therefore, the door is open for a broad range 
of theoretical approaches and heuristics to be used to develop effective, efficient and 
coherent policy options. This includes solutions fostering technological as well as social 
innovation. This is also acknowledged by the Impact Assessment guidelines (EC 2009) 
which describe several other instrumental options such as self-regulation, open methods 
of coordination, information, guidelines, co-regulation, standards, framework directives 
and prescriptive regulatory actions. 
For the above mentioned market failure with respect to imperfect information, this can 
be illustrated by one of CRESSI’s cases of social innovation aiming to improve 
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financial literacy. Equally the missing of markets for social housing could be the 
starting point to suggest social innovations. Which policy options are investigated in the 
Impact Assessment and which methods are used to analyse the impact of policy options 
will depend on several criteria, including power relations in the administrative units 
involved. But in the end adequate theoretical underpinnings and heuristics provide the 
convincing rational arguments for a policy option, and have the power of legitimise 
policy initiatives in deliberative policy making.  
 
References 
Arrow, K. (1962) Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, in: 
Nelson R. R. (ed.) The Role and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Chaminade Ch., Lundvall B.A., Vang J., Joseph K.J. (2009) Designing innovation 
policies for development: towards a systemic experimentation-based approach, in: 
Lundvall B.A., Joseph K.J., Chaminade Ch., Vang J. (eds.) Handbook of Innovation 
Systems and Developing Countries, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
European Commission (2002) Communication from the commission on Impact 
assessment, COM (2002) 276 final. 
European Commission (2009) Part III: Annex to impact assessment guidelines. 
European Commission (January 15). 
Hauknes, J., Nordgren, L. (1999) Economic Rationales of Government Involvement in 
Innovation and the Supply of Innovation-related Services, Oslo: STEP. 
Kubeczko K, Weber K.M. (2009) Proaktive legitimation FTI-politischer interventionen: 
Jenseits von Markt- und systemversagen, in: Fröhlich J., Leitner K.-H., Weber K.M. 
(eds.) Innovationsforschung und Technologiepolitik in Österreich: Neue 
Perspektiven und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten, Vienna: Studienverlag. 
Nelson, R.R. (1959) The simple economics of basic research, Journal of Political 
Economy, 67, 97–306. 
Romer, P.M. (1992) Two strategies for economic development: Using ideas and 
producing ideas, Proceedings of the World Bank annual Research Conference 1992, 
supplement to the World Bank Economic Review, March 1993, 63-91.  
Romer, P.M. (1990) Endogenous technological change, Journal of Political Economy, 
98, S71-S102. 
  
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 50 | 133 
 
 
 
PART 3 
 
Task 1.5:  
What incentive structures or types of 
motivation best suit social innovation 
addressing the marginalised?  
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6. Aristotelian Economics and Modern Finance 
A consideration of the true counterpart to today’s financial 
markets 
By C.W.M. (Ro) Naastepad and Christopher Houghton Budd (31st January 2015) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Are marginalisation and social exclusion related to the motivating forces that belong to 
what have come to be accepted as the foundation of our economic theory, policy and 
institutions? To many, marginalisation and exclusion are unfortunate side effects of 
economic efficiency and (exogenous) technological change. To others, however, they 
are a sign that we are not yet capable of managing the consequences of our quest for 
freedom, characterised as it has been to date by a striving for the absence of external 
constraints over our lives. Is this motivation, and its associated tenets and policies, part 
of the problem, therefore, and can its modification become part of the solution?  
In search of a solution to problems of marginalisation and exclusion, some advocate the 
creation of a ‘social sector’ which picks up the pieces left by ‘free’ markets’ and 
unbounded technological progress. This may involve changes in our economic, financial 
and political systems and a return to laws and rules that reflect our collective 
responsibility. Others aim for ‘market solutions’ such as the creation of financial 
investment instruments (e.g. ‘social impact bonds’) aiming at linking social benefit and 
private return. Opposite as these two solutions − ‘state’ and ‘market’ – may seem, both 
are built on the same view of the human being as driven only by self-interest and 
unable, out of himself,64 to engender socially responsible conduct. Hence he has to be 
subjected to discipline, whether market competition or state regulation. Both solutions, 
however, limit our hard-won and dearly-cherished power of self-determination. 
A third possibility – one that does not imply a return to some external force that 
repudiates such self-governance – would be to broaden our understanding of freedom, 
self-determination, and rationality. In such a perspective, proposed by, for example, the 
economist Adolph Lowe in his under-appreciated Has Freedom a Future?, the solution 
would not be to go back to old constraints, but “to free ourselves from one more 
constraint, perhaps the most pertinacious of all: ignorance of our true nature.” Unless 
we understand the wider nature of the human being and the purpose of human life, we 
shall not be able to define the boundaries of the economy or assign to capital its proper 
role in society. Since the second pair of categories amount to the same thing as the first, 
it is difficult to see how, without revisiting them, solutions to marginalisation and 
exclusion cannot but remain elusive. 
This paper explores how Aristotle’s concepts of τέλος (telos, purpose)65 and ἦθος (ethos, 
                                                          
64 Notwithstanding the political correctness currently associated with gender in the English language, in 
this paper when referring to the human being the words ‘man’ and therefore ‘he’ are understood to be 
general to all human beings, since ‘man’ derives from the Sanskrit root ‘man’ which refers to the faculty 
of thinking (Barfield 1967). 
65 A telos (from the Greek τέλος) is an end or purpose. It is the root of the term ‘teleology’, roughly the 
study of purposiveness, or the study of objects with a view to their aims, purposes, or intentions. 
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character), or the inner sense of what is right and worthy in human life)66 can help in 
defining the boundaries of the economy, and, more specifically, in finding a counterpart 
for the ‘superabundant liquidity’ which, according to many67, not only marks but also 
prolongs today’s continuing global financial crisis.68 For unless we can identify the true 
counterpart to today’s excess liquidity – a phenomenon one could also describe as ‘too 
much capital’− marginalisation and exclusion will prove to be inevitable.   
 
6.2. Background 
Responses to the financial crisis are predominantly of three kinds. A first set of 
proposed solutions centres around ‘more regulation’, ranging from closer surveillance 
and regulation of banks (e.g. Roubini & Mihm 2011, Stiglitz 2010) to full reserve 
banking proposals for abolishing fractional reserve lending and the creation of money 
by banks (e.g. Benes & Kumhof 2013, based on Fisher 1936 and Phillips 1995; for 
‘positive money’ variants, see Jackson & Dyson 2013, Huber & Robertson 2000).  
A second set centres around ‘more market’ and includes proposals ranging from 
financial innovation (e.g. Shiller 2012) to ‘free banking’ (based on Hayek 2007). A third 
set of responses focuses on ‘greed’ as the cause of the crisis, and on ‘moral attitudes’ 
and ‘virtue ethics’ in economic relationships as the solution (e.g. Bowles 2011, 2012; 
Bowles & Gintis 2011, Hodgson 2012) without, however, specifying what ends these 
virtues serve or how they are to influence our behaviour from now on.  
In our view, such solutions do not address the root of the problem. The disturbances we 
witness in our society relate to the foundation of our economic theory and its related 
economic institutions, and will not be solved until we rethink some of the most 
fundamental questions of economics, particularly with respect to capital. What are the 
economy and capital for, and is the answer to this question today different from what it 
was in the 18th and 19th centuries, when the currently prevailing axioms and 
prescriptions of economic theory were formulated?  
The ‘superabundant liquidity’ associated with the financial crisis is not a transitory 
phenomenon. It requires us to understand more carefully the relationship between 
‘excess liquidity’ and the real economy. To this end, let us pause for a moment and 
consider afresh the meaning of ‘real’ and ‘financial’. Whereas today’s discourse is often 
framed in terms of the real versus the financial economy, implying that financial is 
unreal (and that real is unfinancial!), it is more concrete to think in terms of the physical 
economy (ultimately predicated on and valued in terms of goods) and the non-physical 
economy (related to creativity). The physical economy comprises the work (labour) 
necessary to produce goods that meet human needs. The non-physical economy 
comprises the inventive and creative capacities ─ ideas, mental work ─ that improve 
                                                          
66 Concerning character, for Cheffers and Pakaluk (2007), for example, character is about having virtues, 
being virtuous. In this sense, one is or is not characterful, has or does not have character. Thus, character 
might be said to mean having an inner sense of what is right and worthy in human life, at which point it 
becomes important to ask whether this sense is innate or can be learned and cultivated. (See also the later 
discussion under ‘Telos and ethos’.) 
67 For example, Adair Turner in Prospect, September 2009. See full discussion in Houghton Budd (2011).  
68 Hereafter, references to ‘the financial crisis’ mean the global financial crisis, which began in 2007 and 
in various guises continues to this day, with no clear end in sight. 
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production (e.g. the organisation and capital intensity of the production process) and the 
productivity of the physical economy (the goods economy). Thus, one can see the real 
economy as spanning a continuum between two poles (physical and non-physical), 
rather than being one of the poles, and that the financial economy reflects this 
continuum (rather than being its other pole). 
Here some further precision is perhaps needed. A human being needs to eat, be clothed 
and housed whether he labours in the fields all week or preaches a sermon once a week 
on Sundays – to use a picture from agrarian society which typically would also be 
religious. Labour creates goods, which are typically of focused and finite use. Ideation 
on the other hand is typically of general and infinite use. Over time, the proportion of 
people who work to produce goods directly (e.g. a wheel) has progressively declined 
relative to the proportion of people doing mental work that produces ideas (e.g. the idea 
of a wheel), which has increased correspondingly. The physical or goods economy 
feeds, clothes and houses both groups ─ those who work to produce goods and those 
who do not produce goods directly, such as doctors whose skills return patients to the 
workplace sooner or inventors whose gadgets enable us to ‘stretch’ the work done by 
those who make things directly. While labour enables us continually to produce the 
goods we all need, ideation or capacities contributes to humanity’s development via its 
positive impact in terms of inventions and innovations, etc. Thus, not only labour, but 
mental development also has value in itself. 
Reframing the discussion in this way has enormous consequences for our understanding 
of what is nowadays taking place. Historically, the non-physical economy grows vis-à-
vis the physical economy, reflecting the progressive emancipation of the human being 
from the need to work for physical livelihood. Human beings are increasingly free to 
rise above the material; work can increasingly take on a mental quality. One can 
therefore ask: Is the growth of ‘excess liquidity’ a reflection of (and meant to enable) 
this structural change?  
The remainder of this paper will explore this thought further. For example, it is the rule 
rather than the exception today for an asset to be seen only in financial terms – 
considered as an investment ‘in play’ until it can be sold for financial gain – rather than 
as something that supports the real economy, whether physical or non-physical. What 
are the actual consequences, intended or otherwise, of this financialism? In particular, 
does it continue or undo our emancipation from material drudgery hard-won over 
centuries? 
 
6.3. A first attempt at quantification 
The volume of global financial assets has expanded at a rapid pace since 1980, while the 
rate of growth of world output of goods and services has slowed down. Has 
‘superabundant liquidity’ grown over time as a result of structural changes in the 
relationship between the physical and the non-physical economy? 
By 2010, according to IMF estimates, the economy’s physical asset base had grown to 
USD 210 trillion, or three times global GDP worth USD 63 trillion (implying a capital-
output ratio of about three, which corresponds to other estimates). However, by 2010, 
the value of global financial assets had swollen to around USD 600 trillion, tripling over 
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the past two decades. Today, total financial assets are nearly 10 times the value of 
global output (Bain & Company 2012, Figure 1.1; see the Annex to this paper). What is 
the counterpart of these financial assets?  
The estimate of USD 600 trillion refers to the notional value of the derivatives market. 
The more relevant measure for our purposes would be the (gross) market value 
corresponding to this amount, which is USD 21 trillion (BIS 2013, Table 19; see 
Annex), which still constitutes a sizeable share of total global assets. Chen et al. (2012) 
estimated global liquidity – approximated as the sum of financial sector liabilities of the 
G4, i.e. the Eurozone, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – to equal 
USD 90 trillion in 2010-11, which amounts to 140% of the combined GDP of the G4 
countries, or 130% of world GDP (Chen et al. (2012) Figure 1; see Annex). The amount 
spent on buying financial assets (USD 21 trillion) would then amount to close to one-
third of the GDP of the G4. What is the relationship between these assets and the real 
economy? If this amount is not needed to support the physical base of economic life, 
what could be the reason for its existence? 
The measurement of financial assets is fraught with problems. As financial systems 
move away from traditional deposit-based funding (‘core funding’) to capital and, more 
recently, collateral-based markets (‘non-core funding’), standard monetary aggregates 
become less suited to capture movements in global financial capital. In recent years, for 
example, much work has focused on capturing the role of the shadow banking system, 
which provides a fast-rising share of total liquidity. Poszar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and 
Boesky (2010) and Poszar (2011) find that the volume of credit intermediated by the 
shadow banking system has far exceeded that of the traditional banking system since the 
mid-1990s. The liabilities of the shadow banking system are estimated to equal USD 22 
trillion in 2007, as compared to about USD 14 trillion for the traditional U.S. banking 
system. As Mayer (2000) put it – credit now ‘comes from all over’, issuing increasingly 
from outside the banking system.   
What share of financial capital, estimated in one of the above ways or otherwise, is 
‘excess liquidity’ in the sense of capital that is not needed to finance investments in the 
physical economy? Is the amount of capital that is not needed in the physical economy 
growing (absolutely and as a share of total capital)? A conservative estimate of ‘excess 
liquidity’ in this sense is, perhaps, the size of global institutional cash pools, as 
estimated by Poszar in his IMF report. Global institutional cash pools increased from 
USD100 billion in 1990 to between USD 3.5 trillion and USD 3.8 trillion in 2007 
(Poszar 2011, Figure 1; see Annex). To use the figures mentioned earlier, these cash 
pools are used predominantly for financial investments in derivatives markets 
(notionally valued at USD 600 trillion). A less conservative estimate of ‘excess 
liquidity’ puts it at USD 21 trillion, equivalent to the estimated gross market value of 
the derivatives market, an amount that roughly equals the size of the shadow banking 
system.  
If excess liquidity – ‘too much capital’ – mirrors an underlying transformation of 
economic life, the three types of solutions mentioned above will not be sufficient to deal 
with the consequences. The solution, as tentatively explored here, will be to raise our 
awareness so that we see that something in our economic system has changed 
fundamentally (that ‘something’ quite possibly being our understanding itself), thereby 
to find a perspective that enables us to identify the counterpart of the excess liquidity 
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that has been, and will presumably continue to be, created. 
 
6.4. ‘Too much capital’ and ‘the real values of life’ 
Economists of various persuasions have long since warned that financial capital would, 
over time, increasingly separate itself from the physical economy, and subsequently 
cause problems to the physical economy through speculative activities. “Loose funds 
may sweep the world, disorganizing all steady business,” as Keynes succinctly put it.69 
If this is what is happening today, the question today’s on-going financial crisis poses 
is: What is the counterpart of the loose capital that is continuously created and 
accumulated? To what can it tie itself so as to lead us forwards not backwards? Will the 
counterpart show how ─ for example, by being spent out ─ this capital can be stabilising 
instead of disorganizing?70 
The problem that caused the financial crisis, we suggest, is not the loosening of capital 
from the physical economy per se, but the lack of a perspective which tells us how this 
loose capital can be used productively. Again, that this question would, in due course, 
throw up serious problems, was foreseen by Keynes when, in his 1930 essay Economic 
possibilities for our grandchildren, he estimated that within less than a hundred years, 
standards of living would have risen more than enough to cover material necessities. If 
average living standards were eight times higher in 2030 than in 1930, Keynes 
speculated, people would have enough income to turn their attention to other things in 
life besides material subsistence. Humanity would have solved its economic problem. 
Beyond this point, the accumulation of capital for economic purposes would make no 
sense.  
What will humanity do, asked Keynes, once it has solved the problem which was 
hitherto the primary, most pressing problem of the human race – the struggle for 
subsistence: 
If the economic problem is solved, mankind will be deprived of its traditional purpose. 
Will this be a benefit? If one believes at all in the real values of life, the prospect at least 
opens up the possibility of benefit. Yet I think with dread of the readjustment of the 
habits and instincts of ordinary man, bred into him for countless generations, which he 
may be asked to discard within a few decades. To use the language of today – must we 
not expect a general “nervous breakdown”? (Keynes 1963: 366). 
More than eighty years after Economic possibilities for our grandchildren, the most 
productive parts of the world have come close to Keynes’s goal in terms of per capita 
incomes. If today’s ‘excess liquidity’ reflects incomes that are more than sufficient to 
cover material necessities, how will we spend the excess? 
Obviously, a justified objection would be that today many household incomes, even in 
                                                          
69 J. M. Keynes, The Post-War Currency Policy, 8 ix 41 The Collected Writing of John Maynard Keynes, 
Vol. XXV.  
70 Spend-out or spend-down foundations are increasing, as those responsible for them see the merit, 
indeed social wisdom and economic sense, in ‘losing’ capital into education, seed-funding and so on, 
rather than preserving their capital in today’s increasingly unstable financial markets. The difference is 
not a loss of efficiency, but that the benefit accrues to society generally rather than to the provider of the 
funds. A good example is to contrast the benefit to society of a young generation indebted by student 
loans and one set free by grants. 
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the rich countries of the world, are not sufficient to cover material necessities because, 
while economic growth has boosted the per capita income of contemporary western 
societies, median incomes have stagnated (Skidelsky 2010: 143). Most people in 
western societies earn much less than the average income, and part of the ‘excess 
liquidity’ accumulated in the past three decades results from a redistribution of national 
income from lower incomes towards the top of the income scale (rather than from 
increases in production).  
Such liquidity is not truly excess, if by ‘excess liquidity’ one understands money that 
the physical economy cannot accommodate and has no use for. Money that is 
withdrawn from necessary income formation is needed within the economy and hence 
not ‘excess’. Indeed, capital that is formed by withdrawing money from necessary 
income formation is not truly capital, if by capital we mean wealth that originates in the 
ingenuity, creativity and inspiration, that is, in the productive mental activity that gives 
rise to and guides economic activity.  
This is the focus of our thesis regarding the counterpart of ‘too much capital’, namely, 
that it originates in human ingenuity. Humanity’s ever-increasing ingenuity and self-
awareness result in (most often labour-saving) improvements in production processes 
and drive up economic productivity. When labour productivity increases, the same 
amount of labour can be used to produce more goods, or the same amount of goods can 
be produced with less labour. This gain in the form of either more goods or more free 
time is known as the productivity dividend.  
When living standards are low, the productivity dividend tends to be used for expanding 
the capital base of the economy – what von Mises called ‘seed corn’ for the physical 
economy – and thereby the (potential) quantity of goods produced. However, with 
humanity’s ever-increasing self-consciousness, the amount of (physical plus financial) 
capital created by human ingenuity has grown out of proportion to the need for physical 
capital; an increasingly large segment of capital created is not needed (as physical 
capital) in the physical economy and cannot be predicated upon or forced into it.71 To 
the extent that today’s ‘excess liquidity’ represents money that is not needed to maintain 
material existence, how do we spend (this share of) the productivity dividend?  
 
6.5. Humanity’s ‘permanent problem’ 
Rephrasing Keynes, what will humanity do with the productivity dividend once 
productivity increases have solved the problem of material existence?  
“…for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent 
problem – how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the 
leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and 
agreeably and well.” (ibid. p. 367) 
                                                          
71 Obviously, today, even if per capita and median incomes in the rich parts of the world were sufficient, 
for large segments of the world’s population the problem of material existence has not yet been solved. 
Doesn’t this prove that Keynes was premature in his attack on homo economicus? We believe not, 
because even material uncertainty in developing countries is an integral part of the problem of excess 
liquidity. Replacement of homo economicus with a more virtuous successor would arguably channel 
capital that now accumulates in abstract cash pools and financial markets to places where it is genuinely 
needed, including covering the as yet unmet material needs of much of the world’s population.  
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With dread, Keynes wondered whether humanity would be able to find anything more 
amusing to do than continue to chase money and capital. Shall we be able to 
“rid ourselves of many of the pseudo-moral principles which have hag-ridden us for two 
hundred years, by which we have exalted some of the most distasteful of human 
qualities into the position of the highest virtues”?  
Shall we be able to “afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true value”, and to 
recognise the love of money as a possession for what it is,  
“a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological 
propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease. 
All kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distribution of wealth 
and of economic rewards and penalties, which we now maintain at all costs, however 
distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously useful 
in promoting the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, at last, to discard.” (ibid. 
p. 369–370)  
What are we to do with the free time and the free capital which are at our disposal once 
humanity has solved its economic problem? Keynes knew very well that unto itself 
economic theory does not provide answers to such questions. He himself hinted at 
qualities of life beyond material existence – suggesting, indeed, that these are more 
‘real’ than the struggle for material existence itself – which would solve the problem of 
free time.  
In Keynes – the Return of the Master, Skidelsky (2009:134) draws attention to Keynes’s 
Aristotelian underpinnings – especially the idea that “we cannot … do fine actions if we 
lack resources.” It is in these terms, ultimately, that Keynes understood ‘the economic 
problem’. However, he failed to formulate a full answer, because it seems not to have 
occurred to him to relate what he recognised as the ‘real values of life’ to freed capital – 
i.e. the capital that is freed by productivity growth (see later discussion). 
 
6.6. Rethinking growth 
The disproportionate capital formations that characterise today’s financial markets are a 
special case of the proposition, inspired by a particular interpretation of Darwin that has 
been widely accepted, that human life consists of a struggle for subsistence. Developed 
in the total conviction that it constituted a valid and full worldview, and ignoring its 
self-evident materialist bias, this interpretation has been ‘acted out’ on a massive scale 
and has stamped itself on our psyche as well as on our economic system as the guiding 
principle of economic life. That it might have limited or specific rather than universal or 
general application – for example, competing against oneself to be a more effective 
person (and so of more value to society) rather than competing against one another in 
the economic realm – seems not to have been considered. 
It is competitive struggle in the economic realm that has resulted in large formations of 
financial capital, which then seeks returns as if it can behave in regard to the physical 
economy in the same way it can in regard to the non-physical economy. In today’s 
physical economy, capital seeking financial profits increasingly meets with a major 
obstacle: saturation of demand, the obverse of over-production. One obvious way to 
circumvent this double constraint is to invent an endless stream of new commodities, 
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including new versions of existing commodities that render older, but still functional, 
versions obsolete (‘planned obsolescence’; see Slade 2007). Another way is to spend 
massive amounts of money on increasingly sophisticated and often unscrupulous 
advertising techniques, in order to push commodities into the hands (or down the 
throats) of saturated consumers (Schor 2005, 2010).  
Since the physical needs of human beings are limited, competition to maximise 
financial profits increasingly ‘mines’ souls and minds for financial returns, lulling 
potential consumers into believing that genuine soul and spiritual needs – such as 
confidence, admiration, respect, friendship, belonging, comfort, ego-strength, even a 
sense of meaning and direction in life – can be met through consumption.72 This type of 
growth is forced growth, growth for its own sake, not genuine economic growth.  
Growth for its own sake is shaped by forces of narrow self-interest, originating in the 
particular interpretation of Darwin referred to above, and in Benthamite ideas. In this 
paper, this kind of self-interest is qualified as narrow, in order to allow the notion that it 
is not the only form of self-interest, nor are we necessarily trapped by it. We can widen 
our self-interest to include the entire human family. 
Indeed, what else, when seen in terms of its own telos, does the division of labour – the 
basis of economic progress – imply, but that each one of us serves the rest of humanity, 
just as the rest serves each one of us? When looked at from this perspective, isn’t ‘self-
emulation’ or competing against oneself to be a more effective person (and so of more 
value to society), rather than competing against one another, the more appropriate 
maxim in the economic realm? 
It does not take much imagination to see that down the path of narrow self-interest lies a 
society wherein people exist to provide – via work and consumption – a return to 
capital, itself now subject to increasingly abstract forms of ownership that are 
increasingly removed from economic activity. For in today’s financial markets, which is 
the greater amount: directly owned or agent-managed capital? In the words of the 
American economist William Lazonick (2012, 2004), capital is no longer ‘committed’. 
Most capital owners have become recipients of profits that others – managers and 
workers – realise for them. Millions of people invest in funds with the aim of achieving 
a return on their capital, without having any idea what their money finances. Better, 
surely, is a society in which capital exists to serve humanity, and does so consciously, 
rather than the other way round. 
An explanation of ‘growth for its own sake’ is simple enough: that a logic that belongs 
to the non-physical economy is misapplied to the physical economy. In the physical 
economy of carrots, cars and castles, needs – when genuine – are permanent but not 
infinite. But in the non-physical economy of aspirations, of bettering oneself, of 
intuitions, growth is indeed endless. The problem is that we apply this version of growth 
to the physical economy also – where, however, it can only be false and falsifying, 
requiring the cultivation of false decay (‘obsolescence’) and the repudiation of any 
constraints on physical growth. But what is the reality? Can one simply and without 
further ado conflate material and non-material needs? Or does this imply, in the end, 
falling out of harmony with the true nature of life?  
                                                          
72 See, for instance, the documentary The Merchants of Cool. A Report on the Creators and Marketers of 
Popular Culture for Teenagers (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cool/). 
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Capital seeking merely financial returns turns the traditional end (telos) of economic 
activity – to provide for the material needs of society – into a means (techne73) for 
serving isolated private goals. Thought to be a universal virtue rather than a deliberate 
choice, the intermediate goal of modern economics, profit maximisation, takes 
precedence over its ultimate goal – to raise standards of living. Not only consumers’ 
purchasing power, but also production factors (land, real estate, financial ‘instruments’) 
are directed to generate returns on financial capital. The results are over-investment in 
economically unnecessary expansions of physical production, and property deals and 
other preservations of capital which upset the economic system. Assets cease to 
represent the means of production, becoming instead ‘in play’. Factories are not built as 
places in which to make things, but as places in which to stash surplus cash pending its 
opportunistic liquidation. 
Such an approach, characterised by growth only for its own sake, channels resources 
away from meeting the needs of large sections of the world population. It splinters 
economic life into separate and unrelated economic processes, creating islands of wealth 
amidst shortages of capital for meeting genuine needs  – all a consequence of confusing 
ends and means, telos and techne, in economics.  
Associated with this undifferentiated concept of growth is the belief that there are not, 
or should not be, boundaries in economic life. This idea originates in a vision of the 
nature of existence wherein a body-only view of the human being (the 19th-century 
materialist conception of man) has eclipsed the classical philosophers’ trichotomous 
view of the human being having three aspects – body, soul, and spirit. Reducing spirit 
and soul to epiphenomena of the body gives rise to the widely held but uncertain 
modern idea that psychological and spiritual needs can be met in material ways.74  
If instead it were agreed with the ancient philosophers that the human being consists of 
a σῶμα (soma, body), a ψῡχή (psyche, soul), and a πνεῦμα (pneuma, spirit or 
consciousness), it would be clear that the task of the physical economy is to produce and 
distribute the goods required to sustain the material livelihood of human beings – 
meaning, of course, all human beings – and that the physical economy is not the 
appropriate instrument for addressing non-material needs. Non-material needs, such as 
enjoying a play or listening to music or studying mathematics or philosophy, are met 
outside the physical economy.75 Such activities are financed by the surplus generated in 
the physical economy. For all those who work in such fields (of culture, education, 
reflection) have to be remunerated.  
Are the many references to Aristotle in the recent economic literature, however cursory 
and incomplete at times (e.g. Blaug 1991; Sen 2001; Van Staveren 2001; Meikle 2002; 
Cheffers & Pakaluk 2007; Pack 2008, 2010; Skidelsky 2010; Nussbaum 2011; Grant 
2011; Sedláček 2011; Sandel 2012; Skidelsky & Skidelsky 2012), a sign that the 
classical trichotomy is being rediscovered and deserves fresh examination? Is it time to 
                                                          
73 Tέχνη (techne, skill, method) means the rational method involved in producing an object or 
accomplishing a goal or objective. It is often translated as ‘craftsmanship’, ‘craft’, or ‘art’, but more 
subtly as listening, and is distinct from ποίησις (poiesis, art) inasmuch as techne connotes earthly 
necessity. 
74 See fascinating discussion in Kenneth Lux (1990). 
75 We do not eat, inhabit or wear a concert! 
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think again in terms of ‘fine actions’ (τό καλόν)76? How can capital be led to serve the 
full needs of human beings when understood trichotomously? Is the deeper purpose of 
modern capital – indeed, of the financial crisis – to remind us, albeit in cogently 
economic terms, of the non-bodily aspects of human existence linked to creativity – in 
particular, imagination, inspiration and intuition – even to give them earthly expression? 
 
6.7. In search of the ‘invisible hand’ 
For a long time, economic theorists have regarded economic phenomena as subject to 
the same properties that govern nature. “Wealth was essentially a property of the 
physical world; the principles that governed its growth and distribution were said to be 
natural and could be augmented much as a forest might extend its reach into a meadow. 
Wealth was readily equated with the fruits of the earth and sea,” and in early modern 
conceptions of wealth the goal of economic activity was to permit humanity to “restore 
the abundance and complete leisure of the Garden of Eden” (Schabas 2007). The 
expansion of the economy was constrained, if not by a clear perception of the task and 
purpose of the economy, then by natural limits. 
By the eighteenth century, this view had given way to the idea that economics is the 
result of the operation of laws governing human behaviour – the pursuit of happiness or 
utility (Schabas 2007). This new, individualistic and materialistic, utilitarian view of 
human nature – with its origins in Thomas Hobbes’s pleasure-pain (then appetites-
aversions) psychology – raised a problem of social order. How could this self-seeking 
human proclivity be constrained? For its possible negative consequences were obvious. 
Hobbes emphasised the universal war that would ensue from man’s impulse to self-
preservation, and saw very clearly that happiness as he conceived it involves continual 
desire, restless movement from one object to another; there is no such thing as static 
happiness (Hobbes 1651). The solution proposed by Hobbes was to let the human 
being’s inborn selfishness be checked by the state through laws and regulation. In the 
social contract, all individuals give up some of their freedom – their ‘natural rights’ – in 
favour of rules which restrain everybody and put an end to war.  
Most seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers, however, rejected Hobbes’s 
absolutist social contract, for fear that the state itself would fall prey to passions, 
particularly avarice and love of power. A long line of philosophers, from Bernard de 
Mandeville (1714, The Fable of the Bees) and Francis Bacon (1605, The Advancement 
of Learning) to James Steuart (1767, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political 
Oeconomy), De Montesquieu (1793, De l’esprit des lois), and Adam Smith (1776, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations), defended the idea of self-
equilibrating free markets ─ the idea, whose history is intriguingly described by 
Hirschman (1997), that self-interest will countervail itself.  
Contemporary mainstream economic theory is still squarely based on the assumption of 
full-blooded pursuit of self-interest, despite the fact that economists never succeeded in 
                                                          
76 The Greek τό καλόν (to kalon) means morally good, noble, complete human personality, harmonious in 
mind and body. According to Corbin Page (2010) “Aristotle is famously vague on what exactly to kalon 
is, but it is clear that what is fine is closely connected with what is virtuous (ne 1104b30-35). In the 
Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says that ‘fine things are the virtues and the deeds resulting from virtue’ 
(1248b37).” 
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finding the force that – whether despite or thanks to self-interest – moves the system 
towards stability. General equilibrium theorists in particular racked their brains 
wondering how (a model based on) utilitarian human behaviour could bring about 
general equilibrium – a concept derived from nineteenth-century natural science 
(Mirowski 1991). Even the assumption of perfect markets does not lead an economy to 
equilibrium. The many attempts to build a model of general equilibrium all failed to 
find the ‘invisible hand’ that harmoniously integrates self-seeking individual actions 
into a coherent whole. The canonical effort by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu 
(1954), whose aim was to prove the existence of a general equilibrium, only showed 
that, under restrictive assumptions regarding competition and so-called rationality, 
there exists a set of prices at which supply equals demand. However, no one was ever 
able to find a force or tendency within the economy that would actually move prices 
towards this level. All that was found was “just a set of prices that might balance supply 
and demand if by some chance it happened to occur” (Schlefer 2012). Equilibrium does 
not come about unless an ‘invisible hand’ is set in motion – a coordinating ‘auctioneer’ 
or ‘central planner’ external to the model, who continually settles the economy (which, 
when left to itself, would spin out of control at the slightest disturbance) back into a path 
that leads to equilibrium. Frank Hahn (1984; quoted in Schlefer 2012) sums up the 
attempts to model the economy’s pre-supposed self-propelling forces towards general 
equilibrium: “We have no good reason to suppose that there are forces which lead the 
economy to equilibrium.”77  
Despite theoretical as well as empirical-evidence including the current financial crisis, 
economists continue to lecture and give policy advice based on the axiom of general 
equilibrium – perhaps because the shock of the new and unknown is too overwhelming 
(Mirowski 2013). 
What does it require to get even a perfect-market economy to work and produce 
harmonious and stable results? Where is one to find the ‘invisible hand’ that will 
produce the price vector that will move the economy towards equilibrium? It will not be 
found in the physical realm, unless the modern economy, as seems not to be possible, 
can be shown to be ruled by physical laws. Will it be found in the animal realm, that is, 
in pleasure-pain psychology, an aspect of the human being that is shared with the 
animals – which probably explains the many references to the animal world (‘bull 
market’, ‘bear market’, ‘animal spirits’) in economics? Unlike with animals, however, 
in human beings such drives readily become insatiable. In an economy governed by the 
pursuit of utility, the intermediate goal of economics – the techne of profit maximisation 
− soon eclipses its ultimate goal, its telos or end point (Skidelsky 2010, Atkinson 2011). 
Is there a way to lead our drives – keeping telos in view – rather than be led by them? Is 
there a solution to the boundless expansion of the economy and financial capital ─ for 
example, a solution that uses financial capital to create space for the immaterial aspects 
of human life? Is that solution to be found in the human, rather than the physical or 
animal realm: for example, by adding responsibility to freedom – or, better put, by 
discovering the responsibility implicit in freedom? 
                                                          
77 For a discussion of the relevance of equilibrium theory, see also George Soros (2003) The Alchemy of 
Finance – Reading the Mind of the Market. New York: Wiley. 
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6.8. Freedom, responsibility, character and capital 
The financial crisis has led many to question the idea that homo economicus – this 
restless, insatiable being always calculating his personal gain – is the optimal 
foundation for our economic and social order, the guarantor of efficient and harmonious 
progress. However, since an alternative is hard to find, any discussions on the efficiency 
and morality of homo economicus tend quickly to subside.  
Debates regarding solutions to the financial crisis also keep returning to the familiar 
dilemma: the choice between ‘the market’ – the idea that the economy can and should 
be shaped from private market forces driven by narrow self-interest, because it will 
check itself; and the state-led alternative, which does not share the market economists’ 
optimism regarding narrow self-interest as a civilizing medium, and tries to influence 
the economic whole through collective action and coercion from above or outside.  
Opposite as the two alternatives may seem, they in fact share an important conviction: 
Both are built on the same view of the human being as one driven only by narrow self-
interest. The pessimistic belief is that human beings are unable, out of themselves, to 
engender ethical, characterful conduct. Hence man has to be subjected to discipline, 
whether of the market or of the state.  
The view taken here is that the answer to this dilemma lies neither in more freedom for 
markets, nor in more regulation from outside, but in the free development of morality 
within the economy itself. In a word, enlarging our self-interest. This requires 
expanding homo economicus to include character.  
Of course, placing character, or ethos, centre-stage in this way may be regarded as 
quixotic and naïve, even hopeless. With Francis Bacon – who was not only a scientist 
but also an experienced politician and statesman – we may be critical of  “holding out 
the examples of Good, Virtue, Duty, Felicity” while altogether passing over the 
question as to “how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the 
will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits” (Bacon 1605 / 2011 p. 
418). Bacon was one of the first to formulate the idea, which still sounds familiar today, 
that order in a capitalist society could be maintained by utilising one set of relatively 
harmless passions to countervail another set of more dangerous and destructive passions 
(Hirschman 1997). David Hume also felt very attracted to the idea of controlling the 
passions by playing one off against the other, and he, too, forcefully rejected the 
possibility of engineering a social order built upon, or directed towards, man's higher 
qualities:  
“Whatever may be the consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind as 
would endow them with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of 
vice; this concerns not the magistrate who aims only at possibilities. Very often he can 
only cure one vice by another; and in that case, he ought to prefer what is least 
pernicious to society.” (Hume 1752)  
As ‘practical’ people, neither Bacon nor Hume believed that attempts at transformation 
would have any effect. In contrast, Baruch (or Benedict) de Spinoza, who also 
formulated the idea of countervailing passion (1670, Tractatus Theologico-politicus), 
never intended to advocate restraint of the passions by setting one against the other. For 
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Spinoza, the final destination of human beings was to realize the triumph of reason and 
“love of God” over the passions. Although in his theory of the passions, he gives central 
place to the power of the affects, and to the idea that “an affect cannot be restrained nor 
removed unless by an opposed and stronger affect” (1677, Ethica, Part IV, prop. 7), he 
does so chiefly to warn those who intend to realize their final destination against the 
difficulties they will meet on their way (Hirschman 1997).  
If, as King Solomon (and, later, Spinoza) said, without vision the people perish, surely 
this is also true of character.  
The matter is less abstract if, instead of merely speaking of character, one speaks of the 
kind of economy that character would give rise to. In particular, characterful individuals 
would take direct responsibility for economic life, so that financial life would become 
the field par excellence for enabling the unfolding and development of the very trait – 
character – on which it then depended. We would have lifted ourselves up by our own 
bootstraps. Then, rather than capital serving the economy, the task of the economy 
would be to generate the capital required to finance both physical production and the 
unfolding of the human development (essentially meaning everything that can be called 
the economics of education in these words’ largest sense). 
 
6.9. A twin value theory for capital 
The proposition of this paper is that the root of the problems we are facing with ‘too 
much capital’ is our failure to understand capital fully, itself a consequence of our 
failure to understand fully the human condition. Our current concepts do not generate a 
satisfactory solution to the questions posed by the financial crisis because they throw 
light on only one aspect of capital – its role in financing physical production – and miss 
the other aspect: capital as the enabler of human capacities, Keynes’s ‘real values of 
life’.  
Completing today’s incomplete theory of capital so that it can incorporate both aspects 
cannot be done unless we rethink the nature and purpose of capital so that within the 
totality of today’s capital we distinguish between the capital that pertains to the physical 
economy (classically, savings = investment) and the capital that is free of the physical 
economy and cannot in fact be linked to it in any direct sense. 
If a dual role for capital (its role regarding the physical economy and its role in terms of 
human capacities) is accepted, it will stand to reason – not to fancy or speculation – that 
capital as the enabler of human capacities is the true counterpart of excess liquidity. The 
true value of excess liquidity inheres in the total amount of unsatisfied, unquantified and 
as yet uncapitalised aspiration in the world today, whether at the level of individual 
human beings, entire peoples, or humanity as a whole.78 
If this appears quixotic, one way in which the relationship between capital and human 
capacities becomes understandable, even visible, is when we observe how capital 
originates. In conventional economic theory, all forms of capital are lumped together, 
regardless of their origin.  However, capital is generated in different ways, from a 
                                                          
78 That said, it is a moot point whether at this level or point in economics one can or even needs to 
identify quantities. It may be enough, for example, to say someone is ‘very imaginative’ rather than ‘75% 
imaginative’. 
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variety of sources79: (1) via profits in the sphere of physical production (for instance as 
a result of productivity increases made possible by technological change – that is, the 
formation of capital in the traditional economic and accounting sense); (2) through 
voluntary savings in the sphere of consumption (in accounting terms, unspent money 
‘stocked’ on the balance sheet as capital); and (3) by the creation of money by 
commercial banks. These three types of capital formation arise from what one might 
call the straightforward functioning of the economy.  
But in addition capital can be created out of profits that arise through (4) untoward price 
increases (‘forced savings’80); (5) the withholding of necessary income formation (e.g. 
the withholding of income for purposes of countering inflation that was not caused by 
wage pressure81); and (6) property and other deals linked to speculative accumulation of 
merely financial capital.  
Observing the first three types of capital formation, we may see that they have a 
common origin. The first source of capital formation, productivity growth, is the result 
of (indeed reflects a growth in) human creativity and inventiveness. In conventional 
economics, savings (the second source of capital) are generally looked at from the 
perspective of the saver, who supposedly optimises consumption over his life-time. 
However, savings are meaningless unless there are ideas requiring funding. Just so, 
when banks function ‘properly’ they create credit in response to the productive ideas of 
their borrowing customers (which begs the question: do the banks in fact create credit, 
or do their borrowers?). Thus, the origin of the three straightforward forms of capital 
formation can be said to be to be human creativity, or the development of human 
consciousness, which grows incrementally and exponentially as history proceeds.82  
In contrast, the fourth, fifth and sixth types of capital formation arise from sources 
which ‒ as brought home recently by the financial crisis ‒ are frequently monetarily and 
economically disequilibrating, and in that sense also untoward. Unfortunately, 
conventional economic theory does not distinguish between straightforward and 
untoward sources of capital formation, because it lacks a clear understanding of their 
nature.  
 
                                                          
79 See, for instance, Wilken (1982). 
80 For example, price increases which do not reflect an increase in production costs, or in the quality of 
the product, but which force consumers to spend a larger share of their income on an unchanged product. 
81 E.g. S. Storm & C.W.M. Naastepad (2012) Macroeconomics Beyond the NAIRU, Cambridge (MA): 
Harvard University Press; S. Storm & C.W.M. Naastepad (2010) Paying for inequality: the costs of 
NAIRU-based macroeconomics, Global Labour Column 37 (November) (http://column.global-labour-
university.org/2010/10/  
 
 
paying-for-inequality-costs-of-nairu.html); José Gabriel Palma (2009) The revenge of the market on the 
rentiers. Why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turn out to be premature, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 33, 829−69. 
82 A relationship between capital and the creative human mind can also be found when we study the 
origin of the word ‘capital’, which is derived from the Latin word caput, meaning ‘head’. This is not 
surprising, perhaps, because the head refers to the ability to think, which is characteristic for the human 
being and distinguishes him from the animal. Indeed, when we say “we can’t get our head around 
something”, we really mean our mind. Cf. Sanskrit ‘man’ – the faculty of thinking (see note 59). 
Considered in this way, the word ‘capital’ suggests that it relates to the mind, to thinking, to 
inventiveness, in a phrase, to human creativity. 
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6.10.  Freed capital 
The development of human consciousness, including the growth of human knowledge 
and inventiveness (capacities), generates continual productivity growth. In modern 
capitalist economies, productivity grows at around two per cent per annum on average. 
This productivity growth obviates labour, freeing people from the economic round; and 
the money that was previously spent on the wages of those who become redundant also 
becomes free. The capital that is freed from the economy by productivity growth – 
which in our argument has its origins in human creativity – is free to be used for novel 
purposes. One can call this capital freed capital. But what is its counterpart? What are 
the novel purposes to which it can be put? 
In a sense, it is because we do not understand this problem that freed capital becomes 
footloose capital. In consequence, today’s increasing productivity gains are appropriated 
by capital; they manifest as ‘too much capital’ and ‘cash pools’ when they could simply 
be spent, to finance the aspirations of human beings, peoples, and humanity as a whole 
that arise when we experience more than just material existence. If this were to be our 
(chosen) lot, we would simultaneously abandon such things as planned obsolescence – a 
turn of events in human understanding and behaviour that would be in the truest sense 
teleological. 
Conventional economic theory prescribes that the allocation or destination of freed 
capital be determined by profit maximisation. Profit maximisation, it is said, will lead 
capital to destinations with the highest financial returns. However, conventional capital 
theory – including the ‘efficient markets’ hypothesis, especially when applied to finance 
– is a product of an incomplete theory of value, which recognises value only in terms of 
the satisfaction of bodily needs, and does not have an eye for ‘higher faculties’ and the 
needs associated with them. 
The latter come into view only when two kinds of capital are distinguished, related to 
two kinds of worlds: physical and non-physical or, to refine our discussion, material and 
immaterial. Then it becomes obvious that only part of freed capital is needed to finance 
the production that is required to produce the goods necessary to meet people’s material 
needs (von Mises’ ‘seed corn’). The remainder would flow towards meeting people’s 
immaterial needs, providing education for example. 
From the perspective of an economic theory that focuses only on the former and that has 
a bias towards industrial, as distinct from agrarian or cultural, production,83 this may 
appear revolutionary. But is it? After all, it has antecedents in the minds of some of the 
greatest thinkers in economics.  
 
6.11. The ‘unfinished symphony’ of Marshall, Keynes, Mill, Smith and 
Marx 
Scattered throughout the writings of various great thinkers, references can be found – 
                                                          
83 Modern economics generally sees an opposition between agrarian and industrial economics, which is 
historically false. The real opposition is between agriculture and culture, with the Industrial Revolution 
(IR) as a misleading step on the way. It is fascination with the IR and its methods and focus on material 
production that distorts economics into a physical bias. 
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however hesitant and unfinished – to a perspective on the human being that is not only 
much more encompassing than homo economicus, but also dynamic rather than static. 
Alfred Marshall saw powerful elements of morality in capitalism. Although ecoomics 
was bound to treat material want satisfaction as a datum, Marshall was convinced that, 
as wealth increased, wants would become increasingly ‘moralised’ (Skidelsky 2010: 
141):  
“In all economic questions, considerations of the higher ethics will always assert 
themselves, however much we try to limit our inquiry for an immediate practical 
purpose.” (Marshall, quoted in Maloney 1985, p. 199)  
“No doubt, men, even now, are capable of rendering much more unselfish service than 
they generally render; and the supreme aim of the economist is to discover how this 
latent social asset can be developed more quickly and turned to account more wisely.” 
(Alfred Marshall, 1890, Principles of Economics) 
Keynes, on the other hand, “rejected all this as a fudge, accepting Nietzsche’s view of 
utilitarianism as a shopkeeper’s philosophy” (Skidelsky 2010: 141).84 Keynes rejected 
the possibility that capitalism might be evolving, out of itself, a morality or ethics that is 
more mature than the utilitarian ‘love of money’ to which it owes its success. Future 
human advancement would depend on the ability to discard this ‘neurosis’ and to 
discover that what we desire is not necessarily desirable:  
“Keynes’s little essay Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” can be interpreted 
as Mill Revisited in a Moorean ethical framework. … Moore’s ethics raise a central 
issue concerning the connection between happiness and goodness. It cannot be readily 
assumed that what we desire is desirable. … The solution urged by many ethicists 
(including John Stuart Mill) is to improve the quality of our desires to the point that they 
become desirable.” (Skidelsky 2010: 135) 
Keynes did not believe in an automatic connection between pleasure and goodness. The 
future of humanity would depend on our ability to “improve the quality of our desires to 
the point that they become desirable” – a transition that, according to Keynes, would not 
be self-propelling. 
Despite the differences between them, both Marshall and Keynes align with John Stuart 
Mill in his rejection of crude Benthamism. After his mental crisis in 1826, Mill came to 
the conclusion that happiness is not attained by seeking it directly. One finds it by 
striving after some goal or ideal other than one’s own happiness or pleasure. Although, 
in his own view, remaining a Benthamite, Mill’s distinction between ‘lower’ and 
‘higher’ pleasures, and the parallel distinction between unenlightened and enlightened 
self-interest, “strained the Benthamite framework to such an extent that it would 
perhaps have been more helpful if he had radically refashioned or abandoned it” 
(Copleston 2003d: 26).  
Foremost among the ideas introduced by Mill was that of intrinsic qualitative 
differences between pleasures; that pleasure resulting from the development of the 
                                                          
84 In the German-speaking world, utilitarianism initially found little resonance. Nietzsche simply said: 
“Der Mensch strebt nicht nach Glück; nur der Engländer thut das” (1889, Götzen-dämmerung. Sprüche 
und Pfeile). Suffering, not happiness, uplifts the human being: “Ihr wollt womöglich ‒ und es gibt kein 
tolleres ‘womöglich’ ‒ das Leiden abschaffen; und wir? ─ es scheint gerade, wir wollen es lieber noch 
höher und schlimmer haben, als je es war! Wohlbefinden, wie ihr es versteht ─ das ist ja kein Ziel, das 
scheint uns ein Ende!“ (1886, Jenseits von Gut und Böse).   
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higher faculties is higher than physical-sensible pleasure. In his essay On Liberty he 
remarks that “I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must 
be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being” (Mill 1859: 9; italics added). Mill does not hesitate to refer to man’s 
“higher faculties” (Mill 1959: 13 and 16), and in On Liberty he explicitly admits that 
something other than happiness is intrinsically desirable – individuality. He quotes with 
approval the statement of the German philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt that “the end 
of man is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete 
and consistent whole” (Mill 1859: 50, quoted in Copleston 2003d). 
Mill’s insights concerning the human end evoked heated debate about whether they 
were consistent with the hedonistic end of utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism, written in 
defence of Benthamism, Mill reverted partially to hedonistic ways of thinking. But even 
here he seems to be suggesting that the ultimate end is the full development of human 
potentialities (Downie 1966; emphasis added). It may be argued, as is commonly done, 
that the two ends – the full development of human potentialities and the hedonistic end 
of utilitarianism – come to the same thing, for is not the justification for commending 
self-development simply that it will produce more pleasure for the “self” concerned? 
But the justification for making self-development the end does not lay in the pleasure 
which may accompany its attainment, and self-development is still commended even if 
it occasionally causes pain rather than pleasure:  
“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it 
is because they only know their own side of the question.” (Mill 1863: 9) 
Self-development has nothing to do with the balancing of pleasures and pains, but is a 
need or at least propensity found in all human beings; it is incumbent on the human 
being to make his nature flourish, irrespective of whether it causes pleasure or pain. For 
human nature 
“…is not a machine to be built after a model – but a tree, which requires to grow and 
develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it 
a living thing.” (Mill 1859: 117)  
Life has no goal beyond its own perfection. Unfortunately, Mill does not provide a clear 
and full account of what he means by human nature. He lays stress on the perfecting and 
improving of human nature, emphasising the idea of individuality without, however, 
fully explaining what he understands by that term. Neither does he distinguish clearly 
between perfection and fulfilment ─ the latter being a less ambitious and therefore more 
achievable expectation than perfection. He makes clear that individual self-development 
does not mean for him a surrender to any impulses which the individual is inclined to 
follow, but fulfilment of the ideal of harmonious integration of all one’s powers. As a 
matter of fact, Mill does introduce a standard other than pleasure itself, appealing to 
man as “a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its 
own sake, the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without 
hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness.” 
(1865−75, Vol. I: 358−9) Indeed, Mill praised the Greek ideal of self-development, and 
it is to the philosophers of Greek antiquity that he came very close indeed. 
This excursion into the philosophical underpinnings of modern economics may be 
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thought unfashionable, anachronistic and even redundant, insofar as the prevailing 
economic paradigm assumes the matters that played so crucially in the minds of Mill 
and others have long since been resolved. But any critique of the status quo especially 
regarding our understanding of capital cannot but revisit such topics, even at risk of 
contradicting the science of rationalism with the science of hindsight.  
In fact, however, the problems are with us still, unless, that is, we are serious in thinking 
that today’s financial system and the understanding of capital on which it is predicated 
is an unqualified success story. And that the global financial crisis is merely some 
massive pain precedent to some equally or more massive gain – as might be argued by 
Smithian diehards such as the Adam Smith Institute or even documented by its critics, 
see Philip Mirowski's Never Let a Serious Crisis Go Waste. How Neoliberalism 
Survived the Financial Meltdown. But do Adam Smith’s advocates read him as widely 
as they could? Was he – or would he have remained – the champion of rude self-interest 
that their take on life requires him to be? 
In other words, can Mill be reconciled with Smith, who laid stress on the innate 
propensity of human beings towards the pursuit of interest as the propelling force in all 
advancement? In The Wealth of Nations, Smith focused on the pursuit of self-interest, 
which he regarded as the basic and dynamic faculty of the individual, thereby according 
to it the status of a moral principle providing the foundation of the system of natural 
liberty. In the historical context of commercial (mercantilist) society, this was deemed 
‘natural and obvious’. But it appears that Smith's advocacy of liberty as conducive not 
only to wealth but also to social well-being, needs to be understood within a more 
complex formulation of human development in relation to an evolving society. While 
Smith believed and advocated that the self-interest of individuals could, in a system of 
natural liberty, lead to greater wealth and prosperity as against the then-existing system 
of restrictions and unfreedom, he was equally aware that the course of accumulation 
would have to be guided by the development of a consistent morality and the creation of 
supporting institutions (Bharadwaj 1989, Rosenberg 1960, Viner 1927). 
Although Smith advocated an economic order based on the pursuit of narrow self-
interest, he also believed that the human being is endowed with qualities and 
propensities which qualify him for a social existence, such as the faculties of sympathy, 
of judging himself as much as others, based upon imagination and reflection. Indeed, 
close to the end of his life he revised The Theory of Moral Sentiments to allow for a less 
self-centred image of the human being.85  In the context of a liberal society, 
benevolence or sympathy acted as a modifier, a countervailing interest, taming the 
aggressive spirit of self-aggrandizement. Importantly, for Smith, sympathy is an original 
sentiment of human nature. It is often excited so directly and immediately that it cannot 
reasonably be derived from self-interested affection, that is, from self-love (Copleston 
2003b: 356). Thus, on the moral and ethical plane, there is a balancing of two 
distinguishable and opposing sets of propensities, ‘selfish’ and ‘social’ (Bharadwaj 
1989) or as we would put it, narrow and enlarged self-interest. This distinguishes Smith 
from utilitarianism, which tends to reduce the moral judgement to a statement about 
consequences.  
The above remarks notwithstanding, the puzzle remains: How are we to reconcile 
                                                          
85 See again discussion in Kenneth Lux (1990). 
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Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which he put sympathy centre-stage, and his 
The Wealth of Nations, in which self-interest is emphasised not only as the primary 
motive but also as the propelling force of all advance? In order to solve this problem, 
some argue that Smith saw his work as integrally embedded in a wider notion of history, 
in particular, a stadial view of the development of society, occurring through successive 
stages, each characterised by a specific mode of subsistence associated with its own 
social, political, legal, and moral structures that make for a viable social existence. 
Parallel to the mode of subsistence there is an individual psychology that endows 
individuals with propensities and codes of conduct that befit them to maintain the social 
state. Society as a collectivity becomes viable through the progress of morality, and a 
harmonious ‘natural order’ can exist where the propensities of the individual befit the 
social processes.  
A stadial view of society and the human being developing through successive stages is 
also found with other philosophers of the Scottish and French Enlightenment, from 
whose works emerges a view of the human being as one who has both the freedom as 
well as the existential will to develop as a moral being, in mutual interrelationship with 
a society which, too, develops in stages. Both, obviously, advance through successive 
stages, the transition visible through changes in conditions of production and exchange; 
and the need for each stage of social existence to be guided by the evolution of a 
consistent morality (Bharadwaj 1989).  
Much less optimistic regarding the human development potentialities of the modern 
capitalist system was Karl Marx – the later Marx, that is. The earlier Marx was a 
happier soul, able to recite Shakespeare plays to his children, before he became 
(understandably) jaundiced86 by his treatment by those whose interests he questioned, as 
also by the superabundant ‘evidence’ for his views that he encountered in 19th century 
England. Although Marx's analysis is conventionally interpreted as an analysis of the 
capitalist system − an analysis of how the system's economic properties, through a 
falling rate of profit, periodic crises of over-production, and concentration of capital, 
bring about its own destruction – at the root of the contradictions of the capitalist system 
are the commodification of labour and its associated alienation. Contrary to Smith, 
Marx came to believe that healthy human development was hampered, not helped, by 
capitalist relationships. The way the capitalist system organises labour makes people 
work for money and themselves, rather than for one’s own and the others’ development. 
Marx's critique of religion can also be understood in this light − as a critique of the 
particular, distorted form that spirituality takes in capitalist conditions. Religion, in 
capitalist society, reflects or expresses the distortions in capitalist society. When man’s 
political, social and economic life is incapable of fulfilling his true self, he creates the 
illusory world of religion and seeks happiness therein, so that religion is man's self-
administered opium. Man creates the illusory world of the supernatural and projects into 
it his own true self only when the way the socio-economic order is organised does not 
allow him to realise his true self − his spirituality – in the here and now. 
In these respects, Marx may not be as contrary to capitalist economics as some would 
like him to be. Marx's theory is first and foremost a philosophy of man (Copleston 
2003c). The overthrow of the capitalist system by the proletariat that he advocated is not 
                                                          
86 According to John Kenneth Galbraith, in his 1973-4 television series, The Age of Uncertainty, it is one 
of history’s interesting details that Marx suffered from boils. 
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merely a case of the replacement of one dominant class by another. The dictatorship of 
the proletariat is a temporary phase which prepares the way for the universal, classless 
communist society from which self-alienation will be absent for everyone – not just the 
proletariat. Although (particularly the later) Marx focused on material conditions, Marx 
had a mission which can, perhaps, be interpreted in non-material terms. The overthrow 
of the capitalist system is not primary. The primary thing is the unfolding and 
development of the individual, which Marx, however, could not envision as part of a 
capitalist system. To put it in terms of Marx’s own poetry: Can labour cease to be a 
moment of capital without capital becoming a moment of labour? 
 
6.12. Telos and ethos 
According to the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (2007, 2009), the rejection of a 
conception of human life as having a goal set by human nature came with the 
Enlightenment. This implied a rejection of Aristotle’s conception of morality. For 
Aristotle, human beings have a specific nature that determines their proper goal, or 
τέλος, in life. This goal is εὐδαιμονία (eudaimonia) or happiness, which is not the same 
as following whatever is pleasurable (Copleston 2003a). To be moved by pleasure is to 
be motivated by the senses and by narrow self-interest. Such self-interested action does 
not lead to true happiness, however, because the desires of the senses are not 
permanently satisfiable. True happiness results from exercising ἀρετή (arete, virtue). 
Our desires need to be transformed so that they become virtuous, which they do through 
ἐπιστήμη (episteme, insight or knowledge). Thus, knowledge, virtue and happiness – 
episteme, arete and eudaimonia – are one. Even so, they do not come about 
automatically; they need to be learned and exercised, brought to consciousness. This 
requires character. 
The history of moral philosophy from the Enlightenment onwards is, as MacIntyre 
paints it, a history of attempts to ground moral requirements in something other than the 
human telos, as, for example, Hume attempted to do by arguing that moral judgements 
are grounded in our capacity for fellow-feeling. These attempts, MacIntyre claims, have 
all failed. He concludes that it is only by trying anew to formulate an end for human life 
in the Aristotelian tradition that we can hope to arrive at a standpoint from which we 
can rationally evaluate claims about what is morally required. 
Similarly, unless we arrive at a standpoint from which we can determine an end87 for 
human life, it will prove impossible to bring the problems experienced with financial 
capital to a solution. If human life has a telos, a state of fulfilment or completion, then 
so, too, will the modern economy and its essential expression – capital. Put in other 
words, the economy will thrive best and capital will be most truly capital the closer 
human beings come to their fulfilment. It is in terms of this fulfilment that we 
understand character (ethos). 
 
6.13. Two kinds of capital; two concepts of liberty 
From the vantage point of telos and ethos there are two kinds of capital − one financing 
                                                          
87 In the sense of purpose. But not finalism. 
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the production of goods required to sustain livelihood, and one serving capacities, 
implying the building of character and unfolding of purpose. Correspondingly, there are 
two tasks for the economy: to generate the goods required for material livelihood and 
well-being, and to generate the capital that will enable people to realise their life 
purpose and to do so with character. For not only do those things not come 
automatically, they do not come cheap or without cost! Whether defined as ‘spiritual 
perfection’, individual fulfilment, excellence of character, the harmonious integration of 
all one’s powers, self-realization, or the attainment of knowledge, virtue and happiness, 
they have to be schooled by practice. But, pace the argument that artists work best when 
starving in a garrick, such things cannot be cultivated unless the learning process is 
financed, that is to say, capitalised – provided with the capital needed, for example, to 
pay for post graduate research or to build, own and staff schools. 
This will not happen unless economics’ currently negative concept of freedom is 
replaced with a positive concept. In contemporary economics, freedom – as in ‘free 
market’ – means freedom from constraints on one’s behaviour (Berlin 2002). Milton 
Friedman, Nobel prize laureate and author of Free to Choose, defines clearly what he, 
as an economist, means by freedom:  
“Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as 
the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as 
much money for their stockholders as possible.” (Friedman 2002)  
Freedom here means, “the absence of obstacles to the fulfilment of a man’s desires.” 
(Berlin 2002) The utilitarian moral philosophy that constitutes the foundation of 
contemporary economic theory views the human being as driven by forces originating 
in the body. Freedom in this context means freedom from obstacles to acting out these 
drives. Utilitarianism rejects freedom in the sense of free will and autonomous reason – 
free from compulsion by the drives that come from the body. The will is nothing but 
another passion, and reason is subordinate to will. However useful such Benthamite 
utilitarian morality has been in promoting the accumulation of the capital required to 
raise living standards, does it provide an adequate answer to the financial, social and 
ecological problems we are now facing in the 21st century? 
From Aristotle onwards, freedom from constraints on one’s behaviour – freedom in the 
negative sense – has been contrasted with freedom or liberty in the positive sense: the 
freedom to act in responsible or humane ways. This, however, requires the human being 
to become emancipated from the bodily drive to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, from 
neurotransmitters, genes and hormones. Challengingly perhaps, one can wonder 
whether the ‘freedom’ so essential to laissez-faire capitalism might be a fiction – in the 
sense that someone slave to his instincts can hardly be called free. The reality is that to 
be free, the will has to be trained, ennobled, made conscious and social, not spontaneous 
and self-referencing, if telos and ethos (the inner sense of what is right and worthy in 
human life) are to prevail over hedonism, pragmatism and moral relativism.88 If today’s 
quest for such things as ‘corporate social responsibility’ and ‘responsible innovation’ is 
                                                          
88 In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, top managers from various large banks pleaded the US 
government to regulate them, because at that point of shock they saw very clearly the consequences of 
acting out utilitarian drives. Simultaneously, apparently, they shrank from the effort it would take to 
educate their drives from within (rather than having them regulated from outside). Later, clearly, most 
preferred to forget all about it – the regulation as well as the self-education (see Charles Ferguson 
(director) (2010) Inside Job (a documentary on the financial crisis).  
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to be taken seriously, this is perhaps not as controversial a statement as it may appear. 
 
6.14. Capital = capacities 
Also in the modern literature, the development of character (e.g. Grant 2011; Sandel 
2012; MacIntyre 2007, 2009) and capacities or capabilities (Sen 2001, Nussbaum 2011) 
are highlighted as the highest human goal. As increased living standards push humanity 
up Maslow’s pyramid, the source of happiness increasingly lies in immaterial factors. 
The real need of human beings whose material needs have been satisfied is the 
fulfilment of higher goals in life, particularly the development of higher capacities – 
including morality, creativity, and a self-actualization that includes responsibility for 
others (Hodgson 2012, Bowles 2012, Marglin 2011).  
Increases in living standards raise (or should that be ‘derive from’?) people’s aspirations 
– the switch from material to immaterial fulfilment. Human beings increasingly also 
find value in the satisfaction of higher human needs. Yet, in economic theory, value is 
found only in the consumption and possession of material goods – and capital has been 
entirely related to this value. As a result, capital and needs are often (and increasingly) 
in different places. Poverty more and more means: lack of resources to finance the 
development and deployment of one’s capacities. When capital is not freed for this 
purpose, how can Aristotle’s ‘fine actions’ develop? 
To date, the relationship between the development of desired human qualities and 
financial markets has not been systematically investigated. Yet, unless moral qualities 
and creative capacities are financed (capitalised), they cannot unfold. Again, it stands to 
reason – not to fancy or speculation – that the crisis we experience today mirrors our 
failure to grasp the relationship between capital and humanity’s myriad and variegate 
aspirations; the need of people everywhere to discover, unfold, carry out, and ideally 
complete the tasks and goals they feel are truly theirs – as distinct from what they do 
merely to earn money, or even just to subsist. Understanding the link between capital 
and capacities in this sense requires a quantum leap in our consciousness, a leap we are 
capable of but one that does not allow thought and will to live separate lives. Not so 
much a leap, therefore, as a closing of the gap. 
This is the dimension of capital that today’s economics has (as yet) left out. 
Understandably so, because from the earliest Greek writers through to those of the 
modern age, almost without exception money and capital have been looked at with 
suspicion, as the breeders of avarice, lust for power, and usury (Hirschman 1997). 
Aristotle warned that as soon as money comes in, trade for its own sake, the pursuit of 
money-making, arises (Roll 1992). For Thomas Aquinas, too, trade – which enables 
people to ‘make money’ – is unnatural, and those who engage in it risk falling from 
Grace. Trade could only be justified if the profit from it were ‘just’, implying that it not 
be ‘privatised’ to the individual but devoted in some way to public benefit. While goods 
are fruitful, money is barren; it produces nothing. Making money is therefore usurious; 
it has no counterpart in any real value. 
Also post Aquinas, the theory of value for a long time remains ‘unfriendly’ towards 
capital. For Marx, all value originates in labour; capital originates in profit or surplus 
value, that is, in alienation. For neo-classical economists, all value originates in 
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exchange; neither goods, nor capital (nor land and labour) have any value other than the 
price they realise in the market. 
All these great thinkers fail to grasp the true nature of money and capital, because they 
view capital merely in the context of the satisfaction of physical needs. Regarding 
capital accumulation – which inevitably takes place given the tendency for productivity 
to rise, itself a consequence of the evolution of consciousness – they do not seem to 
sense that this can mean more than wealth acquisition. Indeed, when not seen in terms 
of personal riches, capital accumulation can be understood as a societal event, a kind of 
financial commons that needs to facilitate and benefit human beings and society 
generally. 
Yet, a study of economic history does reveal a link between capital and the development 
of the human being. 
 
6.15. Capital and the emancipation of the human being 
After the Middle Ages, drastic societal transformations took place. Trade, mercantilism, 
and the first industrial revolution unfolded, and with it, their primary agent and 
expression, capital, came to the fore. Capitalism arose. As old social and economic 
systems disintegrated and opened up to a larger world governed by capitalist principles, 
capital became the basis of the emancipation of the human being. Capital gives human 
beings a basis on which they can stand on their own, independent of the restraints set by 
tradition – family, class, caste, state, and church – permitting them to pursue their own 
individual task in life.  
Here it becomes visible that capital is connected not only to the production of goods for 
material livelihood, but also to the fostering of human capacities. The loosening 
(emancipation) of capital from production, made possible by trade and industrial 
productivity growth, serves – indeed mirrors – the emancipation of the individual.89  
Conventional economic theory does not allow for such an analysis, because it admits 
neither to an evolutionary view of economic life, nor to a similar perspective on human 
consciousness.  
Could the financial crisis and the excess liquidity which caused it acquire a new 
meaning, therefore, when looked at from a perspective of evolution and transformation? 
Could it be that the loosening of capital from the physical economy is the crown or 
flower of processes that have long been in train: the liberation of capital, intended to 
serve the liberation of the human being? And that a financial crisis – ‘crisis’ in the sense 
of chaos and not knowing what to do – arises when this is not understood? Crisis 
(κρῐσις) really means decision time, and decisions are always easier to make when one 
understands what is at issue. 
Today’s financial life is still predicated on concepts and theoretical constructs that are 
essentially atomistic, and that would have us continue to believe that economic life as a 
                                                          
89 A consideration reflected in economic historian, Niall Ferguson’s observation that ‘Financial markets 
are like the mirror of mankind, revealing every hour of every working day the way we value ourselves 
and the resources of the world around us [so that] it is not the fault of the mirror if it reflects our 
blemishes as clearly as our beauty.’ – Niall Ferguson. 
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whole benefits when capital is privately accumulated by individuals who do not take 
into account or make conscious to themselves the full effects on society as a whole. The 
classical idea of free markets, however, and the reason why classical economists sought 
to create them, was that they would help to free industrial capitalism from the legacy of 
medieval and ancient privileges, including the land rent, monopoly rent and banking 
charges levied by the so-called rentier class (Palma 2009; Hudson 2012). Is industrial 
capitalism now being rolled back towards a neo-feudal reaction defending rentier 
interests? Or does the financial crisis signal that a new wave of reform is about to 
unroll? 
The question is whether financial markets as we know them today are a stage in human 
evolution, or the destination. Could it be that financial liberalisation is the last stage in a 
long process intended to rid humanity of its ancient constraints, rigidities and 
inefficiencies? Is globalised finance a development that is the culmination of 
emancipation and individuation? Could it be that this is the logic of a centuries-long 
history of ‘outgrowing’ guilds, of enclosures, of undermining the power of unions, of 
lifting restraints on the movement of capital?  
Is it part of this emancipatory development to break down, remove or subvert all 
boundaries until economic life is fully open and all-of-a-piece? But then open to what in 
the end? To trade with some other world? Or to the recognition that there is only one 
economy – that of the world as a whole – and that a one-world economy entails a 
severalty of all the world’s peoples and individuals, a ‘choir of cultures’ whose progress 
and welfare depend on each people identifying its global comparative advantage, 
meaning what it can especially, even uniquely, bring to humanity’s table? Open, that is, 
to the recognition that this also implies co-ordination and co-operation rather than 
competition and beggar-thy-neighbour economic policies, and a supranational 
understanding of finance that enables each culture and each individual to sound 
its/his/her own note while also including the tones of all the others? 
In economics, objects cannot be studied independently of their subject, for every 
observer is simultaneously an actor in the economy (cf. Soros (1994)’s reflexivity and 
the propositions of quantum theory, insofar as both claim that the observer affects the 
thing observed). Economic phenomena depend on the consciousness of the observer 
who, inevitably, is also a participant in the economic system. The financial system is an 
expression of the level of consciousness of human beings, and the monetary-financial 
order currently prevailing influences how people think and act with respect to money. It 
is thus our ideas or level of consciousness that determine the role of capital in society.  
Critiques of capitalism arise because capitalism is failing to undertake its own further 
development. Self-centred, rather than self- and other-centred, the financialism of 
modern capitalism can be seen as an adolescent stage in human evolution. The over-
riding need, therefore, is to widen our self-interest until it includes the entire human 
family. To grow up, in other words. 
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6.16. Conclusion 
As indicators of the untoward aspects of today’s, largely financial, economic life, 
marginalisation and social exclusion stand testament to too-narrow an understanding of 
capital and of the meaning and possibilities created by technological progress. What, 
then, is the counterpart of the excess liquidity created by the productivity growth 
resulting from the growth of human consciousness? Answering this question requires 
acknowledgement of the two dimensions of capital. One is to serve the production of 
goods. The other, of which we must now become conscious, is to serve human 
capacities, human creativity. In this way, one would be able to give concrete expression 
to Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities’. 
The source of capital is human ingenuity, creative intelligence or spirit (using the word 
in a non-religious sense). This should also be the destination of capital. It is thanks to 
human creativity that capital is created. Vice versa, further human creativity cannot 
develop unless capital is freed to finance it.  
Unless we become conscious of the non-physical, immaterial dimension of capital and 
release capital to support human capacities, ‘excess liquidity’ can only create untoward 
rather than straightforward growth, which in turn continues to corrode society with 
crises and a legacy of debts, marginalisation and social exclusion that impede the further 
development of human capacities. 
Recurrent or continuous financial crises are inevitable unless finance switches from 
being a means whereby people (via the economy or via financial markets) serve their 
own ends, to becoming the promoter (created with the help of the economy) of further 
human development – that is, by linking the resources freed by productivity growth to 
destinations and uses that enable the development and flourishing of future human 
capacities and creativity. This problem can only be brought to a solution when we 
acknowledge that capital has two dimensions, related to two kinds of value and, indeed, 
two kinds of world, each with its own logic – the one material, the other immaterial.  
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7. Commitment to Social and Ecological Objectives: Crucial 
in Generating Social Innovations for the Marginalized?  
By Justus Lodemann 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Intuitively, the answer to the questions seems ‘yes, commitment to social and ecological 
objectives is crucial in generating social innovations for the marginalized.’ Without 
such commitment it is hardly imaginable that these social innovations become 
established. As a qualification one might add that this holds true at least in cases in 
which the social and ecological objectives are inherent parts of the ideas that might 
become the social innovations90. Our image of social innovation is associated with 
images of persons who are dedicated to a strong vision and, though facing manifold 
barriers like strong political or ideological opposition, bureaucratic obstacles or 
restricted access to financial resources, promote these visions until these approaches 
lead to and/or become raw models for societal change (comp. Ziegler et al. 2014).  
“Commitment stands at the intersection of at least three of sociology's core dialectics: 
continuity and change, agency and constraint, and self and society.” (Ulmer 2000) 
This rough positioning of the term commitment by Ulmer points to the potential role of 
commitment in the analysis of social innovation. Following the working definition used 
by CRESSI, social innovation is “the development and delivery of new ideas (products, 
services, models, markets, processes) at different socio-structural levels that 
intentionally seek to improve human capabilities, social relations, and the processes in 
which these solutions are carried out” (CRESSI, project proposal). Social innovations 
seem to occupy the same intersection as commitment. 
To gain a better understanding of commitment we will first have a closer look on the 
potential target(s) of commitment: commitment to what, to whom? What is the role of 
commitment for a) the social innovator (individual or group) and b) the target group 
(referring to CRESSI that means the marginalized)? What is the role of commitment in 
shaping the relations between the social innovator, the target group of the social 
innovation and further stakeholders (institutions, other groups, society)? And, vice 
versa, in how far does the relation between the social innovator, the target group and 
further stakeholders of the innovation matter for commitment?  
Novelty is one element of social innovations, i.e. „changes in social relations, 
configurations and processes that can have effects at various socio-structural levels“ 
(Nicholls and Ziegler 2014). What aspects might a concept of commitment contribute 
for the understanding of these changes?  
The paper will tackle these questions regarding commitment in more detail. The paper 
aims at advancing our understanding of social innovation. Not all topics are discussed 
extensively; however, the ideas presented hopefully inspire further discussion. 
                                                          
90 This paper will not consider cases in which social or ecological objectives are included as add-ons to 
the central ideas of social innovations. If objectives are not aligned with central ideas this can lead to 
conflicts in resource allocations (time, money etc.), change of perception by target groups (Newman et al. 
2014) etc.  
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7.2. Definition of commitment 
The term commitment has been used in a variety of (sometimes overlapping) research 
disciplines, but its primary roots are in sociology (e.g. Becker 1960) and social 
psychology (e.g. Kiesler 1971). It has gained prominence in the organizational behavior 
literature for the analysis of topics like (employee) commitment to a company, job 
performance and the role of business ethics (e.g. Choi and Jung 2008, Cole and Bruch 
2006, Meyer et al. 2004). The examples given are by no means exclusive. However, 
despite (or because of) the fact that the term commitment is used in several contexts, the 
concepts behind often remain somewhat blurry. In some cases, it even seems to be 
assumed by the authors that the reader already knows or intuitively understands what is 
meant by commitment – a problem  that has already been discussed by several scholars 
and still holds true (e.g. Becker 1960, Ulmer 2000). This non-specification of the term 
might lead to oversimplification in many ways, e.g. it might imply that whether one is 
committed to something or someone is a yes-or-no-question and that commitment is a 
state of mind that cannot be differentiated further. Moreover, we have to differentiate 
carefully between “making a commitment” and “being committed”. Whereas the first 
phrase refers to an action or an acted-out behavior, the latter refers to a state or mindset. 
If we derive from the former – the committed action or behavior – to consistent lines of 
action, the use is obviously tautological (Becker 1960). However, different approaches 
have been made to define commitment (see e.g. review by Meyer and Allen 1991). In 
the following discussion, I will try to analyze and define the term further, looking at 
potential antecedents and important factors of commitment as well as understanding the 
possible target(s) of commitment.  
According to Locke et al. (1981), the term commitment describes the determination to 
try or keep trying for a goal91. The goal´s origin (self-set, participatively set, assigned) 
does not matter, but the goal must be accepted and adopted as a priority of the 
committed social entity. This definition follows one line of our main intuitive 
understanding of commitment. The other line of intuitive understanding normally 
includes others: being committed to another person, the family, a company etc. Being 
committed to another social entity implies that one adopts the goals of the social entity 
and acts accordingly – in contrast to e.g. sympathy which does not (automatically) 
involve an active component. 
In the context of research on workplace commitment, Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) 
propose the following definition: “Commitment is a force that binds an individual to a 
course of action that is of relevance to a particular target “. Or, slightly changing the 
focus: “commitment is a force that binds an individual to a target and a course of action 
relevant to the target” (Meyer et al. 2006). These definitions stress the idea of being 
bound and by that offer a distinction to the term ‚motivation‘. Being bound implies that 
a line of action or a relationship is followed though there are consciously known and 
available alternatives (Becker 1960, Leik and Leik 1977 in Burke and Stets 1999)92. In 
                                                          
91 In this paper ‘goal’ is used to describe a clearly defined ends (of a course of action). 
92 Sen (1977) introduces the possibility to define commitment „in terms of a person choosing an act that 
he believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare to him than an alternative that is also available to 
him“. Sen claims that commitment „drives a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare“ and 
opposes this claim with the notion of traditional economic theory that personal choice and personal 
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distinction to ‘intention’ (which is exclusively cognitive), it becomes an urge or need to 
perform the behavior linked to the target for the committed social entity (Inauen et al. 
2014). However, commitment has a voluntary component; it is not initiated by merely 
recognizing responsibilities93, obligations or simply to avoid punishment (Welch 2012). 
However, during the course of action a degree of obligation might develop for the 
committing social entity (Bandura 1986 in Locke et al. 1988). I will come back to this 
aspect later on.  For the purpose of this paper, I will use the definition as proposed by 
Meyer et al. (2006). 
Commitment shows up in different forms and with different foci. First, we will have a 
closer look on the latter: What are the targets of commitment? In this paper, I assume 
that targets can be goals (of action) or social entities (individuals or groups94). 
Castelfranchi (1995) differentiates between three categories of commitment:  
• Internal commitment links the dedication of an individual agent to a line of 
action with a one-act line of action being the limiting case. A set of behaviors is 
organized around and furthers the course of action to attain a chosen and 
specified goal. The strength of internal commitment moves along a continuous 
line of degree – as is the case for the other categories of commitment. 
• Social commitment is relational. It describes the commitment of an agent to 
another social entity (individual or group) to do an action in the interest of the 
latter. Castelfranchi (1995) argues that social commitment has reciprocal 
components95. The social entity must be aware of the agent´s intentions (mutual 
knowledge) and the entity must agree with these intentions (implicitly or 
explicitly). Social commitment forms obligations, which we will discuss in 
detail later on. 
• Collective commitment refers to the commitment of a collective agent96 to attain 
the same specified goals. In so far, the term collective commitment is 
synonymous with ‘internal commitment of the group’ (goals do not necessarily 
have to be identical with the ones of the individuals who form the group). In this 
case the role of social commitment between the members of the group depends 
on the kind and nature of the group (Castelfranchi 1995).   
 
In this paper I will make use of these categories as for the leading question this 
distinction seems to offer some meaningful aspects. However, I am well aware that 
other approaches to and differentiations of commitment have been made (e.g. Kanter 
1968, Johnson 1973, Meyer and Allen 1991, Burke and Reitzes 199197). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
welfare cannot be separated, refusing to accept pure gains-maximization as an axiom of human behavior. 
However, this claim strongly depends on the definition of personal welfare. 
93 Though it might be linked to the perception of responsibilities; anyhow, the requirements have to be 
intentionally adopted as personal values (Welch 2012). 
94 The term `group´ will be used in a broad sense in this paper, including informal groups of individuals, 
teams, organizations, institutions etc. 
95 In distinction to e.g. sympathy. 
96 Groups in the broader sense; by some authors also called ‘social agent’. I use the term collective agent 
to avoid confusion about the term ‘social’. 
97 For example, Burke and Reitzes (1991) propose an approach without linking commitment to consistent 
behaviors, other individuals, or organizations in the first place. In their view commitment refers to the 
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The relation between commitment and performance has been a topic of discussion in the 
literature as research results have been ambivalent in the past (Locke et al. 1988). The 
main reason for the ambivalence of result might have been that in many studies goal 
commitment had been easily achieved (Locke et. al. 1981). As several studies have 
shown an effect of commitment on performance (comp. Locke et al. 1988), I strongly 
assume that they are positively correlated; however, the strength of commitment plays 
an important role for performance. Individuals are committed to many targets and have 
to make choices regarding prioritization. Commitment has manifold sources with 
different characteristics, each of them potentially having a different effect on 
performance. Moreover, other factors might play a role in initiating, fostering or 
decreasing commitment.  
Various potential determinants of commitment have been described and categorized in 
different schemes. Locke et al. (1988) e.g. divides into three categories: external 
influences (authority, peer influence, and external rewards), interactive influences 
(participation and competition) and internal factors (expectancy and internal rewards). 
Hollenbeck and Klein (1987) describe personal (need for achievement, endurance, type 
A personality, ability, past success etc.) and situational factors (publicness, volition, 
explicitness, social influence, task complexity, performance constraints etc.) and link 
them to goal attainment attractiveness and goal attainment expectancy98. In the 
following some selected factors of commitment are shortly discussed that tend to 
reappear in the literature respectively that might be of relevance in the case of social 
innovation. 
• The importance of identity of the committed social entity for establishing and 
constraining commitment has been stressed by many scholars (e.g. Burke and 
Reitzes 1991, Sen 1985, Welch 2012). Any individual has diverse identities, 
depending on the perspective respectively on her view of herself in the specific 
context (gender, family status, profession, ideological direction, nationality, race 
etc.). Identities are constructed in interrelation; meaningful relationships are not 
to be violated. Sen (1985) argues that, depending on the context, these identities 
shape the individual´s view on ‘self welfare, goals, or behavioral obligations’. 
Any targets or courses of action that are not at all coherent with the individual’s 
narrative authenticity (Welch 2012), or, put differently, do not support the 
individual’s identity, will hardly create any commitment. Obviously, it is very 
difficult to make a general statement about a person´s narrative authenticity and 
how she views herself. Any approximation by an outside reflection of the 
person´s history or background cuts short99.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
connection of a person to a stable set of self-meanings (identity); the apparent ties to actions, person etc. 
are products of this connection. Though this concept seems plausible the paper will draw on a multicausal 
approach (including the concept of identity). 
98 They claim that goal attainment attractiveness and goal attainment expectancy are the major variables 
in commitment (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987, Klein and Kim 1998), forming the knot between personal / 
situational factors and strength of commitment. They state that low expectancy of goal attainment leads to 
lower commitment than high expectancy, even if the goal attainment is attractive (and vice versa); low 
attractiveness of the goal attainment normally leads to lower commitment than high attractiveness, even if 
the goal attainment is expected to be high (and vice versa). 
99 Often foundations like Ashoka and the Skoll Foundation seemingly draw on the biography of the social 
innovator in the evaluation of the initiative in order to grasp commitment, also in regard to future activity. 
This takes little account to the fact that people might more or less disruptively change their opinions, 
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• Volition plays a twofold role: First, commitments are based on volition by 
definition, at least in their beginnings. As already mentioned, volition serves as 
distinctive feature to acting in response to responsibility or obligation. Second, 
volition can become a determinant of commitment; the freedom of choice to be 
committed to a target can change in the course of action due to raising social or 
internal100 pressure to achieve101. Castelfranchi (1995) argues that social 
commitment makes it more difficult to drop the course of action than it is the 
case when no other social entity is involved. The social entity, that the individual 
is committed to, acquires – so Castelfranchi – rights like to control, to demand 
and to protest in regard to the ‘promised’ activities. Thereby social commitment 
creates interpersonal obligations. However, as their origins are based on volition, 
Welch (2012) claims that commitment enhances social freedom102. 
• Ability and constraints play a major role in expectancy (see below). However, at 
least two aspects seem to be noteworthy in the context of social innovation. (1) 
To a great amount individual abilities and constraints in regard to choices, 
resources etc. are shaped by social relations, institutions, the environment etc. 
(Mann 1986, Welch 2012, Chiappero and von Jacobi 2014). Social innovators 
with complex ideas that require a high amount of resources for implementation 
like time, money and knowledge might be constantly confronted with limits and 
restrictions. Therefore it seems crucial that goals are aligned to avoid conflicts in 
resource allocation. (2) Challenging constraining institutions might be a direct or 
indirect target of a committed social entity.  
• Commitment increases or decreases with expectancy of achievement 
(Hollenbeck and Klein 1987, Locke et al. 1988, Klein and Kim 1998). Ideas that 
potentially lead to social innovations always inherit a great amount of 
uncertainty as there is no or only partly approval that these ideas will work out. 
Therefore expectancy of achieving to implement these ideas might be rather low. 
Moreover, the degree of complexity of the ideas has influence on expectancy as 
well: a simple idea might be easier implemented than a more complex one103. 
However, expectancy of achievement always depends on the perception of the 
social innovator. Bird (1988) argues that traditional entrepreneurs are often 
strongly anchored in the present104, not thinking much about the future. Thus, 
expectancy would play a minor role in building commitment in the beginning of 
the initiative. If the social innovation has been already implemented, the success 
might motivate to scale the innovation on a higher / broader level as expectancy 
of achievement increases. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
values and, hence, behavior. Reasons for such a change are manifold, e.g. other identities become 
prioritized. 
100 Creating a feeling of compulsion. 
101 This might be one of the reasons for escalating commitment, i.e. the course of action is still followed 
though achievement is obviously not possible any more. 
102 Social freedom as “the freedom to choose and act with and through other members of the community 
and to partake in the construction of the values, norms, and institutions of that community that shape 
one’s own daily life.” (Welch 2012) 
103 Commitment in the face of uncertainty might also be a ‘complexity reduction technique’. Therefore it 
would help to carry out ideas. 
104 Nevertheless, Bird (1988) claims that envisioning the future plays an important role for success of 
entrepreneurial activity.  
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Why is a social innovator committed to a goal or a group105 in the first place? 
Obviously, reasons might be manifold and hidden deep in the individual´s personality, 
making it impossible to make a general statement106. Factors like emotional affection, 
sense of responsibility (Koe Hwee Nga and Shamuganathan 2010) and the above 
mentioned ones – especially identity – might hint at reasons and, depending on the 
context, have an impact on the strength of commitment. 
 
7.3. Commitment and social innovation 
“Thus, when I speak of the ‘social’, I have in mind real encounters and 
interactions with others as the context for exercising an expanding freedom.” 
(Welch 2012) 
What is meant by the term ‘social’ in social innovations? Drawing on the already 
mentioned working definition of social innovation as used by CRESSI (project 
proposal), the aim is to “improve human capabilities, social relations, and the processes 
in which these solutions are carried out”. Social innovations have social ends. They take 
place in and reshape (part of) societies, which are built by networks of social interaction 
(comp. Mann 1986). Following the working definition of CRESSI, the target group of 
social innovations are human beings.  
In cases in which ecological objectives are main components of the social innovation, 
we have to differentiate further: Are ecological objectives aimed at because ecosystem 
services for human beings are endangered (in its end a human-focused goal)? Do they 
serve no anthropocentric reasons, but, appointing intrinsic value to nature, aim at 
improving specific aspects or the overall state of ecosystems?  Or, taking a biocentric 
position, do these objectives tackle conflicts between the needs of different beings? 
Though we might talk of ‘commitment to nature’, or, including human beings, 
‘commitment to the biosphere’, there is a difference to social commitment as defined 
above: the establishment of relations between species with its implications like mutual 
knowledge, agreement and creation of rights and duties as inherent components seems 
difficult or even impossible. Therefore I propose to make a clear distinction to social 
objectives at this point. In this paper I will stick closely to the working definition by 
CRESSI (project proposal) which - so far – focuses on human beings. Nevertheless, it 
might be important to reflect on CRESSI´s definition of social innovation regarding 
ecological objectives. 
What are the different roles of the three categories internal, social and collective 
commitment in social innovations? I assume that many social innovators draw on a 
hybrid form of commitment: partly being committed to a social entity, partly being 
committed to their vision. The ratio might change and poses the question of legitimacy.  
                                                          
105 In our specific case that means marginalized human beings; the social innovator might or might not be 
part of the group. 
106 There has been a long tradition of debate in disciplines like philosophy and sociology on whether 
human behavior is driven exclusively by egoism or not. In traditional economic theory the notion that 
egoistic behavior even leads to general good is still prominent although there is an increasing amount of 
critics. To ridicule this notion, Sen (1977) tells a little story: “ “Where is the railway station?” he asks me. 
“There,” I say, pointing at the post office, “and would you please post this letter for me on the way?” 
“Yes,” he says, determined to open the envelope and check whether it contains something valuable.” In 
this paper, I will not follow this line of thought further. 
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I will first turn to social commitment. For the case of social entrepreneurs107, Ziegler et 
al. (2014) stress the local embeddedness of these entrepreneurs and their close ties to the 
affected communities, at least in the beginning of their initiatives. The authors claim 
that this kind of local embeddedness creates social accountability, i.e. the social 
entrepreneur can be held responsible for her actions by the community. Ziegler et al. 
(2014) contrast this approach to power that is exerted by outside experts. This line of 
thought is mirrored in social commitment. As mentioned above, social commitment 
creates a reciprocal relation between the individual and another social entity (individual 
or group), including rights and duties on both sides. Both parties enter the relation on a 
voluntary basis. Hence, social commitment is linked closely to direct democratic 
empowerment and is contrary to any form of ‘power over’. Marginalization is created 
actively by social entities, be it aggressively or via ignorance, disrespect or deprivation 
of necessities. Social commitment is diametrically opposed; it is changing power 
hierarchies. 
Regarding the success of social innovations, social commitment to the target group (in 
our case marginalized people) seems to be of crucial importance for several reasons108:  
• Social innovators enhance their credibility from the viewpoint of the target 
groups if their activities stay coherent and consistent over time (which comprises 
the negation of alternatives). This might lead to further acceptance and trust in 
return, which might foster a feeling of togetherness and/or – in case of active 
consent – cooperation (Ruppel and Harrington 2000). Thereby the development 
of collective commitment and, hence, collective power (power to) might be 
initiated109.  
• Social commitment establishes and improves human relations. Capabilities of 
the target group are enhanced by increasing opportunities (to choose). In that 
respect social commitment for the marginalized becomes a social objective in 
itself. 
• A close connection to the target group makes it more difficult for the social 
innovator to exit her activities as social pressure is higher than in the case of 
solely internal commitment110. 
Internal commitment differs as it does not (necessarily) involve interpersonal relations. 
Following a strong vision might enable to be sensitive to opportunities to act (Koe 
Hwee Nga and Shamuganathan 2010); the social innovator might be able to respond 
faster to changing contextual variables. Anyhow, not being committed to the target 
group (the marginalized) might make it more difficult to develop a deep understanding 
of the group´s needs and to draw on social accountability as a source of authority. 
 
7.4. Summary 
                                                          
107 I assume that social entrepreneurs are a subgroup of social innovators. 
108 Granted the target groups are aware of the goals and activities and accept them. 
109 Drawing on Mann (1986), dominant power structures can be challenged by emerging power networks. 
When collective power reaches the extent that existing institutions are put under pressure, changes in 
power relations might be possible, thereby enhancing the situation of the marginalized (in the context of 
this paper). 
110 Even in the case that the goals have been made public.  
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“Commitment is a force that binds an individual to a target and a course of 
action relevant to the target” (Meyer et al. 2006).  
Commitment can refer to a relation between an agent and an action (internal 
commitment), agents can be committed to each other (social commitment) and agents 
can be committed to an action together (collective commitment).  
For theorizing about social innovation for the marginalized, development of an 
understanding of this categorization of commitment – especially of social commitment 
– might offer further interesting aspects, also in relation to Mann´s concept of social 
power (e.g. in regard to collective power and interstitially emerging power networks). 
Social commitment to the marginalized – beyond being a social objective in itself – 
seems to enhance the chances of success in various ways. Furthermore, social 
commitment creates social accountability. As social objectives are allocated in the 
social sphere it seems difficult to imagine the success of social innovations without 
social commitment. The case might differ for ecological objectives. Ecological 
objectives can have different foci (anthropo-, eco- or biocentric) which have to be 
understood in detail. 
This paper highlights several factors that might play an important role in the initiation 
and development of commitment. Can we manipulate commitment in the sense of 
nudging or further ‘social engineering’? Though that may be partly true, there are two 
aspects that might be opposed to this notion. Firstly, the initiation and development of 
commitment seems to be dependent on a complex net of individual factors, making it 
rather difficult or even impossible to calculate the effects of nudging or social 
engineering. Secondly, a better understanding of commitment does not automatically 
imply that it should be manipulated – especially coming from a capabilities’ 
perspective. If so, it should be for (social) commitments that people have reasons to 
value – including a reflective approach that is not inherent in traditional incentives. This 
topic should be discussed and understood in more detail. 
So far, the intuitive answer ‘yes’ to the leading question – “Commitment to Social and 
Ecological Objectives: Crucial in Generating Social Innovations for the Marginalized?” 
– seems to be mostly right. However, to avoid confusion and tautologies, the term 
‘social’ needs further clarification for the various contexts111. 
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8. From Rational Agents to Human Diversity 
By Marco Sebastianelli112, Enrica Chiappero and Nadia von Jacobi113 
 
8.1. Introduction 
The comparison between Neoclassical economics and the Capability Approach is 
asymmetrical for two main reasons: first of all the privileged position held by the first as 
the dominant economic paradigm in the western world, and more importantly, the 
identification of the second as an integrated intellectual community, a feature which is 
lacking in Neoclassical economics. Although the dispersed and disorganised nature of 
the many theoretical frameworks convening in the mainstream paradigm hinders the 
task of tracing its conceptual borders, an agreement can be found in the literature 
(Lawson, 2013; Hahn, 1984, 1985; Weintraub, 2002; Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2006) 
around three key features of Neoclassical economics: 
a) individualistic perspective with a focus on the contribution of single rational 
agents to the outcome of economic phenomena rather than their interaction; 
b) instrumental nature of rationality which relies on a postulated set of axioms that 
impose the congruence of preferences with utility maximisation; 
c) self-interested nature of economic agents who act independently on the basis of 
perfect and relevant information. 
In addition, from the methodological point of view, the systematic recourse to 
mathematical modelling, and the ensuing focus on equilibrium states of the economy, 
strongly characterises the Neoclassical approach.  
Sen, in the formulation of the Capability Approach, takes distance from most of these 
assumptions and, in particular: the depiction of individual as homogeneous, maximising 
and self-interested agents; the assumption that utility provides a sufficient evaluative 
space for human wellbeing; and the interpretation of self-interest as the only driver of 
human behaviour. In order to enlarge the scope of socio-economic analysis, Sen and 
other contributors to the Capability Approach, resort to a set of theoretical and 
methodological choices, all linked by the acceptance of complexity rather than its 
simplification. These constitute the backbone of the Capability Approach and can be 
narrowed down to the following three elements: 
a) acceptance of human diversity (both in terms of personal features and contextual 
circumstances) 
b) recognition of a plurality of scopes, values and intentions that people might have 
in pursuing what they have reason to value 
c) employment of multiple evaluative spaces (functionings and capabilities) and 
well-being dimensions. 
From the methodological point of view, the Capability Approach refuses specific 
formulas, a set of equations or given algorithms, nor is it aimed at identifying and 
analysing equilibrium conditions in the manner of Neoclassical economics. Instead, the 
                                                          
112 Institute for Advanced Studies (IUSS), Pavia. 
113 University of Pavia. 
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broad conceptual framework at the basis of the Capability Approach has proved to be a 
fertile ground for a wide range of normative, evaluative and empirical purposes. These, 
in turn, have triggered the application within Sen’s broad theoretical architecture of a 
plurality of methodological strategies, analytical and statistical methods. 
In this paper, attention will be restricted to a comparison between the intrinsic focus and 
the analytical purpose of Neoclassical economics and the Capability Approach, with a 
particular focus on the following aspects. In the first section, we will discuss the 
theoretical origins and implications of the two approaches. In the second section the 
paper will examine the definition of rational economic agents and the motivations 
behind individuals’ choices and actions. In the third section the evaluative space and 
metric for measuring well-being will be taken into consideration. Finally, we will 
present arguments in support of the idea that the Capability Approach can offer a more 
appropriate theoretical platform for investigating the role and the impact of social 
innovation processes. 
 
8.2. Comparing the two approaches 
The Neoclassical economic paradigm and the Capability Approach differ in both the 
intrinsic focus and the purpose of their analysis. One fundamental a priori difference lies 
in the twofold, and sometimes ambiguous scope of Neoclassical models. Within the vast 
realm of studies conducted under the umbrella of Neoclassical economics, descriptive 
and normative stances have often been adopted equivalently, thereby raising more than 
a few eyebrows among economic methodologists and heterodox114 economists.  This 
difference concerns the epistemological groundwork on which the two economic 
paradigms are built, which is in turn influenced by the models of reasoning employed 
by each of them. While Neoclassical economics focuses on the search for 
simplifications that allow to reduce the complexity of economic phenomena, the 
Capability Approach embraces such complexity and places it at the centrepiece of its 
analysis. 
The Neoclassical paradigm was originally influenced by logical positivism, the same 
approach previously adopted by the natural sciences and by nineteenth century physics 
in particular (Johnson, 1996). This logical structure, formalised in the deductive model 
of explanation, implies the verification of a theory by means of evidence, running from 
the general to the particular. The most authoritative implementation of logical 
positivism within modern economic sciences is Milton Friedman’s instrumentalism, 
according to which the value of a theory depends on the accuracy of its predictions 
rather than the reality of its assumptions (Friedman, 1953). In spite of Popper’s critique 
concerning the need for scientists to switch from verification to falsification, the 
contemporary Neoclassical paradigm clings to a form of logical discourse according to 
which theories explain certain predictions, whose accuracy in turn confirms the theories 
themselves, thereby leading to a circular argument.  
                                                          
114 The term “heterodox” is used here to epitomise approaches characterised by greater degree of 
complexity than the Neoclassical paradigm, and generally dissatisfied with its assumptions - namely, the 
atomistic conception of individuals as rational agents who act in accordance with some theoretical axioms 
in order to maximise their utility. 
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In opposition to the neoclassical economic tenets there stands a body of knowledge 
categorised under the name of heterodox economics (which includes evolutionary and 
post-autistic economics, just to name a few). The different schools of economic thought 
coexisting under the heterodox paradigm share some common features which seem to 
arise from the form of argument they all employ: inductive reasoning. Inductive 
reasoning climbs from the particular to the general, inferring a conclusion as the most 
probable explanation of existing evidence. While the outcome of deduction is certainly 
true (insofar as hypotheses are true), induction generates conclusions whose truthfulness 
can be falsified, but never verified with absolute certainty. This feature of inductive 
reasoning makes it a more complex and fertile framework, but also reduces its 
explanatory power thereby giving birth to a scientific paradigm that seeks regularities 
and patterns while preserving the intricate nature of the observed phenomena. It can be 
argued, indeed, that the relative caution and modesty that  inductive reasoning forces 
into the work of heterodox economists are precious allies in their pursuit of ultimate 
accuracy.  
The Capability Approach does not lend itself to any of these two paradigms in a clearcut 
manner. While the most common interpretation sees it in stark opposition to the 
Neoclassical doctrine, some scholars (notably, Benicourt, 2002) disagree with such a 
conclusion (see also Robeyns, 2002 for a counterargument). Benicourt’s argument 
follows the idea that while he has introduced elements of novelty in the economic 
discourse, including moral philosophy, Amartya Sen has largely drawn important 
elements of his framework from neoclassical architecture. The Capability Approach, 
and especially Nussbaum’s operationalisation, follows indeed a rather deductive mode 
of reasoning, the clearest example of which is perhaps the identification of a specific list 
of human capabilities on which to evaluate the quality of people’s lives. Nevertheless, 
the absence of three crucial elements of the neoclassical tradition (see Arnsperger and 
Varoufakis, 2006), allows one to draw a distinction between the latter and the 
Capability Approach. Such elements are: methodological individualism, methodological 
instrumentalism and methodological equilibration.  
Methodological individualism, or ontological individualism to use the terminology used 
by Robeyns (2005) and others115, refers to the idea, common in Neoclassical 
economics, that all phenomena can be understood simply as the sum of individual 
contributions to them.  This view negates that interactions between human beings are 
capable of generating outcomes that cannot be explained by multiple individual actions 
and implies that society is nothing more than the sum of all individuals. Arnsperger and 
Varoufakis identify this approach with the appropriate simile of a watchmaker who 
examines cogs and wheels separately and independently from their interaction. Sen, not 
only inherently rejects a similar interpretation of the economic discipline, but bases his 
whole approach on social interactions and multiple combinations of features, both 
personal and contextual, that intervene in the construction and evolution of social 
groups. Another element that brings Sen away from the Neoclassical tradition is the lack 
of methodological instrumentalism that is commonly employed to justify any human 
behaviour in the light of an overarching goal or end. According to the Capability 
                                                          
115 Some authors (Robeyns, 2005; Chiappero-Martinetti and Biggeri, 2013) use the term methodological 
individualism to identify the tendency to reduce human beings’ inherent plurality and remodel people into 
homogeneous agents. More on this topic will be discussed in the third section. 
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Approach, and more generally in Sen’s literature on the topic of rationality, instead, 
motivation for human behaviour can and must be sought in a wide range of motives, 
including those that might have an intrinsic rather than simply instrumental value. 
Finally, the issue of equilibration concerns the belief (once again, instrumental) that the 
economy lies in a state of equilibrium of some sort that is often a basic assumption of 
Neoclassical economic models. While Sen’s position on this subject is only mildly 
critical of some of its applications (Sen, 1989), the Capability Approach does not rely 
on a theory of equilibrium to sustain any of its results. 
The Capability Approach places the emphasis on the necessity to understand the nature 
of economic phenomena, with the purpose of producing knowledge-driven suggestions 
on how to improve people’s lives. Knowledge of micro-level phenomena is therefore 
built by taking into consideration all degrees of complexity necessary to create a 
realistic portrait of the object under observation. Conversely, the Neoclassical paradigm 
relies on a body of simplifying axioms about economic agents - chiefly, their rational 
nature, self interested attitude, and maximising behaviour - employed to derive 
exhaustive depictions of reality at the expenses of the precision of its premises and 
assumptions. Despite the technical nature of its contents, the debate about the 
Neoclassical and alternative approaches has often touched upon ideological arguments 
which, over the years, have plummeted into disordered flag waving. A new 
interpretation of the economic discipline would arguably benefit from an impartial 
attitude towards alternative approaches, including their variable suitability to different 
domains of analysis. Economics, like other social sciences, is cursed by the 
impossibility to reproduce reality experimentally in a laboratory environment and by the 
heterogeneity of its objects of analysis: this implies a necessity to apply some degrees of 
simplification to the analysis itself. Crucial here, therefore, is to find the right balance 
between overly specific and excessively simplified depictions of the world, bearing in 
mind that different purposes will demand different degrees of specificity-abstraction. In 
this light the comparison between Capability Approach and Neoclassical economics can 
be understood as a trade-off between accuracy and explanatory power with a tendency 
for the latter to vary in intensity according to changes in the object of analysis and the 
approaches employed. 
 
8.3. Economic agents 
The logical-positivistic approach employed by Neoclassical economics, coupled with 
the commitment to provide clear-cut answers to economic dilemmas, imposes the 
implementation of a wide range of simplifications. Probably the most symbolic of them 
is the identification of the object of analysis (i.e. human beings) with a streamlined 
version of the object itself, namely the representative agent. The representative agent 
shall be interpreted as a figurative person whose features and behaviour reflect the 
observable actions of human being. While the latter constitutes a descriptive element of 
simplification (these features are in fact derived from observation, albeit oversimplified, 
of human behaviour), a normative element also contributes to the definition of what an 
economic agent is. This normative character of the representative agent has been 
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introduced in the previous section and imposes a set of axioms116 which conform to the 
assumption of perfect rationality. The Neoclassical interpretation of human beings, 
therefore, reduces them to homogeneous and abstract objects of analysis, whose 
interests and ambitions, although existent, are not taken into consideration for the 
purpose of economic analysis.  
Sen and the Capability Approach shift the focus of the analysis towards the peculiarities 
of each individual and away from mainstream economics' typical simplification to a 
more complexity-prone framework. The heart of the Capability Approach is the 
individual, but the latter is taken into consideration from a holistic perspective, 
including both his complexities and those of the surrounding environment, which 
comprises social norms and institutions. Therefore, despite contrasting arguments, there 
appears to exist a mild agreement on the idea that Sen’s approach follows a sort of 
ethical individualism, as opposed to the methodological individualism previously 
discussed (Robeyns, 2005; Chiappero-Martinetti and Biggeri, 2013).  
The diversity in human nature is taken into account by the Capability Approach in two 
fundamental ways: first of all through the multiple evaluative spaces that can be 
considered and secondly through the multiplicity of factors that allow one to convert 
commodities into functioning (i.e. the ultimate achievements of people’s lives) 
(Robeyns, 2005). The diversity is first of all accounted for by the fact that Sen 
recognises that people act and perceive on the basis of different objectives, values and 
priorities rather than reducing them to profit-seeking devices. The purpose of the 
Capability Approach is to provide an evaluative framework for human conditions and 
social arrangements on the basis of what people may have reason to value, a task that 
requires a much richer toolkit than mainstream approaches. The conversion factors, and 
the distinction between capabilities (potential achievements) and functionings 
(achievements themselves) is also crucial, since it allows one to dig deeper into the 
actual meaning that a particular condition might have for each individual117. 
Conversion factors constitute the junction between tangible and intangible resources and 
potential and actual outcomes, as they pay tribute to the importance of the individual’s 
personal and external traits, both social and environmental. 
 
8.4. Nature of rationality 
The hypothesis of rationality supported by the two approaches is a key element of this 
methodological debate, since it has traditionally represented a central feature of both 
Neoclassical economics and the Capability Approach. In this regard, it is worth noting 
that the Capability Approach, albeit segmented in a multitude of multidisciplinary 
contributions, follows a uniform theoretical framework based upon the acceptance of 
and interest in the complexity of economic phenomena, while Neoclassical economics 
                                                          
116 The two basic axioms are completeness and transitivity of preferences. Different streams in the 
neoclassical literature have produced different twists to the basic assumption of rationality. For a 
thorough and critical analysis of these, see Kirman (2011). 
117 A fitting example is the one concerning the difference that exists between a person who is fasting for 
religious motivations and one who is starving for lack of food. The two people do not differ in terms of 
final achievement (lack of nutrition) but their conditions differ very much from the point of view of their 
capabilities (Sen, 2000). 
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gathers a scattered collection of non-homogeneous contributions. For the purpose of this 
analysis, the most basic and traditional interpretation of “neoclassicism” will be taken 
into consideration, leaving aside different sub-approaches that might be classified under 
the same heading118. The major difference in the way rationality is conceived by the 
two paradigms concerns the role assigned to rationality, an element that somehow 
relates to the level of complexity allowed for in Neoclassical Economics and the 
Capability Approach: lower in the first and higher in the second.  
Rationality enters Neoclassical economics in a purely instrumental manner: it is in fact 
constructed in a way that minimises difficulties in understanding such a crucial element 
- namely the origin - of human behaviour. It merely constitutes a step required in order 
to proceed with the analysis of higher level phenomena: rarely have the works of late 
nineteenth century Neoclassical economists have  focused on rationality as a 
phenomenon per se, while a far greater deal of attention has been devoted to areas in 
which rationality only served as a means. The instrumental nature of the Neoclassical 
doctrine is primarily influenced by a strong predominance assigned to forecasting rather 
than explaining phenomena. Such an interpretation of economic science, in fact, 
requires harsh simplifications with the purpose of creating models of reality that allow 
straightforward answers to possible questions. This feature of Neoclassical economics 
has a sizeable impact on different elements of rationality, including the specific 
connotation of preferences and motivations that will be discussed more thoroughly 
below.  
The Capability Approach, instead, is deeply concerned with the actual features of 
human rationality: throughout his career Amartya Sen has devoted a significant part of 
his literature to this field, in which he is recognised both as one of the pioneers and 
greatest experts. He and the Capability Approach stand against the Neoclassical 
interpretation of rationality as simple internal coherence of choice, maximisation of 
personal interest and maximisation in general (Sen, 1982). Rather than applying 
simplified accounts of human reasoning, Sen embraces its inherent complexity. The 
plurality of human nature lying at the epicentre of the approach, in fact, forces deeper 
investigation into the actual role and essence of rationality that in turn requires analysis 
from a non-instrumental standpoint.  
Epistemological discussion of the two conceptions of rationality reaches its most critical 
expression in the debate on the drivers of human behaviour. The second part of this 
section is devoted to such debate and will be structured as follows: in the first 
subsection the role of preferences and values will be spelled out; the second subsection 
will concern the kinds of motivations envisaged by Neoclassical economics and the 
Capabilities approach. 
 
8.4.1. Preferences and values 
As a consequence of the aforementioned instrumental nature of Neoclassical rationality, 
the latter is assumed to be perfect for every economic agent, and as such characterised 
                                                          
118 The definition of Neoclassical economics was first used by Thorsten Veblen, whose archetypal 
version of the neoclassical school was the work of Alfred Marshall. In the present work, the term is used 
with the intention of separating mainstream approaches from those which might add external features 
(most notably elements of bounded rationality) to the neoclassical doctrine. 
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by complete and transitive preferences over alternative options. Completeness and 
transitivity are the two fundamental axioms that define rationality in a way that 
significantly simplifies the implementation of mathematical models in economics. 
Commonly considered a principle of operational elegance, the axiomatic nature of 
“neoclassical rationality” disregards much of what we know to be true about the way 
people think and act, and it does so in order to allow simple and meaningful 
conclusions. In fact, as Kirman (2013) points out, by simplifying human preferences 
through the axioms of perfect rationality, the Neoclassical economist is able to build a 
continuous demand function and prove the existence of an equilibrium which would 
otherwise be ruled out or at least very hard to define. 
As Lawson (2013) points out, the definition of Neoclassical economics is inevitably 
entangled with that of mathematical deductivism, an approach epitomised by the 
enduring reliance upon methods of mathematical modelling with the aim of explaining 
all phenomena by means of laws and regularities. According to Lawson, the source of 
the problems of this paradigm lies in the incompatibility between this ontological 
presuppositions and the object of analysis which, being strictly “social”, does not lend 
itself to such event regularities. In the attempt to reconcile the two, Neoclassical 
economists then resort to an atomistic conception of the world, which is best interpreted 
as the aforementioned methodological individualism. Although not realistic, the latter 
allows one to draw simplified versions of social phenomena, which can then be 
described by means of mathematical laws. 
Figure 1: Circular interpretation of preferences - Neoclassical economics 
 
 
 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Another feature of the Neoclassical interpretation of preferences concerns their 
methodological construction by means of inference from behaviour. With the 
innovation brought about by Samuelson (1938) and his revealed preference theory, 
Neoclassical economics attempted to free itself from the problematic element of utility, 
and to provide a rationale for human action without resorting to anything external to it. 
The latter is commonly referred to as the internal consistency of choice requirement: a 
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 98 | 133 
 
principle that would allow one to “explain behavior without reference to anything other 
than behavior” (Little, cited in Sen, 1993; p. 497). The road shaped by this 
simplification is paved with a few inconsistencies, the most salient being the circularity 
(Figure 1) of the relation between preferences and behaviour (Sen, 1982).  
Due to the semantic overload (Dennis, 1998) affecting the economic discourse, the two 
terms are often employed within the Neoclassical paradigm in order to reinforce each 
other without a clear-cut logical hierarchy. A common oversimplification put forward 
by the Neoclassical literature consists in fact in explaining behaviour on the basis of 
preferences which are in turn axiomatically justified by the search for welfare, thereby 
originating a circular argument. Anderson (2001) ascribes this type of mistake to the 
dogmatic use of the concept of preference in the economic literature. She points out, 
following Sen’s line of reasoning, that ‘one is not entitled to infer that a particular 
choice advanced the individual’s welfare just because she made it voluntarily’ 
(Anderson, 2001, p. 22). Likewise, one is not entitled to infer her preferences from her 
choices either, because the latter might originate from a different source119. 
Within the Capability Approach, axiomatisation is entirely discarded, the only purpose 
of the theory being to capture actual reasons that people might have to act. Rather than 
inferring these reasons from either behaviour or any mathematical requirement, Sen 
argues in favour of the “inescapable need to go beyond the internal features of a choice 
function” (Sen, 1993; p. 487). The Capability Approach broadens the concept of 
preferences by expanding them to the idea of values. The latter can be interpreted as the 
drivers of action whose origins include all arguments that might lie at the basis of 
human behaviour. The Capability Approach’s commitment to expand the information 
basis of decision making can be traced to the fact that agency - one of the crucial 
elements of the approach itself - presupposes that reasons to act include purposes that 
might even conflict with one’s wellbeing but are part of her/his commitments (Osmani, 
2009). The strong emphasis placed by the approach on freedom also implies a need to 
allow for a greater and more diverse account of rational principles that incorporate both 
their opportunity and procedural advantage. The procedural element of human 
behaviour is entirely overlooked by traditional economic approaches, whose sole focus 
lies on the “culmination outcome” of behaviour itself, while it gains importance in Sen’s 
discourse as an evolution towards a “comprehensive outcome” (Sen, 2002, p. 12) which 
includes the process through which culmination comes about. At the same time, Sen 
(2002) points out that freedom in its opportunity aspect cannot be motivated by 
focussing on the alternatives that one would axiomatically follow and choose, and that 
the focus should instead shift towards the things that individuals truly value. 
Values are crucial in Sen’s work since they epitomise the freedom on which the whole 
theory is grounded: rather than “forcing” actors into a scheme of preferences - which he 
interprets as a basic denial of freedom of thought (Sen, 2002) - absolute predominance 
is given to their opportunity to choose the motivation of their action. Sen embraces 
Arrow’s broad characterisation of preferences, including an interpretation of human 
behaviour which assigns an action to people’s objectives and values, and is directed 
                                                          
119 One commonly employed example is that of the person invited to a fancy dinner who, facing the 
choice between one of many pears and the last apple in the fruit basket might choose the pear regardless 
of his/her preferences for apples. Inferring his/her preferences for pears on the basis of such choice would 
therefore prove misleading. 
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towards them: according to this view, individuals are able to build overarching opinions 
about their own objectives (Sen, 1982). This is essentially what Sen defines as ranking 
of rankings (Sen, 1977) and in Arrowian terms is defined as values about values 
(Arrow, 1951). According to Arrow, while market mechanisms only take into 
consideration tastes-based orderings, of equal importance are the values on the basis of 
which those orderings are originated.  
Figure 2: Non-circular interpretation of values - Capability Approach 
 
 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
As anticipated, the difference between tastes (or preferences) in their Neoclassical 
interpretation and what values represent in the Capability Approach also lies in the 
direction of consequentiality between each of them and human behaviour. Both of them 
are conceived in order to account for all possible drivers of action, but while preferences 
(at least in neoclassical terms) stem from behaviour, values are responsible for shaping 
the latter in the Capability Approach (Figure 2). Neoclassical economics avoids any 
descriptive analysis of the prior interpretation of preferences, which are modelled 
around the normative principle of utility maximisation; preferences are therefore 
deduced ex post, just like an archer who draws the target around the arrow after it has 
reached its destination. On the contrary, studies within the Capability Approach devote 
lengthy discussion to the formulation of a coherent body of drivers which take their 
ultimate form in the concept of values. These, in fact, shall be interpreted as the 
extension of preferences to a wider domain of reasons for action that cannot be fully 
captured by traditional types of motivations. As a result, a form of rationality that takes 
into consideration individuals’ values, such as the one implied by the Capability 
Approach, can adopt a multitude of different shapes and adhere more faithfully to the 
reality of human behaviour, thereby bettering its chances of describing it more correctly. 
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8.4.2. Motivations 
The issue of what is and should be the ultimate goal of human action is rather old and 
quite a central one in the debate on Neoclassical economics120. The origin of the 
modern utilitarian interpretation dates back to Hume, according to whom decision 
making is divided into three modules: reason, beliefs and passions, and Bentham who 
pushed utility as the chief purpose in life. The Neoclassical interpretation of rationality, 
which inherited much of its argument from utilitarianism, is not only methodologically, 
but also conceptually instrumental with respect to the goals of human behaviour. The 
only conceivable goal under the Neoclassical paradigm is the maximisation of utility, 
and rationality is axiomatically set out in a way that makes every economic agent’s 
choice a means to achieve such a goal (Figure 3). The outcome of this architecture of 
human rationality is the creation of a specie - i.e. homo economicus - who responds in 
machine-like fashion to analytical inputs such as prices and other monetary incentives. 
Also, the economic agent is deemed to be selfish, since it is from the maximisation of 
his own utility that individuals fulfil their goals. 
Figure 3: Goal achievement under Neoclassical paradigm 
 
 
 
Self-interest represents the overarching goal in life, and translates - by means of 
complete and transitive preferences (perfect rationality) - into a behaviour whose 
outcome is the maximisation of personal welfare (which coincides with the agent’s 
goal). 
 Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
On the other hand, the Capability Approach allows for a much more diverse spectrum of 
                                                          
120 It is worth noting that the confusion between “is” and “should be” (or the descriptive and normative 
nature of analysis) that often afflicts Neoclassical economics, is another important issue, which the 
introductory section has already touched upon, and is particularly crucial within discussions on goals and 
ends of human action. 
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motives to guide human behaviour which is both derived and triggered by a more 
complex architecture of rationality. Sen’s contribution, in fact, can be interpreted as the 
critical answer to two major theoretical architectures, namely Bentham’s utility-based 
and Rawls’ commodity-based approaches. Dissatisfied with the way both of his 
predecessors had dealt with this issue121, he builds the Capability Approach around the 
freedom and diversity of individuals and conceives rationality in a way that preserves 
these characters throughout the analytical parts of the theory. As Alkire (2005) points 
out, by broadening the information basis of his analysis of welfare, Sen is forced to 
resort to a more sophisticated set of assumptions about human beings, which in turn 
carries within itself a new conception of rationality that is at the same time technical122 
and ethical.  
In his article entitled ‘Rational fools: a critique of the behavioural foundations of the 
economic theory’, Sen introduces a new categorisation of drivers which allow one to 
fully account for altruistic behaviour, a feature that could not adequately be carried out 
by means of Neoclassical conceptions of human motives. While Neoclassical 
economics had dealt with altruistic volitions by adding an element of generosity to the 
traditional (i.e. selfish) utility function, Sen (1982) demonstrates how such a solution 
fails to capture the intrinsic complexity of selfless action. He therefore proceeds to 
divide altruistic behaviour into two categories, one moved by sympathy and the other by 
commitment: the first relates to cases in which others’ concern directly affects one’s 
welfare, while the second indicates choices that are not best in one’s personal interest 
but are considered more appropriate or rightful. While sympathy can be identified 
within an enlarged conception of self-interest, commitment “drives a wedge between 
personal choice and personal welfare” (Sen, 1977, p. 329) whereas the equivalence of 
the two has always been a stepping stone of Neoclassical rationality.  
 As Anderson (2001) points out, Sen is not particularly clear in specifying a justification 
for committed behaviour within one’s preference scheme in cases of human interaction 
where non-cooperation dominates cooperation - i.e. those situations in which 
individuals tend to put their personal interests in front of those of the community.  It can 
be argued, though, that Sen’s favourite solution to the paradox of committed action123 
is to value the act in itself, and not because of the consequences it generates. The 
Capability Approach, therefore allows for multiple layers of possible motives, and 
especially introduces the possibility for drivers of action to have intrinsic as well as 
instrumental reasons. Intrinsic reasons for acting constitute a significant part of human 
rationality and deals with all cases for which the payoff does not derive from a 
consequence of the act but rather from the completion of the act itself, and can be 
conceived only within a framework that allows multiple types of goals for human 
action. 
                                                          
121 Sen’s critique of Rawls’ approach concerns the excessive emphasis posed on equal distribution, with 
the consequent commodity fetishism and the impossibility of solving the problem of interpersonal 
comparison. The basic critique of Bentham’s “greater good” argument, instead, concerns the problem of 
distribution. 
122 Alkire (2005) uses the expression “narrow technical or engineering rationality” quoting from the 1987 
book by Amartya Sen entitled ‘On Ethics and Economics’, and it is probably to be interpreted as a 
synonym of the traditional mainstream usage of the term. 
123 With the term paradox of committed action (sometimes paradox of voting) Anderson (2001) describe 
prisoner’s dilemma-like situations in which the choice to cooperate appears paradoxical from the 
standpoint of traditional scheme of preferences.  
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8.5. Evaluative space and metric 
A distinctive element of Neoclassical economics is the narrow interpretation of the 
evaluative space and metric of its analysis. In fact, with its roots firmly planted in 
Benthamite philosophy, Neoclassical economics reduces human life to experiencing the 
greatest possible utility and all economic activity  to  a process of maximisation thereof. 
The metrics employed to assign a number to such evaluative space can be different and 
may vary across the vast neoclassical literature but it usually encompasses material 
wealth and more specifically monetary quantities. The syllogism employed by 
Neoclassical theories is the following: since human beings behave so as to maximise 
their utility, and since utility can be measured by means of income, then the latter 
represents an appropriate indicator of human conditions. Such syllogism brings about a 
twofold simplification: first of all the implied purpose of human life is reduced to utility 
maximisation, and secondly, in order to measure the abstract concept of utility, a 
unidimensional material indicator is employed as a feasible/useful proxy. This approach 
to the evaluation of economic phenomena has greatly influenced the way in which the 
economy has evolved and been guided, bringing about the predominance of the gross 
domestic product rhetoric in macroeconomic discourse and that of income at the 
microeconomic level. It is worth noting that the logical positivism employed by similar 
approaches has led to the contamination of the doctrine itself by its own findings, which 
has originated circularities that run from the centrality of economic gains, to the 
deduction of preferences from such centrality, to the explanation of actions by means of 
such preferences. 
Also relevant to the comparison of the two approaches under observation, both the 
evaluative space and the metric adopted by the Neoclassical paradigm are substantially 
static and homogeneous across individuals. This is a direct consequence of the way in 
which economic agents are defined in Neoclassical models, and implies severe 
limitations to the plausibility of the conclusions reached by them.  
The Capability Approach applies a very different evaluative space to its economic 
reasoning, which once again originates from the aforementioned basic elements of the 
theory, namely the kind of rationality and agents envisioned by it. The Capability 
Approach suggests two evaluative spaces that should be applied complementarily: 
capabilities and functionings. While a person’s functionings represent what she 
succeeds in being and doing, capabilities indicates the ability to achieve such goals, 
even though she might choose not to employ such ability (Saith, 2001). A crucial 
element of Sen’s theory is the great importance given to people’s freedom, which 
constitutes its main difference from Neoclassical approaches, and particularly, freedom 
of thought which is essentially denied by axiomatic forms of rationality.  
An evaluative space composed by capabilities and functionings allows for a more 
articulated analysis for two reasons: first of all they include multiple dimensions, and 
secondly they allow one to open up a debate on ethical issues. Capabilities and 
functionings are the beings and doings that people value and as such they include a 
broad variety of conditions that might be worth taking into consideration. While Martha 
Nussbaum, in her interpretation of the Capability Approach goes as far as suggesting a 
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definite list of dimensions to be taken into consideration, Sen does not support any 
similar restriction, thereby leaning towards a more bottom-up nature of the theory 
(Comim 2001). Moreover, by stressing the importance of the context in which economic 
phenomena take place, the Capability Approach offers a fertile framework for analyses 
that seek to investigate how just and enabling specific conditions are for human beings. 
The inherent complexity governing much of the social sciences is once again the main 
focus of the Capability Approach concerning its choice of a proper metric. The 
translation of the richness of Sen’s contribution into practical terms represents a 
challenge which includes, together with the selection of a list of dimensions, 
methodological strategies for their interaction (see, among others, Chiappero-Martinetti 
et al., forthcoming and Krishnakumar, 2014). Operationalisation of the theory for 
analytical purposes is in fact lagging behind the Neoclassical paradigm, due to both its 
greater difficulty and its comparatively recent origins. Since traditional methodologies 
appear in fact to cause the Capability Approach to lose much of its peculiarities, 
alternative ones have been tested, ranging from, among others, fuzzy set theory, an 
alternative logic based on the vagueness of variables and characters, and qualitative 
methods (Hollywood et al, 2012). 
 
8.6. Conceptual space for social innovation 
The previous paragraphs have highlighted a number of differences between 
Neoclassical economics and the Capability Approach. The Neoclassical approach 
presents some limitations for the analysis of social innovation and its role in reducing 
marginalization: on the one hand, Neoclassical economics may be appropriate for the 
analysis of market equilibrium but seems to neglect outsiders in general. In analyzing 
marginalization, therefore, Neoclassical economics may be limiting whenever the 
rationale and way of functioning of people is not directly reducible to the price system 
governing market rules. On the other hand, Neoclassical economics seems to be unable 
to account sufficiently for individual and for collective values, motivations and actions - 
elements that seem to be main drivers of social innovation processes. 
Social innovation can emerge within or outside of market rules, can make or not make 
use of price mechanism allocation and may in general pursue values or be driven by 
motivations which can or cannot be monetized but may instead be oriented toward a 
positive and medium/long-term social impact. Neoclassical economics can hardly 
accommodate such broader and plural aims and intentions, which on the contrary seem 
to be quite easily incorporated in a Capability Approach perspective. This section 
briefly summarizes to which extent thinking in terms of capabilities can represent a 
more adequate conceptual backbone for understanding the emergence and the impact of 
social innovation processes. In what follows, the theoretical elements previously 
outlined are tested for their adequacy to provide a conceptual space for social 
innovation. 
 
8.6.1. Allowing for collective agency/action 
By recognizing that social interactions are not just the sum of individuals, but an 
D1.3 CRESSI Working Paper 6 (28.02.2015) Page 104 | 133 
 
intricate and non-systematic combination of individual and relational attributes, the 
Capability Approach is potentially able to include and to understand phenomena of 
collective agency/collective action (Ibrahim, 2006; Ballet et al, 2007). Within 
Neoclassical economics, group behaviour needs to be understood as the sum of 
(identical) individual behaviours, therefore not allowing one to include elements such as 
power, cognitive frames or imitation and herding behaviour into the analysis. These 
however are elements that are likely to play a crucial role for the adoption and diffusion 
of innovative ideas and practices. 
 
8.6.2. Shared intentions 
If human motivations can in fact be different and - more importantly - not only 
instrumental for self-interest but also ends in themselves, we can imagine that ideas, as 
often embedded in social innovation processes, can move people in themselves - not 
only through their effect on self-interest. This is a fundamental hypothesis for 
understanding not only what brings social innovation processes about, but also why 
other people should believe in them, adopt them and follow a new solution or trend. The 
pursuit of some sort of common good, as often entailed by a social innovation, further 
requires individuals to embrace some sort of shared intention. The intention to preserve 
the environment, for example, may be an end in itself that actually requires some self-
constraint. A person might indeed not be maximising self-interest when contributing to 
environmental protection124. By sharing goals - that may or may not require self-
constraint - collective action can come about. Shared intentions are expected to play a 
crucial role for collective agency, so if collective agency represents a necessary element 
of social innovation, shared intentions should find a conceptual space within the general 
framework used.  
 
8.6.3. Social interactions 
Herding behaviour and imitation were mentioned, but these are not the only 
mechanisms that shape and determine the content of exchange of social interactions. 
Social interactions are likely to play a crucial role for social innovation processes, be it 
through their influence on the shape and mission that particular networks assume, or be 
it through their role as connectors in transmitting ideas, proposals and solutions 
(Bikchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Manski, 1993, Postlewaite, 1998). Yet, social 
interactions are completely ignored in the motivation-framework of Neoclassical 
economics: indeed both, the monotonicity and transitivity axioms are likely not to be the 
only, the main or any driver of actions whenever the individual is embedded into a 
context of social interactions.  
The Capability Approach tries to teach us 'complexity' in the analysis of drivers, 
motivations and actions of people. Yet, the conceptual framework is usually concerned 
with the choice-making and achievement process of the single individual. If we imagine 
how multi-faceted and complex the interaction between different actors can be, it seems 
                                                          
124 See the special issue of the Journal of Human Development and Capability on The capability approach 
and sustainability edited by Rauschmayer and Lessman (2013, Issue 1, Volume 14) 
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to become even more necessary to take distance from a conceptual framework that 
reduces every type of action and decision into a precise regularity, namely one driven 
by maximization and by self-interest. When studying human actions within social 
interactions - as is the case when investigating social innovation processes - it is likely 
that complex combinations of factors actually 'modulate' or 'mediate' strict cause-effect 
relations - even when they may be true and relevant at the individual level.  
 
8.6.4. More than preferences 
The previous paragraphs of this study therefore seem to suggest that it might be 
insufficient - and highly limiting - to see in preferences the sole drivers of choices and 
actions. The social character of social innovation especially - directly implying 
relations, exchange and connectivity - requires a broader and more comprehensive view 
of drivers: in a world in which only self-interest and its maximization are determining 
human action, we might not in fact observe social interaction at all! In order to 
understand social innovation processes, it seems to be especially necessary to consider 
imitation, herding behaviour and shared intentions, more than individual preferences, as 
these - even if correct, may not tell us much about how social innovation is coming 
about or can be scaled up.  
 
8.6.5. Commitments 
Of course, collective actions may also produce individual returns, for which individuals 
express interests. For example, a social innovation in urban gardening might also 
produce an individual return for a flat that can now enjoy a 'greener' view from its 
balcony. Yet it seems more likely to be the value attached to the principle of a more 
enjoyable public space that brings people together - note that this seems to be the crucial 
point as a single individual intending to improve her view from the balcony will not be 
able to trigger any relevant change. So, while individual preferences are clearly a part of 
the picture of reality, they seem not to be too informative about what brings people 
together, the crucial point that makes a difference for a collective action to even start. 
The conceptual space for commitments that the Capability Approach provides seems to 
be more appropriate. This is particularly true when the commitment to a collective goal 
stands partially in contrast with personal wellbeing (or utility). As previously outlined, 
such self-constraining actions may occur either because of sympathy or because of 
commitment. We expect commitments to be more relevant drivers of social innovation 
processes than sympathy, especially when the innovation process succeeds in provoking 
a mix of different social groups or classes. 
 
8.6.6. Overarching Principles 
Of course a crucial question remains in which cases individuals actually shift from self-
interest pursuing actions to broader commitments. As previously outlined, the 
Capability Approach allows for individuals to embrace some sort of 'overarching 
principles' that serve as drivers, whereas such forces of motivation are not foreseen by 
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Neoclassical economics. For the CRESSI project and its conceptual framework, 
overarching principles may be put into direct connection with cognitive frames, as these 
seem to modulate 'how we perceive reality' and therefore may constitute a cognitive 
structure as to how individuals analyse their surroundings, their options and their 
potential actions.  
 
8.6.7. Values 
From what has been stated so far it seems clear that a broad and complex base of 
possible human motivations needs to be considered or at least permitted in the analysis 
of social innovation processes. Getting back to the comparison with preferences, values 
may indeed allow for such a broader view, simply because an individual may prefer 
action A, but indeed be doing action B because of the role that certain values play for 
him or her. Of course, values may be viewed as an ex-ante matrix that somehow leads to 
final preferences. Yet, the simplification-driven framework of Neoclassical economics 
abuses the concept of preferences by placing an individual's action in between of - 
usually - two different options, which further requires to compare different options with 
the same metric, namely utility, or its maximization through self-interested behaviour. 
And yet, can common goals or shared intentions really be explained through self-
interested maximization? Where do we locate the value of the act itself, e.g. the pride or 
sense of belonging to a certain group, or simply 'being there' at a greater event, like the 
fall of the Berlin wall or of Woodstock (these are just examples). Cognitive frames may 
indeed play a major role in explaining the value attached to 'belonging' or 'being there'. 
Through this, they are likely to help explain mass behaviour, new trends and collective 
requests for change. As none of this seems to be neatly and properly referable to the 
over-simplistic model of utility maximization, by allowing a greater degree of 
complexity, we are likely to discover more driving factors for the emergence and 
realization of social innovation processes. 
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9. The Role of Incentives versus Intrinsic Motivation in 
Relation to Microcredit Activities 
By György Molnár125 
 
9.1. Introduction 
Neo-classical economics assumes rational (in the sense of consistent preferences), 
utility maximising individuals and profit maximising firms; economic actors’ are 
motivated only by their myopic self-interest, and guided by price signals. If we remain 
within this paradigm, it can be shown that any equilibrium in a competitive market is – 
in a certain sense – unimprovable. It is only a short step from here to claim that if 
something is unimprovable then it is also optimal. “Being in the core [i.e. exchange 
equilibria – my addition, G.M.], however”, warns Sen (1977, p. 320), “is not as such a 
momentous achievement from the point of view of social welfare. A person who starts 
off ill-endowed may stay poor and deprived even after the transactions, and if being in 
the core is all that competition offers, the propertyless person may be forgiven for not 
regarding this achievement as a "big deal."” 
Paradoxically, even those who do not think that the falling out of marginalised groups 
from society is acceptable often believe that the situation can be changed by using pure 
market instruments. They believe that a system of incentives should be established to 
motivate entrepreneurs to facilitate the employment of the poor and marginalised, while 
they become compelled to work. This latter perspective emerges mostly in developed or 
transition economies with existing welfare systems. This approach almost fully ignores 
the intrinsic motivations of the participants, and that ignorance may lead to a number of 
market and government failures.  
From the 1980s on, economists and policy-makers intended to give a gradually growing 
role to microlending as an attempt to support the creation of micro-businesses providing 
job opportunities and thus a living for the active poor. Investigating microcredit 
activities, the problem of incentives versus intrinsic motivation arises at least from two 
aspects: 
1. Why should a microlending institution be founded and run? 
2. Why do marginalised people apply for microcredit if a welfare system exists?  
In this paper, I will address the above questions. In doing so, I will refer to the 
experiences of Kiútprogram126, a Hungarian non-profit organisation founded in 2009, 
specialising in social microlending. Kiútprogram provides microcredit and mentoring  
primarily to socially excluded Roma people. Two different types of microcredit can be 
distinguished: microcredit referring to microloans for business start-up, and social 
microcredit, that is small loans intended to assist excluded persons to borrow money for 
expenses facilitating their social and economic integration through self-employment. 
                                                          
125 Institute of Economics, CERS-HAS. 
126 “Kiútprogram” means “Way out programme” in English. A detailed documentation can be found on 
the website of the programme at www.kiutprogramme.hu. More information about the activities of the 
programme is available at Audy et al (2013). Disclaimer: the author has participated in the design and 
operation of Kiútprogram. 
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The most important difference between the two types is the requirement to present – or 
not – any kind of financial collateral or assets (real property or other valuables). In the 
following, I will focus on social microcredit only, omitting “social” for simplicity’s 
sake.  
 
9.2. Motivations in setting up microlending institutions 
The “inventor” of microlending, Muhammad Yunus launched his experiments in 1976, 
providing unsecured loans of relatively small amounts to people living in deep poverty 
in order to enable income generation. He established the Grameen Bank in 1983 after 
processing and assessing the results of early initiatives and considering the fact that 
traditional commercial or investment banks are not willing to serve the poor. At the 
launch of his experiments, his motivation was clearly his empathy with the poor and his 
commitment to alleviate poverty (Yunus, 1999).  
In his book, he outlined the concepts of two types of social entrepreneurship:  
1. “Companies that focus on providing a social benefit rather than on maximizing 
profit for the owners, and that are owned by investors who seek social benefits such 
as poverty reduction, healthcare for the poor, social justice, global sustainability, 
and so on, seeking psychological, emotional, and spiritual satisfaction rather than 
financial reward.” (p. 274). 
2. “Profit-maximizing businesses that are owned by the poor or disadvantaged. In this 
case, the social benefit is derived from the fact that the dividends and equity growth 
produced by the PMB will go to benefit the poor…” (p. 275). 
The first type seems to move away from the neo-classical paradigm since it intends to 
build on the intrinsic motivations of investors, allowing for altruism. Although not 
obvious from the above quote, it is clear from the context and from his own practice that 
Yunus assumes that this kind of commitment is financially constrained: non-profit in 
the sense that it does not return a profit, however, it cannot be unprofitable in the long 
run, it should be – at least – sustainable. 
In the second version, this condition is more transparent. However, another issue arises: 
are socially excluded people living in deep poverty capable of truly enforcing their 
ownership rights? I am not aware of any instances when this actually has worked 
successfully – except for some financial self-help groups consisting of at most a couple 
of dozen members. What usually happens is that the sponsors’ donations generate profit 
primarily for the management. 
In both versions, apparently the implicitly assumed “psychological, emotional and 
spiritual satisfaction” gained by sacrificing the financial rewards fades away as soon as 
the capital starts to shrink; this seems to be a very unique ethical approach that 
financially curbs the degree of empathy. Thus the dissociation with neo-classical 
principles is only partial. I will get back to this issue later. 
More or less parallel with Yunus’s model, the Indonesian microcredit system was born 
(Bank Rakyat Indonesia). Marguerite Robinson (2001) covered this initiative with a 
telling title and subtitle: the expression sustainable shows up in the subtitle, Sustainable 
Finance for the Poor. In reality, it’s not only about sustainability but also profitability. 
The title of the book, The Microfinance Revolution, refers to the “revolutionary” 
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development that Ira Lieberman, former CEO of the World Bank and author of the 
foreword describes as “providing financial services – for profit – to the working poor” 
[my emphasis – G.M.]. Or, as the author says: “The focus then turns to the recent shift 
in microfinance from government and donor-subsidized credit delivery programs to 
financially self-sufficient institutions providing commercial microfinance.” (p. xxxvi) 
The author is clearly empathic with the poor with a strong sense of commitment, but 
also strongly committed to pure market economy-based solutions. The standpoint that 
the poor can be helped in a profitable way – and only in a profitable way – has soon 
turned into a neoliberal policy doctrine. Milford Bateman (2010) gives a lively 
description and criticises this process. “In short, commercialized microfinance appears 
to have undermined the long-term fight against poverty and underdevelopment in 
Bolivia” (p. 120) writes Bateman, referring to a concrete example, but later he 
generalises this statement. According to his opinion it is not more than a myth that 
microfinance directly helps the very poorest, empowers the poor and the women, or is 
self-sustainable. Bateman also highlights the fact that it is especially harmful if the loan 
recipients work in the informal economy, too.  
Even if demand for profit has not, the myth of self-sustainability and the fundamentally 
neo-liberal ideas have deeply saturated into the thinking of EU decision-makers, too. 
Because of its typical approach, it is worth to quote a study on microcredit issued by the 
European Commission (2003) a little longer from; however, similar phrasing can be 
found in almost all EU documents on microcredit.  
“Self-sustainability is a major issue for a microcredit fund. One way of achieving this 
goal can be to charge an above market interest rate. An above market rate is acceptable 
where the risk is higher. For example, in a pure subordinated loan, with no collateral at 
all by the micro-entrepreneur, the interest rate can be higher than for a traditional loan 
in order to cover all risks.” (p. 29.)  
So in order to help the poor who can’t present any type of collateral, they should be 
charged higher interest rates than the well-off. 
Regarding consequences, this paragraph has a special significance: “In several 
European countries, a below-market interest rate practice (soft loan or even interest-free 
loan) still exists. According to different sources, however, these soft loan funds 
provided by private microcredit institutions should be regarded as being of limited value 
and further development of these funds should not be encouraged. Such private funds 
cannot be self-sustainable, and therefore independent of public subsidies.” (ibid. p. 27.) 
Based on the related literature and a detailed description of an Indian case study, Ghosh 
(2013) thinks that the crisis swept away the belief in the poverty-alleviating function of 
microcredit once and for all: “However, the mushrooming of MFI’s [microfinance 
institutions] of both non-profit and profit varieties was very quickly followed by crises 
in many of the same developing countries that were earlier seen as the most prominent 
sites of success, in the typical manner of most financial bubbles that burst.” (p. 1204). 
According to the donors and designers of the above-mentioned Kiútprogram, the 
fundamental cause of microlending failures was the profit-oriented approach of MFIs 
and the requirement of self-sustainability. One of the primal causes of persistent poverty 
and the reproduction of social exclusion is the lack of capital, as Sen puts it in the 
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introduction, being “ill-endowed”.127 Without providing capital, microcredit can only 
maintain the level of disadvantage even in the best case. In this sense, three types of 
capital should be mentioned here: financial, knowledge and social.  
Kiútprogram provides knowledge and social capital by the continuous and intense 
presence of field workers and mentors. Training and assistance are provided to organise 
acquisitions and sales, and build a network with the non-Roma society. In order to 
integrate into the formal economy, in the first phase free accounting services are 
provided and the programme also covers a part of the social contribution payments. This 
is a high-cost, non-redeemable expense where self-sustainability is not an option. On the 
other hand, investment resources are provided as a loan – partly to avoid the crowding 
out effect. However, lending losses are unacceptably high from a purely market aspect, 
about 40%. From a different viewpoint, however, this means that 60% of the previously 
long-term unemployed people (mostly Roma people who face discrimination in the 
labour market) have got jobs as self-employed and become capable of providing a living 
for their families. Microlending combined with mentoring conducted by the 
Kiútprogram is cheaper and more effective than the government-financed public works 
programme.128 There are almost no other effective labour-enhancing programmes in 
Hungary targeting the marginalised, or even more narrowly, the socially excluded 
groups.129 
In contrast to the concepts described in the above cited EU document, Kiútprogram is 
financed by private sponsors who are intrinsically motivated solely by the social 
commitment towards the poor, and who do not expect self-sustainability of the MFI.130 
They expect profitability not from the MFI, but the micro-businesses. 
The lack of motivation for being profitable, the complete lack of financial incentives on 
the sponsors’ side contradicts the pure business logic so much that the Open Society 
Institute, a foundation financing several Roma programmes and managed by people 
honestly committed to social change, refused to sponsor the programme because of the 
lack of self-sustainability.  
I do not cite this because this specific incident is so noteworthy but because there is a 
strange contradiction here. In case of purely philanthropic initiatives that target the 
alleviation of the symptoms of deprivation – but not suitable of enhancing social 
mobility – it is generally accepted that sponsors and volunteers are intrinsically 
motivated. This type of charity initiatives usually meet approval from the society and 
being financially profitable is not even a question.  
However, if the aim of the initiative is to improve persistent marginalised living 
circumstances by integrating people in the labour market then considerations regarding 
financial incentives immediately come to the front. From the viewpoint of the sponsors 
of MFIs, the failure of microcredit is due to the mixing of financial incentives and 
                                                          
127 For further details see Kiútprogram (2012). 
128 For further details see Audy et al (2013). 
129 There are some excellent educational programmes, but these only have long-term effects in terms of 
increasing the chances becoming employed. 
130 Kiútprogramme received considerable EU funding between 2010 and 2012. However, they did not 
receive it as a microcredit initiative, but through regional policy bodies, as a one-time financing of a pilot 
programme to facilitate the integration of the Roma: Pilot Project Pan-European Coordination of Roma 
Integration Methods - Roma Inclusion. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/activity/roma/pilot_en.cfm  
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intrinsic motivation. 
There is one more important lesson learnt from the short history of microlending 
described above: originally it was meant to be a social innovation facilitating the 
financial inclusion of people living in deep poverty. During its implementation it was 
proven that – if appropriate techniques are applied, which will be discussed below – 
loans can be provided to poor people contrary to earlier views. All this resulted in the 
foundation of organisations whose activities contributed more to the deepening than the 
alleviation of deep poverty. 
 
9.3. The marginalised on the Hungarian labour market: incentives 
versus inner motivations 
Compared to other European countries, employment rates are very low in Hungary; in 
2013, 58% of the age group 15 to 64 was employed while the average figure in the 
European Union is 64%. The employment rate is negatively influenced by 
undereducated people (less than primary, primary and lower secondary education): only 
27% is employed in this group – the EU average is 44% (Eurostat online database, 
tables named ‘lfsi_emp_a’ and ‘lfsa_ergaed’). The employment rate of the Roma in 
Hungary is essentially the same (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2011). 
In this regard, various Hungarian governments based on a misconceived, vulgarised 
neo-liberalist ideology adopted the standpoint that unemployment – especially 
unemployment of undereducated people and the Roma – is mainly the result of factors 
on the supply side of the labour market. There is a widespread belief that jobless people 
think they are better off claiming benefits and working illegally when the opportunity 
arises compared to having a permanent job. Therefore, by reducing the amount and 
restricting access to unemployment-related assistance, jobless people can be encouraged 
to take up employment, while public works programmes – paid well below the level of 
national minimum wage – will instil better work ethic in people. In line with these ideas 
the amount and payment period of jobseeker’s allowance were reduced, eligibility for 
jobseekers’ benefit was tightened, the maximum amount of regular social assistance, 
employment replacement assistance and pay in public works programmes were cut in 
2011. (For a detailed discussion on the Hungarian social policy in the last years, see 
Szikra, 2014.) 
Most likely there has not been an experiment of this scale before. In 2014, already half 
of the registered unemployed participated in public works, while the probability of re-
employment in the open labour market from public works programmes fell to 10%. The 
more often someone is involved in public works, the less likely they are to find a job; in 
2013 more than half of people employed in public works programmes were “returning” 
participants. In terms of livelihood, it is beneficial for people who cannot find a job to 
take the opportunity to work in as many public works programmes as possible because 
the amount of employment replacement assistance is too low to live on and continued 
hardship has a negative impact on job-finding. In other words: once public works is 
available, simple calculation of a risk-averse jobseeker makes favouring it as the only 
rational choice. These effects create a special trap that is increasingly difficult to get out 
from. Public works employment was therefore clearly unable to deliver its promise of 
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rapid activation of the long-term unemployed on the open labour market. 
The above described method of using financial incentives to drive people into the labour 
market has failed. Hungary is likely to head towards the development of a severely 
segmented labour market where – including family members, too – nearly one million 
people will have decreased chances to re-enter the primary labour market. In brief, 
marginalisation is stabilised and reproduced, or even expanded (Cseres-Gergely & 
Molnár, 2014). 
The basic cause of the failure was the flaw in the original hypothesis. If the unemployed 
could easily get a job, but living on welfare was more beneficial to them, combined with 
working in the informal sector, then this fact should have also been shown in their life 
satisfaction. But the contrary is true. Model-based calculations proved that welfare 
recipients – even if the effects of other factors such as income level, education, health, 
etc. are filtered – are less satisfied with their lives than others. (Molnár & Kapitány, 
2008). But this is not a Hungarian phenomenon, see for example Clark (2010) or 
Winkelmann & Winkelmann (1998). Being unemployed is not a benefit-maximising 
decision but a situation without choices. 
This rather costly and failed social experiment offers a – sort of – positive function to 
policy-makers because it “proves” that they have done everything possible, used all 
available incentives, but these people still do not want to work. I use the phrase 
“positive” in the same meaning as Herbert Gans does in his paper, The positive 
functions of poverty (1972). It is worth citing a fitting quote here: „…the poor can be 
identified and punished as alleged or real deviants in order to uphold the legitimacy of 
dominant norms (…). The defenders of the desirability of hard work, thrift, honesty, and 
monogamy need people who can be accused of being lazy, spendthrift, dishonest, and 
promiscuous to justify these norms” (p. 280). Along these lines, the law regulating 
social benefits authorises local governments to revoke welfare benefits from those who 
are found not keeping their living surroundings clean and tidy by municipality officials. 
In the previous paragraph I highlighted the phrase “these people”, because it hides a 
covert reference – yet clear to everyone in Hungary –, namely that it refers to the 
Tzigane.131 The implications are not true, of course: although the majority of the active-
aged Roma is unemployed, the reverse does not hold true: the majority of unemployed 
is not Roma, not even the majority of the undereducated unemployed. 
Prejudices and public opinion about the idle unemployed is further strengthened by the 
fact that there is really not enough meaningful public works for so many people. Public 
works participants who work in areas visible to the general public usually sweep the 
streets, clean the gutters, rake leaves, mostly in the same place, day after day. 
Obviously, these tasks are performed with little enthusiasm, trying to slack off as much 
as possible. A survey among public works participants showed that the average rate of 
life satisfaction was 20% higher among those who thought that they were doing a 
meaningful job in the public works programme than among those who found their work 
meaningless (Farkas, Molnár, & Molnár, 2014, p. 79). 
                                                          
131 I intentionally use the word “Tzigane” instead of the politically correct “Roma”, which is closer to the 
generally used Hungarian word (“cigány”).  Interestingly, after a quick initial spreading of the word 
Roma, it stalled and it is now solely used in the public sphere; the vast majority of the Roma do not use it 
either. „If a politician comes here and says “Roma”, I immediately know that he is going to lie”, as a 
Tzigane woman told me in a remote village in the eastern part of Hungary. 
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As a result, it has become a general view even among experts that there are in fact 
several hundreds of thousand people who could not be re-integrated into the open labour 
market even in theory. The editor in chief of the periodical Munkaügyi Szemle (Labour 
Market Review) posits in one of the editorials: "It is time to face the fact that 
unfortunately there is a reproductive social group of a significant size that fully and 
permanently dropped out of the labour market, or got too far away to be able to meet its 
hardening demands." (Munkaügyi Szemle, 2013/1.) 
The main ambition of the founders of Kiútprogram was to prove in a constructive way 
that this self-apologising train of thought is wrong. Their intellectual starting point is the 
same as Amartya Sen’s: “With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively 
shape their own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive 
recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs. There is indeed a strong 
rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency – and even of 
constructive impatience.” (Sen, 1999, p. 11.) 
According to this approach, the main cause of the long-term unemployment of 
undereducated people is not the lack of willingness to work, but the lack of adequate job 
opportunities for them. As soon as an opportunity arises that they see as realistic to 
improve their own and their family’s lives substantively and in the long run, their 
attitude towards work changes immediately. The vast majority of the participants of 
Kiútprogram (93%) said that they feel that they are able to do something to have a better 
future (Audy et al., 2014, p. 15), while the same figure was only 38% measured by the 
aforementioned survey among public works participants. This shows that intrinsic 
motivation is strong; to facilitate employment, actual opportunities are needed instead of 
crafty, artificial incentives.  
But this is not so simple. If Kiútprogram offered some kind of employee status with a 
little more salary than public works then enthusiasm and interest would surely be lower. 
The main reason is the continuous failures of being employees in the clients’ past, or, 
more generally, career failures, with additional discrimination in the Romas’ case.  
It is a well-known phenomenon that long-term unemployment undermines self-esteem 
and failures often lead to aggression (often in the form of self-aggression, e.g., 
alcoholism), or to the even more characteristic apathy, feeling of helplessness. During 
fieldwork, the team members of Kiútprogram often have come across the symptoms of 
“learned helplessness” (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993). In a part of the Hungarian 
Roma community, men often experience a strong frustration because they are not able 
to provide a living for their families.132 
To overcome this phenomenon, most potential clients need a strong motivation. The 
most effective incentive is the loan, which is a rarely seen, huge amount compared with 
the usual income of the family. In addition, there is no collateral in any form. These 
poor people had never got this level of trust in their lives. The main difficulty of starting 
the programme was that potential clients first could not believe that the conditions were 
real; they thought that there would be some trick or hoax in the background.  
The role of trust is prevalent in two aspects. First, we trust the clients’ honesty that they 
                                                          
132 During the history of Kiútprogram, the typical female dominance characteristic of the microlending 
practice in developing countries did not happen. In our practice, the clients of the programme are often 
not individuals, but families. 
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want to repay the loan; second, we also believe in their potential to succeed with the 
micro-business (including agricultural production) created with the help of the loan. In 
the previous section we mentioned that loans work better than capital injection because 
they do not have an excluding effect. From a different point of view, it is also more 
practical: free money does not build trust, provides no motivation to do everything for 
the business.  
Kiútprogram is primarily not a microfinance institution, but a special active labour 
market and micro-enterprise development programme, where microlending is only one, 
not the most important, but still an indispensable tool. 
The practical operation of Kiútprogram has several similarities to Roland Fryer’s 
experiments to improve school performance among mostly black and Hispanic students. 
His results suggest that student incentives increase achievement when the rewards are 
given for inputs, but incentives tied to output are not effective (Fryer, 2010). The 
objective of such incentives is to help students start to learn – then the student has to 
make the efforts. According to Ruth Grant, financial incentives given to the students are 
fundamentally harmful, except for one instance that refer to Fryer’s experiments: “Yes, 
incentives undermine intrinsic motivation – but in some circumstances, students may 
have little intrinsic motivation to begin with. In such circumstances, a child might try 
something, on account of the temptation of an incentive, that he or she has been afraid 
to try or has been uninterested in trying. Having discovered that success is possible, the 
child may no longer need the incentive. The incentive would work like a „jump start” 
for a dead battery.” (2011, p. 119 – my emphasis, G.M.)133 
Beyond the relationship of incentives and intrinsic motivations, the parallel is further 
strengthened by the fact that in most cases (mostly in agriculture) our clients must learn 
the technology of production. Clients who didn’t even finish primary school, and 
usually hate school because of their childhood humiliation are happy to learn while 
doing productive work for their own good. After the first year, they are able to apply the 
instructions of pesticides on their own.  
The very objective of the incentive is to help clients become active, get started and after 
a two to three years’ learning process they become capable of securing a better living 
for themselves and their families independently.  
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10. CRESSI’s Common Framework 
 
Christopher Houghton Budd, C.W.M. (Ro) Naastepad and Cees van Beers134  
 
10.1. Introduction 
The subject of this chapter is to frame the findings of the papers and the results of our 
sharing and discussion of them. It also provides their implications in terms of CRESSI’s 
Common Framework,135 comprising the perspectives of Beckert, Sen and Mann.  
Thus, it provides a synthesis of this stage of the CRESSI project, and a (tentative) 
common theoretical framework as it emerges from the eight papers, which is to guide 
the case studies, measurement and analysis to be undertaken later in the project. 
Conversely, the work done in the remainder of this project will feed back into the 
common theoretical framework. 
Section 10.2 starts with a succinct explanation of neoclassical economics, particularly 
elements of it that are most relevant to CRESSI’s main theme: social innovation 
addressing marginalisation. Section 10.3 presents the findings of the papers. Section 
10.4 concludes by presenting the implications of this stage of the work for CRESSI’s 
Common Framework.  
 
10.2. A succinct-as-possible explanation of neoclassical economics 
(NCE) in relation to social innovation addressing 
marginalisation 
Neoclassical economics (NCE) will be easier to understand if we start by briefly 
investigating the historical and scientific context in which it emerged. While many of 
today’s economic theories have roots in the work of classical economists such as Adam 
Smith (1723−1790), Thomas Malthus (1766−1834), David Ricardo (1772−1823), and 
Karl Marx (1818−1883), as well as in the work of the later economist John Maynard 
Keynes, and even in the economic work of ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle136, NCE 
starts with the marginal revolution of the 1870s which involved a shift away from 
classical theories based on substance or ‘cost-of-production’ theories of value (Deane 
1990; Weintraub 2002) and the central classical concept of social surplus (Bharadwaj 
1986), towards the marginal emphasis on value as a relationship between costs of 
production and subjective elements in the person wanting to obtain the object 
(‘consumer preference’). Henceforth, price was perceived as the outcome of the 
interaction of ‘supply and demand’; “value is linked to unlimited desires and wants 
colliding with constraints, or scarcity” (Weintraub 2002). Leaving the relationship with 
the British historical context of an upcoming middle class and the growth of mercantile 
                                                          
134 The authors are grateful to Rafael Ziegler, Nadia von Jacobi, Klaus Kubeczko, Attila Havas, György 
Molnár, and Justus Lodemann for fruitful discussion and for valuable comments on an earlier version of 
this chapter. Any errors in this chapter remain the responsibility of the authors. 
135 Summarised at the end of D1.1 and also at the end of this chapter. 
136 In particular Aristotle’s concepts of use value and exchange value. 
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capital for sociologists of science and economic historians to explore, attention shifted 
away from the study of actual, historical, dynamic processes of production taking place 
in space and time, to subjectivist (utilitarian) and ahistorical analysis of axiomatic 
concepts such as consumer preference and market equilibrium. 
When, after about a century of ‘early neoclassical thinking’ − by William Stanley 
Jevons (1835−1882), Carl Menger (1840−1921), Francis Edgeworth (1845−1926), and 
Alfred Marshall (1842−1924) − neoclassical economics was finally established as a 
complete and consistent general-equilibrium system, efforts concentrated for some time 
on the question how utilitarian (self-interested) human behaviour and perfect 
competition could spontaneously bring about general equilibrium − a concept derived 
from nineteenth-century natural science137 (Mirowski 1991). Inspired by the work of 
Léon Walras (1834−1910), Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu (1954) finally showed 
that, under a series of very restrictive assumptions, there exists a set of prices at which 
supply equals demand (Schlefer 2012). 
How do these characteristics of NCE relate to the main theme of the CRESSI project: 
the creation of economic space for social innovation addressing marginalisation? Two 
issues are highlighted below regarding, firstly, neoclassical equilibrium, and secondly, 
its assumptions. 
What does the neoclassical equilibrium set of prices entail? With its focus on economic 
growth – an understandable choice given the low average living standards in the 
nineteenth century − NCE is concerned with the problem of how to maximise the output 
of commodities given available endowments of land or nature (N), labour (L), and 
capital (K). Naturally, the highest possible output will be obtained when N, L and K are 
used efficiently, i.e. not wastefully.138 The neoclassical assumption is that efficiency is 
guaranteed if N, L and K are traded in markets governed by self-interest (profit-
maximising producers and utility-maximising consumers), that is, if N, L and K are 
traded in the same way as commodities are traded. Prices will signal where N, L and K 
are most needed, and ensure that the ‘factors of production’ end up where demand for 
them is highest. The maximum output which thus will be reached entails full 
employment of all ‘factors of production’.  
The distribution of income brought about by ‘factor markets’ is taken to reflect each 
individual’s marginal productivity. With classical concepts such as subsistence wage 
and cost-based pricing discarded, neoclassical markets do not allow for, for instance, a 
subsistence minimum or, on the other hand, a cap on the price of land or capital; on the 
contrary, such ‘interventions’ are believed to reduce growth and create unemployment. 
That such statements are hard to prove, because they are built on tautologies, is a 
methodological issue yet to be resolved (Blaug 1992). Pending a solution, countries 
where NCE is implemented in a relatively pure form, such as Britain and the U.S., 
experience relatively high poverty rates, alongside high average per capita incomes. For 
                                                          
137 Especially the formalisation, in the 1840s (based on earlier work by Joseph-Louis Lagrange  (born 
Giuseppe Lodovico Lagrangia), Pierre-Simon Laplace, and Sir William Rowan Hamilton), of the two 
laws of thermodynamics (the law of conservation of energy/matter, and the entropy law); see Philip 
Mirowski (1991); Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971).  
138 Looking at output from the side of supply, NCE disregards an independent role for demand, assuming 
that (at the macro-level) it will adjust to what producers offer (‘Say’s Law’). This distinguishes NCE from 
Keynes who, observing the mass unemployment of the Great Depression, concluded that Say’s Law 
(‘supply creates its own demand’) does not always hold.  
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those who consider this amoral, U.S. economist and Nobel prize laureate Paul Krugman 
explains: “… the amorality of the market economy is part of its essence, and cannot be 
legislated away”. Labour should be traded, “just like apples or coal”; markets are 
“absolutely and relentlessly amoral”. The only option to deal with poverty and 
marginalisation is “after-market intervention”.139 Within NCE, distributional issues are 
relegated to a subfield of NCE called ‘welfare economics’ (Atkinson 2011). Welfare 
economics ranks the effects of policy interventions in terms of the social welfare they 
entail. Based on neoclassical assumptions, its outcomes tend to involve a trade-off 
between ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’; exploration of the possibility of efficiency going 
hand in hand with everyone’s material existence needs being met is not a prominent 
neoclassical concern: 
 “An economy can be [Pareto] optimal … even when some people are rolling in luxury 
and others are near starvation as long as the starvers cannot be made better off without 
cutting into the pleasures of the rich. If preventing the burning of Rome would have 
made Emperor Nero feel worse off, then letting him burn Rome would have been Pareto 
optimal. In short, a society or an economy can be “Pareto optimal” and still be perfectly 
disgusting.” (Sen 1970) 
Thus, the neoclassical equilibrium set of prices does not preclude marginalisation. That 
is, the fact that it brings about equilibrium does not guarantee that the equilibrium price 
vector – including the ‘price’ of labour, land and capital – permits each individual to 
cover his or her material existence needs. As neoclassical economists acknowledge, “a 
resource allocation can be inter-temporally efficient and yet be perfectly ghastly” 
(Dasgupta & Heal 1979: 257). Yet, the assumption is that if the economy is run on 
neoclassical assumptions and prescriptions, total output will be higher, and this will 
permit compensation − through after-market redistribution – of those whom the market 
hasn’t served well. In other words, the scale effects of adherence to neoclassical 
assumptions will allow ‘winners’ to compensate ‘losers’. However, that the wealth that 
is created will eventually ‘trickle down’ is assumed rather than conclusively proved. 
Material existence for everyone is assumed to be taken care of ‘after the fact’. 
Nevertheless, such neoclassical results – of compensation and ‘trickle down’ − only 
hold within the framework of the restrictive assumptions underlying the Arrow-Debreu 
model. If ‘externalities’ − such as commitment to desired social or environmental 
outcomes − cannot be ruled out, the neoclassical conclusions – e.g. of scale effects 
outweighing distribution effects, or a trade-off between efficiency and equity − no 
longer hold. Walrasian general equilibrium (GE) solutions do not hold in a world where 
neoclassical assumptions do not apply.  
The discovery that most neoclassical assumptions do not hold in reality may be the 
reason why NCE has moved away from investigating GE to microeconomic partial 
equilibrium studies of situations where one or more assumptions do not hold. However, 
the implications for GE are seldom analysed; in general, NCE continues to fall back on 
the theoretical Walrasian model, basing its policy conclusions on it, rather than working 
out how the model would have to change if the micro-studies of ‘market failures’ and 
‘externalities’ were taken seriously. The latter would imply a paradigm change, which 
most researchers are not prepared to explore.   
                                                          
139 Paul Krugman, Washington Monthly, September 1998 (Book review of The Living Wage. Building a 
Fair Economy by Robert Pollin and Stephanie Luce.) 
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How did NCE come to prevail? This may be due in no small measure to its rational, 
mechanical metaphor, borrowed from nineteenth-century physics (Mirowski 1991), 
which readily lends itself to mathematisation. “Agents were like atoms; utility was like 
energy; utility maximisation was like the minimisation of potential energy, and so forth” 
(Weintraub 2002). This rational, mechanical metaphor may be appealing for two 
reasons: first, because it speaks the language of physics, which has strong connotations 
of objectivity;140 secondly, because it may invoke the idea – real or illusory – that social 
goals come within reach simply by modelling the system and by altering – from outside 
− its parameters: a technocratic or social-engineering approach. Since in the past two to 
three decades NCE, including its explanation of ‘production factors’, has generally been 
taught at schools and universities as if it were the only (sensible) perspective on 
economics that exists141 − indeed a ‘meta-theory’ framing all economic as well as non-
economic thinking (Weintraub 2002) − it is the dominant perspective informing 
policy142, the presence of other theories and attitudes notwithstanding.  
The question for the CRESSI project is to what extent this theoretical framework is 
suited for analysing and furthering innovation, in particular social innovation addressing 
marginalisation. Although NCE originally was not developed to deal with innovation, 
later additions to NCE have dealt with technological progress, although treating it as an 
exogenous factor. More recently, neoclassical growth theory has attempted to 
endogenise technological progress, attributing it to profit-maximising behaviour in 
oligopolistic conditions at the micro-level and, typically, R&D investment, competition, 
and average education levels at the macro-level. NCE has also taken on board concepts 
from evolutionary, institutional, and behavioural economics in an attempt to add realism 
to NCE’s strict and axiomatic assumptions. However, such explanations still rely 
heavily on core neoclassical assumptions and the ruling out of ‘externalities’ which may 
be critical for social innovation, in particular commitment to selfless objectives: 
“Mainstream economic theory makes powerful use of the assumption of full-blooded 
pursuit of self-interest. Some specific results, including the central Arrow-Debreu 
theorems on the efficiency and Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria, are based on 
ruling out “externalities” (including altruism) altogether, except in some very restricted 
form. Even when altruism is allowed (as, for example, in Gary Becker’s model of 
rational allocation), it is assumed that the altruistic actions are undertaken because they 
promote each person’s own interests; there are personal gains to the altruist’s own 
welfare, thanks to sympathy for others. No role is given to any sense of commitment 
about behaving well or to pursuing some selfless objectives. (Sen 1997) 
For an understanding of the innovation process, and social innovation in particular, 
‘other-interest’ and commitment to behaving well may be critical, and their absence 
might act as an inhibitor in the innovation process. The inability of NCE to deal with 
such ‘externalities’ explains the need for novel frameworks and concepts. We come 
                                                          
140 Whether recent discoveries of subjectivity in physics corroborate such connotations is another matter. 
141 Often one is told, directly or indirectly, that if one does not accept the tenets of neoclassical economics 
– in particular the definition that economics is “…the science which studies human behaviour as the 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” Lionel Robbins (1932) – one is 
not an economist. This, combined with the abolition of economic history, the history of economic 
thought, and the philosophy and sociology of science as subjects in the economics curriculum in the past 
three decades, results in students having no reference point from which they can contextualise or verify 
such claims.  
142 Whether as theory driving the policy-making process or as after-the-fact legitimation. 
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back to the latter (in Section 10.4) after investigating causes of ‘externalities’ that are 
particularly relevant for social innovation. 
 
10.3. ‘Externalities’ in social innovation 
The neoclassical concept of ‘externality’ is defined as “The effect of one party’s 
economic activities on another party that is not taken into account by the price system” 
(Nicholson and Snyder 2007: 359). Positive externalities are benefits to society whose 
costs (whether of goods production or service provision) cannot be recouped by their 
producer. An example is an innovation in waste water cleaning by a firm which benefits 
everyone while those benefiting from it are not charged. Negative externalities are costs 
to society that cannot be charged. An example is (possible) negative health impacts of 
WiFi143 which affect everyone but are not charged to the firm causing the problem, nor 
to the users of the goods. Because the externalities are not charged, they do not appear 
on the income and expenditure account and balance sheet of profit-maximising 
producers (cf. Muller, Mendelsohn and Nordhaus (2011); hence they are not minimised 
(for negative externalities) or maximised (for positive externalities). In neoclassical 
terms, the costs and benefits associated with the generation of externalities are ‘non-
appropriable’. The (assumed) social implications of ‘externalities’ are that goods (and 
services) with positive benefits will be under-supplied; those with negative externalities 
will be over-supplied. 
The neoclassical solution is to price ‘externalities’ so that they can be ‘individualised’ 
and ‘internalised’, thus becoming part of processes of profit maximisation and cost 
minimisation, which is expected to simultaneously maximise social benefit and 
minimise social cost. It is the self-interestedness of profit maximisation that, according 
to NCE, leads markets to produce whatever consumers want (subject to income 
constraints). Externalities undermine the social benefits of individual self-interest, in the 
sense that it no longer gives optimal societal results (social benefits are under-produced 
and social costs are not minimised). The solution is to price, and create markets for, 
externalities so that they can be internalised, which will lead to socially optimal levels 
of production. 
However, to make matters more complicated, other possibilities are also thinkable (see 
also Bootle below). Rather than being charged to specific producers or consumers, costs 
may also be shifted forward to the public balance sheet and so on-charged through 
taxation. Or costs are arrived at reversely, for example the costs of police on a school 
campus because the content of teaching does not hold the students’ attention so they 
become bored and indisciplined. 
Such limits of self-interest as the basis for our social order – indeed, of self-interest as a 
“civilising medium’’; see Hirschman (1997) – are not readily captured by NCE’s 
underlying more fundamental assumption, epitomised as homo economicus. But they 
are a concern to social innovators addressing marginalisation.  
                                                          
143 See, for instance, http://www.freiburger-appell-2012.info/en/home.php?lang=EN; 
http://www.electrohealth.nl/images/govt/Raad_van_Europa_12608_dangers_of_electromagnetic_fields.p
df; http://www.electrohealth.nl/images/elektrogevoeligheid/EMF_Guideline_OAK-AG_2012_03_03.pdf. 
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A problem with an exclusively neoclassical solution is that the externalities concerned 
may not be quantifiable in any precise way. Moreover, the underlying assumptions 
regarding human motivation may not (fully) hold for social innovators and/or for the 
problems they are concerned with. If governance and models for entrepreneurship and 
innovation based on price only incentives cannot bring about efficient solutions to 
marginalisation, there would be a need for novel analytical frameworks relevant for 
social innovation. 
The papers in this report suggest that the following causes of ‘externalities’ are 
important in social innovation:  
1) Creation and spreading of knowledge – Social innovation depends on and itself is 
likely to further the creation and spreading of new knowledge. When innovation is 
interpreted in a more narrow sense, as newly-generated organisational or 
technological knowledge to improve processes and/or products, it tends to be under-
produced in perfect competition, because the new knowledge is non-exclusive, 
which makes it impossible for the innovator to appropriate the returns and thereby 
recoup the cost of innovation (Arrow (1962), referred to by Kubeczko, this report). 
This is likely to hold more strongly for social innovation. 
2) Dynamics and uncertainty − Social innovation by its nature involves taking 
decisions under uncertainty – since it will often be impossible to attach exact 
probabilities to future outcomes. The neoclassical way of reaching equilibrium 
requires an overview of all possible outcomes regarding production and 
consumption, present as well as future, with probabilities attached to all of them. In 
a world characterised by innovation, such information is not available (see Havas; 
Kubeczko; von Jacobi; Ziegler). A framework for social innovation will have to 
show ways for dealing with uncertainty and dynamic efficiency (Schumpeter) rather 
than perfect information and static efficiency. 
3) Trust and motivation – A framework for analysing social innovation would also take 
into account the negative effects which extreme poor conditions may have on trust 
and motivation (Molnár). This is an example of a ‘negative externality’ which is 
unlikely to disappear automatically within a competitive, free-market framework. 
4) Myopia, or discounting the future − Benefits of social innovation are likely to 
include non-economic, non-monetised dimensions, in particular: fulfilment of 
capabilities (Sebastianelli, Chiappero and von Jacobi) or capacities (Naastepad and 
Houghton Budd). The creation of such benefits requires funding. At present, 
however, funding is mostly commercial and linked to projects generating short-term, 
private, financial returns. Long-term, social, and non-monetised returns are 
discounted, although in the end, such benefits are likely to improve economic 
outcomes as well. These are examples of positive externalities which may be created 
by social innovation and are not captured by NCE. 
Can the externalities involved in social innovation be removed by internalising them, as 
would be the neoclassical solution? The internalisation of externalities related to social 
innovation may be problematic, because the pricing (or ‘monetisation’) of external 
benefits of social innovation − such as increased capacities and/or capabilities − poses 
problems of a fundamental nature. The first concerns the valuation (in money terms) of 
impacts such as ‘increased access to health or education’, ‘greater self-worth’, or ‘more 
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fulfilment’ of the (previously) marginalised.  
Second, even if it were possible to attach a monetary value to such benefits, the next 
question would be how we can make sure that the prices attached to them are socially 
optimal. A socially optimal price would reflect the value of the benefit over its entire 
life time, not just to the person receiving the benefit, but also to society at large which 
benefits from the enhanced capabilities and/or capacities of the individual. Such 
difficulties are likely to greatly complicate if not preclude the determination of the 
‘socially optimal’ value. 
A related fundamental problem is the choice of the ‘appropriate’ social rate of discount 
to be used to turn ‘future benefits’ into ‘present value’ terms. For example, enhanced 
capabilities may have effects in the distant future, for instance on children, 
grandchildren, pupils, students, colleagues, in short, everyone whose capabilities are 
enhanced and whose capacities can unfold thanks to the person whose capabilities were 
enhanced in the first place. At what discount rate are these to be valued?   
Further, suppose the relevant benefits can be properly priced, so that they can act as 
incentives for social innovation; they would then have to be sufficiently high to 
compensate for the risk involved, which is likely to be high, since the outcome of social 
innovation is fundamentally uncertain. Moreover, such results have to be comparable to 
alternative investment opportunities. If the internalised benefits of social innovation do 
not sufficiently raise the rate of return to such innovations (relative to risk), it will be 
unlikely that these price incentives will achieve what we would like them to do: 
mobilise greater funding for social innovation. 
Finally, and most importantly: apart from the neoclassical question whether externalities 
can be monetised and whether a market for them can be developed, another question 
that arises is whether they should be monetised and marketed? This takes us to the core 
behavioural assumptions of NCE, i.e. its perspective on human nature. According to 
NCE, people both are and should be motivated by financial gain. This can be 
understood when the reason why NCE emphasises these human qualities is understood. 
NCE has, from the beginning, been concerned with economic growth. This may be 
understandable in the context in which it emerged, about two centuries ago, when living 
standards were much lower than today, and where an expansion of opportunities − 
indeed capabilities − of people required, first of all, an increase in the number and 
quality of goods available to them. The neoclassical idea was that the quickest way to 
achieve this would be through (1) private property and (2) the pursuit of self-interest. 
For if self-interested persons own capital, what will they do? They will attempt to 
multiply it. This capital became the basis for the expansion of the productive base of the 
economy. For in the days of Adam Smith, when financial markets were not as 
ubiquitous as they are today, the way to accumulate capital was to start a factory and 
produce goods. This is what Adam Smith called the ‘invisible hand’: when an 
entrepreneur expands the number of goods which people have at their disposal, he 
serves society as much as he serves himself, even though the former was no part of his 
intention. Private benefit equals social benefit. But what does accumulation mean in 
today’s context of an economy characterised by  ‘financialisation’? Does accumulation 
still add to physical investment and the expansion of goods? Indeed, does the expansion 
of goods have the same priority today as it had two centuries ago – a question raised by 
Keynes already in 1930 and by Amartya Sen and many others today?  
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The rise of NCE should be seen also in the social context of 18th-century Britain. When 
NCE emerged, its emphasis on self-interest was part of an emancipatory movement. The 
amassing of mercantile capital gave an upcoming middle class a ground to stand on, 
independently of norms, values and rules set by the Church, the state and the nobility. 
Capital gave human beings a basis on which they could stand on their own, independent 
of the restraints set by tradition, permitting them to pursue their own individual task in 
life. Are NCE, and capital, emancipatory still? The papers in this report suggest that this 
may require a further step in the development of NCE, or economics in general: the 
inclusion of ‘other-interest’, ‘ethical individualism’ or ‘character’ in addition to self-
interest (see also Section 10.4). This may be the way to, in the words of Roger Bootle of 
London’s Capital Economics, “save capitalism from itself”.144  
For if today, thanks to the increase in living standards achieved through two to three 
centuries of accumulation, other − mainly non-material − values come into view, is 
pursuit of self-interest only the way to achieve them? In relation to non-material 
dimensions of life, the human being tends to be intrinsically motivated (committed) 
rather than driven by external (price) incentives. The papers in this report point to 
perspectives on human nature according to which human beings are ‘intrinsically 
motivated’, ‘committed’, or have ‘character’. Indeed, concerns are that insistence on 
incentives in relation to non-material aspects of life may even have counterproductive 
effects. Most importantly, it may cause what Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) have 
called “motivation crowding out”, and erode intrinsic motivation itself (Grant 2011). In 
short, in the case of non-material dimensions of life which tend to be important in 
contemporary society and in social innovation − such as capacities and capabilities −, 
one-sided emphasis on incentives may lead to their ‘under-production’. This is the crux 
of the question, and an important subject for further investigation.  
Today, the neoclassical principles which were developed originally to deal with the 
production of goods are increasingly applied also in the realm of non-material, non-
economic dimensions of life. This becomes visible already in the notion of ‘services’, 
but more concretely in terms of things such as education, research, wellbeing, even 
spiritual aspects of life such as morality and a sense of meaning and direction in life.145 
Perhaps related to reduced possibilities of further expansions of the economy proper − 
given contemporary phenomena such as ‘demand saturation’, ‘secular stagnation’, ‘de-
growth’ –, the imperative of accumulation increasingly draws non-material, non-
economic dimensions of life − which previously were acknowledged, for instance by 
macro-sociologists such as Max Weber, to belong to non-economic realms (cf.  Mann’s 
‘culture’) − into the economic realm. As a consequence, health care, education, 
research, wellbeing, even capabilities, are now also called ‘goods’, and new ‘markets’ 
                                                          
144 “The Trouble with Markets has grown out of my burgeoning worry that the financial collapse of 
2008/9, the essence of which I can claim to have foreseen, imperils not just the economy but capitalism 
itself. Globalisation, the root of recently low inflation and increased prosperity, is at risk. And dare I say 
it, democracy, the root of everything is at risk as well.” See 
https://www.capitaleconomics.com/staff/roger-bootle.html) and Bootle (2012) The Trouble with 
Markets. Saving Capitalism from Itself, London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. 
145 For instance, finding a gene for morality, or drugs or implantable chips for enhanced attention and 
cognition, opens up prospects of new ‘markets’. But does this improve people’s capabilities and 
capacities, or preclude their unfolding and development? 
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are created for their ‘production’.146 Does this create sufficient economic space for, for 
instance, what the ‘Capability Approach’ calls ‘evaluative space’ and ‘ethical 
individualism’? Will it lead to socially optimal levels of the non-material dimensions of 
human life, at socially optimal prices and socially optimal quality?  
One of the reasons for such ‘economic imperialism’ (Lazear 2000) is the lack (real or 
imagined) of other perspectives on these issues. In an attempt to fill this lacuna, the 
papers in this report point to novel theoretical frameworks and concepts as well as novel 
institutions and economic solutions that may be more adequate to deal with the non-
material nature of the factors that are important in addressing marginalisation (see 
Section 10.4). 
 
10.4. Towards theoretical foundations for social innovation:  
CRESSI’s Common Framework 
In terms of CRESSI’s Common Framework, as represented by Table 1 and Figure 3 in 
Deliverable 1.1 (reproduced below),147 the papers in this report agree that social 
innovation requires intellectual space for a reconsideration and widening of ‘cognitive 
frames’ (in terms of Beckert) or ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’ (Mann) – in particular, of NCE 
and theories derived from it, that is, most of what today is regarded as standard 
economics.  
This, in turn, requires ‘space’ in institutions (Beckert) and politics (Mann) for the 
evaluation and rethinking of values and ideals. Finally, intellectual and institutional 
space depend on the economic space created by their funding.  
  
                                                          
146 Examples are the ‘health care market’, the ‘market’ for higher education; ‘social impact bonds’; the 
opening up of psychotherapy and psychiatry to financial investors.  
147
 See: C. Houghton Budd, C.W.M. Naastepad, and C. van Beers, "From ‘Common Framework’ to 
measurement and analysis", in C. Houghton Budd, C.W.M. Naastepad, and C. van Beers (Eds.) (2015), 
Report on Institutions, Social Innovation & System Dynamics from the Perspective of the Marginalised, 
CRESSI Deliverable 1.1, Chapter 11. Available at: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-
impact/cressi/publications-0 
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Table 1: Integration of Sen, Beckert and Mann (1)1 
 
Sources of Power2 Kinds of: 
Marginalisation 
(1) 
Social innovation 
(2) 
Capabilities 
(3) 
1. Cultural (Ideological) Cm Ci Cc 
2. Economic Em Ei Ec 
3. Security-related (Military) Sm Si Sc 
4. Political Pm Pi Pc 
5. Artefactual Am Ai Ac 
6. Natural Nm  Nc 
(1) Based on: Risto Heiskala (2014) Relating Mann’s conception to CRESSI (see this report). 
(2) Note that this matrix is based on RH’s elaboration of Mann’s The Sources of Social Power.     
     Mann distinguished four sources of social power: RH adds two sources (natural and artefactual) while  
     renaming two others (‘ideological’ becoming ‘cultural’ and ‘military’ becoming ‘security-related’). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Extended Social Grid Model and Social Innovation 
 
More specifically, the papers in this report suggest that social innovation addressing 
marginalisation may critically depend on the following. 
 
10.4.1. The creation of intellectual, institutional and economic space 
Rather than adherence to predetermined rules (von Jacobi) and goals (Ziegler; 
Lodemann), social innovation requires space for existing ideas to be evaluated, for 
novel ideas to be born and developed, and for will grounded in ‘ethical individualism’148 
                                                          
148 In the Capability Approach, “Ethical individualism … postulates that individuals, and only individuals, 
are the units of moral concern [so that] when evaluating different states of social affairs, we are only 
interested in the (direct and indirect) effects of those states on individuals" (Robeyns 2005). 
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(von Jacobi; Sebastianelli, Chiappero and von Jacobi). This may involve a 
reconsideration of current paradigms and ‘best practices’. 
Bringing into practice novel ideas requires institutional and political space. Institutions 
(including legislative processes and regulation) reflect values, collective interests and, in 
terms of Mann, social powers. At present, such values are largely informed by the 
values and conceptions of NCE (Kubeczko) including a one-sided focus on incentives 
and work ethic (Molnár). Social innovation, on the other hand, will require an 
institutional and policy setting adequate for the generation and distribution of 
knowledge (Kubeczko), learning and acquisition of entrepreneurial qualities (Molnár), 
and evaluation, renegotiation and modification of values and social objectives (von 
Jacobi). Finally, coordination of plans and sharing of information and (collective) 
interests with other individuals and groups may help overcome (assumed) atomistic 
behaviour and improve decision-making concerning social innovation (von Jacobi).  
Without material needs being met, evaluative and institutional space will remain 
illusory. Both, therefore, require the creation of economic space, in particular, the 
channelling of funds towards financing intellectual and institutional space. This, in turn, 
requires novel economic underpinnings, both intellectually (see point 10.4.3. below) and 
in practice (see 10.4.2). 
 
10.4.2.  ‘Other-interest’’ 
The replacement of market automatism with conscious evaluation and rethinking of 
values will place individuals before the task of balancing their own interests with those 
of others.  
The CRESSI project advocates a Schumpeterian approach to innovation, in that 
Schumpeter places the entrepreneur centre-stage (see also the papers by Ziegler and 
Molnár). But entrepreneurship can be self- or other-serving. ‘Other-interest’ would 
involve discussion of the normative presuppositions and implications of 
entrepreneurship and innovation, and of maintenance of the health and integrity of the 
system (Ziegler); it would also involve creating room for commitment (Lodemann). For 
although social innovations need to be profitable in order to stay in business (Molnár), 
they are often not developed without the presence of committed entrepreneurs, 
financiers and customers prepared to go against, rather than passively responding to, 
market incentives. 
 
10.4.3. A dual theory of value and capital 
The above suggestions take us to the heart of economics and finance. To raise them is to 
question the concept of homo economicus, asking what wider image of the human being 
is a match for social innovation. This may require an expansion of homo economicus 
into a more virtuous successor who includes ‘intrinsic motivation’ (Molnár), ‘ethical 
individualism’ (von Jacobi; Ziegler; Sebastianelli, Chiappero and von Jacobi) and 
‘character’ (Naastepad and Houghton Budd). It is only when ‘incentives’ are replaced 
by a sense of ‘telos’, as well as commitment to it (‘character’, ‘intrinsic motivation’, 
‘ethical individualism’) that capital can become available for purposes other than self-
interested accumulation and preservation of capital (Naastepad and Houghton Budd).  
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From an economic-sociological point of view, the ‘Capabilities Approach’ goes a long 
way to challenge the assumption of homo economicus as a concept for humanity and as 
the foundation for its economic dealings (Sebastianelli, Chiappero and von Jacobi). Its 
notions of ‘diversity’, ‘plurality of scope’, and ‘multiple evaluative spaces’, for 
example, directly and specifically challenge neoclassical atomistic individualism. 
A main reason why NCE builds on the notion of homo economicus lies in the role it 
assigns to capital (Naastepad and Houghton Budd). NCE (as well as in most other 
streams of economic thought) focuses on economic growth, and capital serves this 
purpose. According to NCE, the quickest way to economic growth is when capital is led 
by self-interest. A broader vision (or version) of the economy is provided by Keynes’s 
understanding of the economic problem as ‘meeting material needs so that fine actions 
can be carried out’, or Sen’s understanding that growth of GNP is not to be understood 
as a goal in itself, but “a means to expanding the real freedoms enjoyed by the members 
of the society” (Sen 2001). In this view, capital serves a dual purpose, as the financier of 
production as well as the enabler of fine actions. Focused as it is on material aspects of 
existence (accumulation of material wealth), NCE has no direct eye for ‘fine actions’ or 
the unfolding of capabilities and capacities. The idea of capacities as a new counterpart 
of capital overcomes this myopia, enabling a widening of the lens of NCE, or indeed all 
conventional economics.  
 
10.4.4. Revisiting efficiency 
Social innovators care about outcomes and processes in terms of marginalisation 
(Ziegler; Lodemann). For social innovators, efficient solutions to marginalisation may 
require a reconsideration of the concept of efficiency. Efficiency concerns the 
relationship between a goal and the resources used to achieve it. For social innovation 
addressing marginalisation, the efficiency question would be how to reduce 
marginalisation with least cost. This, however, raises a complication.  
Efficiency is often measured as P/C, i.e. the amount P of some valuable output per 
amount C of resources used. However, for social innovators, this relationship is more 
complicated than in NCE, because cost (price) itself may have an impact on 
marginalisation. Unlike in NCE one cannot say: “the end justifies the means”, because 
the means are an integral part of the end.  
 
10.4.5. A re-consideration of methodology and scientific-ness 
Equally central to the papers is the need to revisit the meaning of science in the field of 
economics. Of particular epistemological and scientific relevance here is the discussion 
(in the paper by Sebastianelli, Chiappero and von Jacobi) of inductive and deductive 
reasoning. 
Although too substantial a topic to treat here with any justice, the outcome of the debate 
on frameworks relevant for social innovation may well depend on our ability to find 
alternatives to both induction and deduction. 
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10.5. Conclusion 
If we now span the arch from where CRESSI started, that is, the statement in the EU 
(2013) FP7 programme call that  
“…we lack systematic research about how markets, public sector and 
institutions (including incentives, norms and legal provisions) work for those 
groups of society which are marginalised….”,149  
to the end of CRESSI Work Package 1, how do deliverables D1.1 and D1.3 help in 
understanding the relationships between, on the one hand, marginalisation, and on the 
other hand, markets, institutions, and norms, and the role which social innovations 
could play in overcoming such marginalisation? 
WP1 (deliverables D1.1 and D1.3) has resulted in a framework that places markets and 
marginalisation within a wider context of society as a whole, which is described as 
consisting of different spheres, in particular, (1) ‘cognitive frames’(in terms of Beckert) 
or ‘culture’(in terms of Mann), (2) ‘institutions’ (in terms of Beckert) or ‘politics’ (in 
terms of Mann), and (3) ‘social networks’ (in terms of Beckert) or the economy (in 
terms of Mann). 
When looked at from the perspective of these (three) spheres, questions of markets and 
marginalisation take on a new dimension. In particular, the question arises whether, for 
instance, behaviour, incentives, values, cognitive frames, and institutions which may 
work for markets or in the economy, are also appropriate for the sphere of institutions 
and politics, and the sphere of culture and cognitive frames?  
Taking a concrete example from the present report: are incentives, which may be 
appropriate in the economic sphere, also appropriate in the sphere of regulation (e.g. 
‘tradable emission rights’) and in the sphere of culture (e.g. a ‘market for higher 
education’, or, in terms of capabilities in the sense of Amartya Sen, a ‘market for 
capabilities’)?  
Above all, social innovation addressing marginalisation may require answers to such 
questions.  
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